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Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
In this dissertation,

argue that writing philosophical

I

texts is a self-constituting activity as well as a meaning-

producing activity and that both activities are genderinformed.

To do this

I

develop an interpretive framework

based on some philosophical and psychoanalytic theories of
self viewed from a feminist perspective.

The philosophical

theories provide the background and context for

examination of

a

Lacanian theory of self.

a

closer

The latter is then

critiqued and revised in light of object relations theory and
feminist perspectives on psychoanalysis
of Irigaray and Chodorow)

.

I

(in

particular, those

then apply this interpretive

framework to specific texts of three philosophers
(Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre)

I

.

target a puzzle of

interpretation presented by each of these texts.
help of my interpretive framework

I

With the

give each text a "gender-

sensitive" reading that resolves the puzzle in an

illuminating way.
Each text demonstrates what

I

positioning with its own version of

term a variation in male
a

gender barrier that

precludes certain solutions to problems presented by the
text

.

By exploring constraints presented by the need to

vi

maintain

a

particular version of male positioning,

I

provide

an internal critique of what we might call a "masculinist

perspective.

Such a critique, by calling attention to the

inherent limitations of three examples of male positioning,

motivates an expansion of that perspective to incorporate
other points of view.

I

thus hope to demonstrate some ways

in which gender categories inform philosophical "truths" and

to motivate further work on the effects of gender in

philosophical texts.

Such work could clarify problems in

self-constituting activity presented by the need to maintain
a

partiuclar gender identity, and possibly suggest avenues

for solutions to philosophical problems that would involve

deconstructing gender categories entirely.
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CHAPTER

1

SETTING THE CONTEXT
1

.

1

Introduction
The question of who we are

human being

— has

— what

kind of creature is a

been with us for a long time.

Philosophers

have made many attempts over the centuries to give the

definitive answer, but the more we probe the question the
more complicated it seems to get.

Evolving scientific

procedures to study objects "out there" is difficult enough,
but when the object of study is ourselves, we seem to run

into the paradoxical problem of trying to split ourselves in

two in order to become our own objects of study.

Nowhere is this paradox more apparent than in the
attempts that philosophers have made to theorize about the
self.

We feel ourselves to be the subjects of our own

thoughts and actions.

My thought is not your thought; you

are not responsible for my actions.

subject of my experiences as

I

Not only am

have them, but

I

the

can remember

I

my past experiences as mine, and respond to current

situations as "me".
total of who

This "me" somehow represents the sum

am and who I've been--the self to which

I

I

refer all my experiences over the greater part of my lifespan.

We all feel we have one,

and we suspect that it is a

crucial aspect of being human, and yet when we try to say
just what it is,

it

slips away from us.

We either close our

eyes and stop our ears in the attempt to find it
(Descartes)

[

1

]

,

decide it simply doesn't exist

(Hume) [2],

or

2

turn to discussions of personal identity instead

(contemporary analytic philosophers)
self

a

[3]

.

And yet a theory of

theory about the subjective experience we all have

that my experiences are mine

is crucial to our understanding

of human beings as subjects of knowledge, as agents of

action, thought or desire, and as participants in social and

political systems.

Human beings are not simply objects whose

behavior can be tabulated and analyzed; they are intentional
agents whose consciousness of themselves and the world they
live in form an inextricable feature of everything they say,

think or do.
The traditional, humanist view of human beings as

unified,

rational,

self-interested agents, has become

increasingly suspect.

In this dissertation

I

develop an

open-ended theory of self that can meet some of the
challenges of post-modernist attacks on traditional notions
of the self and human subjectivity as well as fulfill some of

the requirements of a feminist concern for social change.

In

the attempt to formulate a new approach to self-understanding

that doesn't sacrifice the notions of human agency and

responsibility,
1)

I

propose the following:

that the Hegelian tradition of theorizing self/other

relations is more helpful for developing

a

theory of self

than the Cartesian tradition.
2)

that post-structuralists

of my project,

(in particular,

for the purposes

the French psychoanalyst, Lacan) extend the

Hegelian tradition in

a

useful way.

3

3)

that feminist literature

(in particular,

feminist

epistemological standpoint literature and feminist critiques
of psychoanalysis)

gives us a basis for including gender in

a

theory of self, as well as providing suggestions for
solutions to certain problems of post-structuralist thought.
I

am thus proposing an approach to theorizing about the

self rooted in the Hegelian tradition as it extends through

post-structuralist thought, and informed by psychoanalysis
and feminist theory.

The theory of self

I

arrive at will

posit the following:
1)

that a theory of self should be

a

theory about self-

constituting activity rather than about
2)

a

fixed entity.

that this self-constituting activity is informed by

gender
3)

that self-constituting activity is inextricably linked

with meaning-producing activity.
4)

that meaning-producing activity is also gender-informed.

5)

that we can trace the process of self-constituting,

meaning-producing activity in the examination of
philosophical texts.
6)

that such an examination can yield further insights into

how gender informs self-constituting and meaning-producing

activity
7)

that this new understanding of the self can give us

insights into how particular perspectives inform and shape
social reality and how we can move toward social change.

4

In section 1.2

I

to a theory of self.

will give an overview of this approach
In section 1.3

I

will contrast the

Cartesian and Hegelian approaches in theorizing the self,
arguing for the latter.

In section 1.4,

I

will further

develop the Hegelian approach toward the self by discussing
views on the self held by Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger.
And in section 1.5

I

will set the feminist context for a

gender-sensitive approach to the self.
This chapter will prepare the way for the psychoanalytic

discussion of the self presented in chapter

2

which draws

heavily on the French post-structuralist, Lacan, and the
feminist critiques of psychoanalytic discussions of the self

presented in chapter

Chapter

3.

4

will give some examples of

how the theory of self developed in chapters

1,

2,

and

3

can

yield further insights by being brought to bear on the
reading of philosophical texts.

tentative conclusions for

a

In chapter

5

I

present some

gender-sensitive theory of self

and give some suggestions for future work.

1

.

2

Overview of Mv Approach to
It was Hegel who,

approached

a

a

Theory of Self

in The Phenomenology of Spirit

theory of self through

changing forms of consciousness

.

a

,

first

description of the

Rather than assuming

consciousness always had one role appropriate to

it,

he

stressed the importance of studying consciousness in relation
to its object and traced the changing nature of this

relationship.

In addition to introducing the dialectical

5

role of the social context into the question of

consciousness, he also introduced the quest for self-

certainty as

a

problem that consciousness needed to solve in

each turn of its transformation.

[4]

Marx picked up Hegel's theory, stressing the dialectical
1 s t i on s h ip

him,

of human nature with its social context

.

For

this meant that differing class consciousnesses were

formed on the basis of one's relationship to the mode of

production.

Human capacities, needs and interests change

over time in response to changes in the mode of production,
and this change in human nature,

in turn,

changes in the mode of production.

makes for further

In class societies,

the

ruling class ultimately dominates prevailing ideologies.

The

latter generates forms of "false consciousness"--ways of

understanding human nature and society that distort "reality"
in the interests of the ruling class.

[5]

Recent trends in post-structuralist thought

(for

example, the work of Lacan, Derrida and Foucault in France)

have further extended this tradition to give us the

"decentered self",
nature.

a

self that is radically contingent in

These trends have progressively "deconstructed"

human nature,
attributes.

leaving an ever smaller core of essential human
In taking the Hegelian-Marxist view of human

nature to its logical extreme, the humanist version of the
self unravels completely: less and less is counted as

"natural" until the self is entirely dispersed into the

social structures within which it is formed.

In contrast to

6

the Marxist problem of demystifying "false consciousness,"

this aspect of post— structuralist thought presents new

problems for human agency,
If what we call

freedom and social critique.

"selves" are the product of language and

social forces beyond our control, if there is no way to

distinguish an "authentic" self from one distorted by the
dominant ideology, then what basis do we have for taking

responsibility for our actions or for demanding social
change?

I

believe that feminist theory can suggest some

answers to this question.

We are more than arbitrary

products of linguistic and social forces entirely beyond our
control.

Despite the insights offered by post-structuralists

such as Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault

modernist" literature misses

a

create meaning in

Any meaning

a

vacuum.

this "post-

[6],

crucial point.
I

create must be

created in the context of self /other relations.
dependent on contact with embodied others

.

We cannot

It

is thus

This contact has

significance that always exceeds the linguistic and social
structures that inform us as subjects.

It

is to this

"intuitive" realm beyond language which the attempts to
capture what is distinctive to "feminine" experience can lead
us.
a

In this realm words may be inadequate for the "truth" of

moment of connectedness shared with another.

Yet out of

that moment will come new attempts to communicate what was

shared in that experience.
Feminists have always been concerned with providing
women with the self-understanding necessary to understanding

7

their experiences as being the experiences of women.
is,

That

they have searched, for ways to give voice to precisely

those aspects of women's experience they have felt to be
ignored, devalued or distorted by dominant modes of

expression.

A contemporary strand of feminism is currently

investigating the possibility of developing

a

feminist

epistemological standpoint grounded in aspects of experience
felt to be distinctive to women.

[7]

Feminists disagree on

the feasibility as well as the desirability of such

project.

a

Some feel that it is detrimental to the feminist

cause because it presupposes precisely those’ essentialist

arguments about differences between the nature of men and the
nature of women that we want to discard.

Others feel,

however, that if we grant a systematic difference between the

experience of men and the experience of women due to social
structures that affect men and women differently (rather than
due to biological differences)

,

and if we take seriously the

Hegelian claim that one's "truth" is informed by one's
experience, than a feminist "deconst ructive project" would be
to

identify how distinctively masculine perspectives
on masculine experience have shaped the most
fundamental and most formal aspects of systematic
thought in philosophy and in the social and natural
sciences--the aspects of thought supposedly most
gender-neutral (Harding and Hintikka 1983, x)

Feminists concerned with articulating a perspective
rooted in what they consider to be women's distinctive

experience have taken various tacks.

Some have argued,

on

8

the basis of psychoanalysis and object relations theory,
that
® nee

f

between male and female children in the early

experiences of the process of separation and individuation
from the primary caretaker, have lasting repercussions for
^ f 6rsnces

between the two genders

.

[8]

Other feminists

have built directly on this work, while others have

emphasized other differences in the experiences of men and
women.

The latter literature argues that the sexual division

of labor,

due to the predominance of women in the role of

"sex/affective production”

[9]

(i.e.,

childbearing,

childrearing, and emotional servicing) and/or the more
"mundane" tasks of day to day life (i.e., cooking, housework,
etc.)

creates the material conditions for distinctively

gendered perspectives.
Feminist discussions of different perspectives bring us
to a deeper understanding of how perspectives shape and form
one another, as well as of how any perspective at all comes

into being.

With the Hegelian tradition that stresses the

dialectical interaction between self and world, and the

psychoanalytic tradition that stresses the development of
self,

a

this literature can help us address the question of how

social identity and social reality comes to be.

Simone de Beauvoir introduced the notion of woman as
'other'

into the Hegelian tradition of theorizing self/other

relations.

[10]

Current feminist epistemological standpoint

literature builds on this literature.

In this

dissertation

want to investigate self/other relations more fully by

I

9

bringing psychoanalysis and philosophy together with the help
of Lacan and feminist critiques of psychoanalysis.

This

project is both deconst ruct ive and reconstructive.

On the

basis of the feminist literature I've mentioned,
that a difference in perspectives exist.

I

assume

On the one hand

I

want to develop a masculinist perspective on identity and
self /other relations.

On the other

I

want to articulate more

fully what the feminine perspective on identity and

self/other relations might be.

[11]

Thus, my project is to

construct a theory of self that is informed by debates
sensitive to gender-difference in perspectives on self/other
relations,

in light of the current,

post-structuralist

literature (in particular, Lacanian psychoanalysis) that has
cast our traditional notions of human subjectivity into

doubt
I

believe that we can characterize the foundation for

masculinist epistemological standpoint versus

a

a

feminist

epistemological standpoint in two kinds of self-strategies.
These self-strategies are formed in early childhood and are

continually reaffirmed in the context of the two realms of
experience depicted by current feminist literature.

I

call

these two self-strategies "masculine" and "feminine" with the

understanding that there is

a

continuum between the two

extreme forms of these self —strategies that are manifested by
concrete individuals.
extreme forms is

a

Thus,

characterizing them in their

tool in coming to understand how gender

affects our perspective and reality in ways more complicated

10

than such a schema may allow.

Just as there are many

different versions of "true" masculinity or femininity, there
are many different versions of these two self-strategies.

trying to characterize two self —strategies
the truth that

I

I

In

am speaking to

think lies behind the feminist attempt to

—

characterize an alternative epistemological perspective

perspective that is distinct from the masculine one.

Just as

the current hegemony of the current dominant discourses

cannot be said to represent the perspective of all men in
this society, there is no feminist theory that can be said to

represent the perspective of all women in this society.

I

don't believe that we can, or should, reduce the number of

epistemological standpoints we construct to that of one
masculinist standpoint or one feminist one.
What

I

want to do here speaks to the truth

I

feel

emanates from post-structuralist thought: there is no one
perspective, and, in fact, no one perspective can be

validated as the correct one.

The post-structuralist claim

that there is no "rational" basis for valorizing any

perspective over any other, no matter how "marginal,
a

distrust of adopting any perspective at all.

is a way out of the

I

"

fosters

feel there

impasse of the distrust of theory and of

any thrust toward social hegemony that this viewpoint

entails.

That is, there is a way out of the relativist

dilemma of both taking

a

critical stance with respect to

society and having an agenda that one wants society to
emulate.

By working together to achieve a collective

11

perspective, a new hegemony, that incorporates into its

symbolic structures the lived experience of all the

individuals that fill its positions, we could build

self-understanding acceptable to all.
In the chapters to come

I

a social

[12]

will argue that such a social

self-understanding must build on the "authentic" experiences
of us all.

These "authentic" experiences include those often

inarticulate experiences in which our bodies as sensitive
instruments register sensations in
complete reaction from us.

a

world that provoke a

We can create new categories that

signify these bodily sensations in

a

socially acceptable form

in relations with human others that mirror back to us our

sensations, demonstrating their acknowledgement of an aspect
of our experience that up to then we had thought was ours

alone.

In the reflecting mirrors of self/other relatedness

we communicate bodily sensations to human others,
a

thus giving

generalized meaning to those bodily sensations that exceed

the particularity of a particular experience by putting it in

context with human others.
are born.

Thus, new categories of meaning

rather than simply building on the meaning

categories already laid out in language, this kind of

communication attempts to symbolize bodily sensation in such
a

way that other human beings can recognize similar

sensations of their own.
On this view, human individuals are always embodied,

always rooted in the bodily sensations that they feel due to
the five senses of their own embodied selves

.

Language is

not solely self-referent ial unless it leaves behind its

referential roots

— the

roots of feeling and sensation that

lie in our embodied selves

A gender-sensitive investigation

.

of perspectives on self/other relations will reveal different

perspectives on the production of meaning.

This in turn will

provide some hints and suggestions for how meaning, generated
in the felt sensation of bodies in self/other relations,

is

generated and translated into the symbolic categories that
attempt to generalize human experience so that we can share
our experiences and be known to one another.
In keeping with my project

problematic for constructing

a

I

want to propose a new

theory of self.

The new

problematic

I

certainty.

Not only are there various forms of selfhood, but

each form is
certainty.

propose adopts the Hegelian notion of self-

a

response to the problem of establishing self-

That human beings are subjects of experiences

with selves that constitute the locus of those experiences
(at

it

least on an experiential level)

is not simply a reality:

is the human response to the problem of intentional

agency.

To be an intentional agent requires more than a

conscious subject of experience.

It

requires a subject that

perceives itself as having some degree of autonomy and

efficacy in the world
'self'

— in

short,

a self.

On this view,

the

could be understood in two senses— the construct

ordering the range of experiences that one identifies as
one's own, as well as the activity that allows for a

meaningful processing of one's experiences as one lives them.

13

This latter notion of self would then posit selfhood (or

subjectivity) as mental activity that operates according to
some principle that orders one's experiences into some sort
of coherence.

The base of this activity would be the

illusory and provisional construct of self created from one's

experiences in relation to which mental activity could carry
out its function.

The subject of consciousness, the, would

be a construct created out of consciousness--with

consciousness being an amorphous, easily dispersed activity.

Subjectivity would be

a

centering of that activity around

certain experiences held within a framework of significance.
It

is this framework that would stabilize those experiences

with respect to other experiences.

Selfhood is the human solution to the problem of
effective agency.

Our actions have meaning because we are

responsible agents who carry them out with

a

purpose in mind.

What we do, think and say has significance within the broader

framework of social significance of which we form

a

part.

An

important feature of the ability to be an effective agent is

self-awareness

—

-a

sense of one's place in the broader social

framework and of how one's words and actions will impact from
that place.
The body is the organic base of a huge mass of

information.

For agency to be possible, this information has

to be ordered in some way.

information.

Consciousness processes this

In the process it creates a self that acts as

the locus of significance, the principle around which

14

experience is ordered.

The problem of selfhood is the

problem of how to create subjectivity out of the confusing
mass of experience and bodily sensation generated by the

human body.

A theory of self that posits selfhood as the

solution to the problem of human agency moves us away from

theory of self to

a

theory of self-construction.

a

Not only

are we interested in the various forms that selfhood has
taken,

we are also interested in how each of these forms

solved the problem in particular circumstances.

That is, how

was the self established with respect to its objects at a

given time?
On the view that human beings engage in purposive human

activity in order to maintain themselves as intentional
agents as well as to carry out their intentions, the writing
of philosophical texts can be seen as a form of self-

construction.

A philosophical text would then be the

representation of the construction of
self.

thought

a

particular form of

Deconstruction, a by-product of post-structuralist
[13],

is a theory of interpretation that can help us

read out texts as representations of self-constituting
activity.

The technique of deconstruction is influenced by

psychoanalysis and

a

new way of conceptualizing the self.

is when the traditional notion of a coherent,

unified self is

brought into question that deconst ruct ive readings become

legitimate way of entering

a text.

It

a

Once it is no longer

taken for granted that the author's meaning forms

a

complete

and consistent picture that is self-transparent, the ruptures

15

in the text become entryways into meaning that may subvert

any given line of interpretation.

A self that is divided and

in contradiction with itself will produce texts with divided

and contradictory meaning.

contradictions of

a

Exploring the gaps and

text will thus illuminate the

contradictions in the self produced by the text, and

a

theory

of self that addresses such contradictions will give us more

insight into the gaps and contradictions of texts.
The kind of deconstruct ive reading

I

advocate is one

that would bring the question of woman to the fore.

One

advantage of psychoanalysis over philosophical accounts of
is that the former brings sexuality into the

the self,

limelight

.

This focus necessitates addressing the questions
The self becomes a gendered

of gender and sexual difference.

self and questions about that engenderment enter into the

whole problematic of a self that is inherently divided and
decentered.

If how we conceptualize the self affects how we

philosophize, it also affects the kind of questions we will

bring to a philosophical text.
becomes crucial to

a

Once the question of woman

theory of self, it also becomes crucial

to the readings of texts that are based on that theory.

Assuming a traditional notion of self, we will construct
coherent and consistent interpretations of texts with

certain amount of closure.
self,

a

Assuming

a

a

divided, decentered

reading that traces contradictions and breaks in the

text will be more in keeping than a reading that attempts to
impose an order that isn't there.

The problematic of gender
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in psychoanalysis leads us to the question of woman as one of

the entryways into subversion of meaning in a text.

Psychoanalysis posits gender identity as
than a given.

a

problem rather

Resolving this problem is one of the tasks

crucial to the development of an autonomous self.

A divided,

decentered self must not only continually reconstruct itself
to maintain some sort of coherency,

itself

.

it must also re-engender

How this is done and the tensions this causes can be

revealed in

a

deconst ructive reading that takes the question

of woman as an entryway into the text.

Psychoanalysis originated in the interest of bringing
people to psychic health.

A coherent sense of self seems to

be one of the requirements of psychic health.

In the search

for a norm for health, this discipline theorized not only

about what the self should be, but the possible break-down

points to developing

a

satisfactory sense of self.

Investigation of failures in attaining the full selfhood we
associate with a socially functioning human being revealed
the tentative nature of selfhood itself.

Psychoanalysis,

in its various forms,

has spawned a

multitude of theories about the self, each related to

a

preferred method of therapy.

To give a complete survey of

them all, or to try and offer

a

to offer,
I

distillation of all they have

is far beyond the scope of this dissertation.

What

would like to do is pick my way through some of what

psychoanalysis has to offer in order to offer my own theory
of self.

My hope is to lay the ground for further work on
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such a theory by pulling together some strands of

psychoanalysis in
Since

I

a

philosophical context.

am not a psychoanalyst, my evidence and

confirmation for a theory of self will not lie in my work
with analysands

question of how

Rather,

.

a

as a philosopher

I

will pursue the

theory of self plays into one's conception

of knowledge and social reality.

If

I

can develop a theory

of self that can explain gaps and contradictions in a

philosophical text that are otherwise inexplicable, then
will have some confirmation of my theory.

I

If a theory of

self can provide an explanation of some of the contradictions
in a philosophical text,

then the connection between the self

of the text and the interpretation of reality it attempts to

articulate will become clearer.
What

am suggesting is that in any articulation we are

I

not only proffering a response to the world, we are also

proffering

a

response to ourselves.

Any interpretation of

the world is inextricable from an attempt to interpret

ourselves and our place in the world.

particular philosophical outlook, then,

The creation of a
is

the creation of a particular type of self.

coextensive with
Investigating the

views presented on, for example, knowing and social reality
is one means to a deeper understanding of a philosophical

text while investigating the conception of self that

explicitly and implicitly created in the text is another.
better understanding of how the two affect one another in

particular text can lead to

a

A
a

better understanding of how the
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two moments of subject and object interact and transform one

another
Of course the same interaction will take place between
me and the texts

I

peruse.

The theory of self

I

take to the

text as an interpretive tool would be no more than a device
for reductive analysis if

did not allow the texts to

I

interact with and transform my theory.

A psychoanalyst would

not be doing justice to her analysands if she closed herself
to perceiving words or behavior simply because they didn't
fit her theory.

As a practicing psychoanalyst she would

expect her theory to change over time.

Thus,

in developing a

theory of self that picks and chooses some elements from
vast and divergent literature,

definitive theory.

I

a

am not trying to give a

What I'm trying to do is develop

a

theory

that is workable, and that could be further developed through
use

.

My interest in the relationship of subject and object,

self and world,
I

is

based on two more specific interests that

see as interconnected: the problem of knowledge and the

problem of social identity.

It

is my

contention that it is

with respect to the self that these two problems
interconnect.

Interpreting who we are through interpreting

reality not merely places us in
creates our place in it.

a

particular social order but

By defining the social position of

the people around us we define our own social position.

latter is

a

more specific instance of the former

an entirely different realm.

a

— and

the

not in

In both activities we are

19

placing ourselves as selves in

a world.

And if the self is

"dropped out" as it seems to be, for example, in scientific
discourse, this is only because that discourse has chosen to

maintain the perspective involved as an implicit given.
This dissertation attempts to provide

a

grounding for a

more complete theory of the relation between gender and selfconstruction.

More readings of the type sketched here would

have to be done to fill out the theory with respect to

philosophical texts.

Philosophers who speculate about the

self in the Hegelian tradition have already taken significant

steps towards breaking down traditional notions of the self

unified entity that can be understood in

as a discrete,

isolation from its world.

What

I

have done here with the

help of feminist theory and psychoanalysis is to develop

a

way of reading texts that would add to this tradition.

Such a theory is crucial to

a

feminist project.

One

major obstacle in the way of any program for radical social
change is that the problem of maintaining

human agency is

obviously have
structure.

a

problem of terrifying proportions.

I

Men

don't believe that it necessarily follows

that men perpetuate patriarchy out of

dominate.

sense of self for

stake in maintaining a patriarchal social

a

But

a

a

"natural" desire to

If a typical pattern of problem-solving in our era

has been to overpower the "opposition" into submission, be it

with words or physical force, perhaps it is to the current

strategies in self-construction that we can look for an
explanation.

The more aware we become of how our selves are
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determined by social reality and the contradictions involved,
the more control over self-definition we can take.
In the following section

I

will distinguish what

a Cartesian from a Hegelian approach to the self.

I

call

This will

set the context for a review of some approaches to the self

that have influenced post-structuralist thought.

The latter

will frame the view of the self, chiefly derived from

Lacanian psychoanalysis, that

I

will develop in chapter

In the final section of this chapter

I

2.

will review some

feminist arguments about what might constitute

a

feminist

perspective distinct from the masculine perspective that
informs dominant forms of discourse.

This will frame the

view of the self derived from feminist critiques of

psychoanalysis developed in chapter

1

.

3

3.

Descartes and Hegel; Two Approaches to the Self
In the philosophical tradition there have been two

tendencies with respect to epistemological concerns and
concerns about the social order

.

One tendency has been to

separate the two sets of concerns, saying that questions
about truth and falsity and when and whether we attain true

knowledge are completely separate from questions about how
the social order is constituted and how it should be

constituted.

This tendency takes epistemology as the study

of an individual subject in contemplative seclusion from the

world who pursues objective knowledge of the object at hand.

Another tendency takes epistemological questions and
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questions about the social order as inextricably linked:
there is no such thing as a knowing subject unaffected by his
or her position in a particular social order.

Thus,

any

question about how we come to know must also account for the
subject's position in society and what interests motivate
that subject's knowing.

With the latter view,

"objectivity"

in the sense of the disinterested knowledge of value-free

facts is rendered problematic,

if not completely undermined.

One way of labelling these two tendencies would be to

call the first tendency in the Cartesian tradition and the

second tendency in the Hegelian tradition.
On the Cartesian epistemological model, the more we can

detach the object of study from its surroundings and
determine the properties essential to
know it.

it,

the better we will

The more we can remove the object of study from its

concrete context the more "objective" our study will be.

Objectivity here refers to the universal validity of our
findings

— no

matter where or when or by whom the same study

was carried out, the findings would be the same.

There is

a

current trend, particularly in continental

philosophy, to question the sub ject/ob ject split.

[14]

On

this view, there is no such thing as a perspective from which
we can gain disinterested,

that are "out there."
end in view.

"objective" knowledge of objects

Any viewpoint we take is taken with an

To assume that there is such a thing as the

disinterested stance that can avoid subjective colorings in
order to lay bare reality "as it

is,

only conceals one's
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perspective.

Thus,

taking the subject and object in

fully

a

contextualized setting could be more revealing than taking
the object in isolation.

It

is only within the context of

investigation that we can know the objectives that are
coloring a given interpretation.
On the assumption that we have direct access to reality,

questions about our limitations in gaining knowledge of

it

and the degree to which that "knowledge" is a distortion

don't arise.

Once we start questioning how comprehensive and

accurate our knowledge is of the world we live in, the

question of just how we come by that knowledge becomes
important

.

It

is then that the question of who and what we

are becomes inextricably linked with questions about the

nature of reality.

Self-understanding then becomes

a

crucial

aspect in our broader understanding of the world and

prescriptions for the "correct" way to approach questions
about reality may be given.

Where metaphysical

investigations don't directly address the question of how the

questioning subject affects the investigation, they hold
implicit assumptions about what the nature of that subject is
or should be.

Current analytic philosophy tends to assume

that the ideal questioning subject is the contemplative,

unextended thinking substance of Cartesian philosophy.

[15]

Such an assumption about the nature of the questioning
subject has repercussions for what is taken to be relevant to

metaphysical discussions.

On this view the rational endeavor

that will lead to true knowledge is seen as the product of

a
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disembodied self in contemplative seclusion from the world of
everyday affairs.

In order to arrive at the most

comprehensive and accurate account possible of reality as it
"really" is, one must detach oneself from one's mundane

concerns and take an appropriately "objective" attitude

toward the topic at hand.

This Cartesian approach to

metaphysical questions with its assumption of

a

distinct

sub ject /ob ject dichotomy has far-reaching consequences for

both our understanding of ourselves and our world.
Hegel exemplifies another tradition in self-

understanding as it relates to metaphysical questions in
which the questioning subject is seen as

broader whole.'

a

moment in

a

In this tradition the questioning subject

cannot be understood out of the particular context in which
it

is found and any questions about how that subject affects

metaphysical investigations are an on-going and pressing
i

concern.

This view insists that the questioning subject

cannot be dropped out of consideration once, say, we reach an

appropriately disembodied stance towards the topic at hand.
Since any knowledge of reality is obtained in a particular

context by

a

particular subject, the particular nature of

that subject and how it affects the knowledge obtained must

always be taken into account.

Thus,

instead of a distinct

split between questioning subject and the world "out there"

under question, we have

a

subject that is unable to take an

external perspective on the world she would question since
she is a part of that world.
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On the Cartesian view, questions about the nature of the

self have little bearing on metaphysical questions since it
is already assumed that there is an ideal stance from which

metaphysical investigations should be conducted.

On the

Hegelian view such an ideal stance is precluded.

this

problemat izes the relationship between subject and object and
renders knowledge of the subject in all its changing forms

crucial to our knowledge of the world.

Thus,

self-

understanding comes to have an on-going and transformative
effect on our understanding of the nature of reality.

Instead of assuming that there is

a

particular stance from

which we can finally grasp the truth about the world, it

is

assumed that as we change, the "truths" we grasp will change
and that an understanding of our changing selves will give us

insight into the reality we come to know.

Questions about the nature of the self have taken
different tacks depending on which tradition the questions
come out of.

On the Cartesian view, an investigation of the

self takes the self as an object like any other that one must

examine from an appropriately disinterested perspective if
one is to truly understand just what it is.

The self-

understanding that comes from this investigation is not
expected to have any repercussions for either how one
understands other aspects of reality or how one goes about

investigating the nature of reality.

On the Hegelian view,

there is no disinterested perspective from which one can

examine the self as an object in isolation from other
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objects.

Self-understanding must come through an examination

of the process of interaction between self and world.

The dialectical tradition of philosophy has focused on
the subject and object of knowledge and desire as two moments
of a whole that interact.

In this dialectical interaction

the object is not merely known or desired, but enters into

a

relationship with the subject in which both subject and
object are transformed.

such a view of the subject of

knowledge and desire posits the self as

construction with

a

a

material

historicity that precludes easy

definition, rather than a transcendental entity.
On a dialectical reading, the self cannot be left out of

any account of the world since the two are moments in a whole
of interpretation.

that is,

If the self has a transformative effect,

if the self creates reality as much as being created

by it, then an understanding of the self's motivations and

interests will help us understand the constraints on our
claims to knowledge as well as our desires.

subject and object are moments of

a

Given that

whole rather than

isolated from one another, the subject's self-understanding
is going to affect its understanding of what's true and

what's desirable.

How one sees one's self and one's stake in

that self as the foundation of one's subjectivity is going to

play an important constraining role in how one understands
one's world.

Thus,

the relationship between self and world

becomes problemat ized

.

One's personal identity plays

a

crucial role in determining one's interpretation of reality.
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In the next section

I

will take a closer look at

approaches to the self derived from Hegel, Nietzsche and
Heidegger.
into pos

The approaches discussed here have been taken up

— s t r uc t u r a

1 st

thought and will set the context for

the Lacanian approach to the self taken up in the next

chapter

I- 4

Approaches to the Self in the Hegelian Tradition: Heael

Nietzsche, and Heidegger
Hegel
In the Phenomenology of Spirit

.

Hegel proposes to

"undertake the exposition of knowledge as

a

phenomenon."

In

this work, he refocuses metaphysical discussions about

timeless "truth" to

a

discussion of the changing relationship

of knowing subject to the "truth" that is known.

In keeping

with a phenomenological approach, he allows the truth to

determine itself completely within consciousness rather than

positing it as
consciousness.

a

standard existing somewhere outside of
Hegel takes the philosophical stance of the

"we" who are investigating knowledge to examine the actual

experience of the consciousness who knows.
in the actual process of knowing,

he then shows how

consciousness is forced to

revise its concept of truth if it is to know at all.

By

tracing the phenomenology of spirit, Hegel hopes to lay the

groundwork for his theory of truth in the actual experience
of consciousness itself.

In the first two chapters of the
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P henomenology

we can see the grounds for a dialectical
theory

of truth that emphasizes the relational
nature of the self.
At each level of consciousness a dialectic
is seen to

emerge where knowledge of an object is referred
to the object
known for verification, only to discover that
the object
itself must be revised.

In the experience of consciousness

this dialectic does not explicitly emerge

— it

is the

philosophical perusal of what occurs in experience that
renders the pattern of in-itself, for-itself and in-and-forit self

explicit by noting the necessity of the movement from

one object constituting truth to the next

.

In the actual

experience of this movement the original object is supplanted
and lost as if it had never been.
In investigating sense-certainty

consciousness
the object,

— as

it is experienced,

— the

first level of

Hegel delineates the

I,

and the certainty that it is the object that is

the essential reality as features of this level of

consciousness.
truth.

At this level,

But when

I

a

i_s.

point out an object "meaning" to point it

out in all its particularity,

pointing out

the object apprehended

I

discover that rather than

concrete particular

universal (the "This"

I

point to)

I

have pointed out a

Once sense-certainty has

discovered that the This taken in-itself to be essential
reality turned out to be for consciousness an empty
abstraction, it is forced to alter its criterion for truth.
By examining the actual experience of sense-certainty

Hegel has shown its own conception of knowledge to be
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inadequate to itself.
its conception,

Because of the original inadequacy of

consciousness is forced past sense-certainty

to the level of perception in the attempt to find a

conception of knowledge that will be borne out by its
experience
At this stage sense-certainty takes it for granted that
it has direct access to truth;
it

is known as it is.

once the object is apprehended

When pushed to grasp the object

pointed out in tis entirety, sense-certainty’s truth turns
out to be out of reach.

The sub ject /object distinction that

was no problem for knowledge as long as the object

constituted truth turns out to be problematic.

But rather

than assume the object to be truth intact, and the problem to
lie in gaining access to that object,

consciousness shifts

its perception of the sub ject /object relation itself.
In perception the I,

in order to relate a plurality of

universals in the "one" that makes that plurality this

particular object, takes the object as self-same and relates
For

the diverse moments of her apprehension accordingly.

perception the criterion of truth is the self-same

that

which remains the same from perception to perception.

Now

that the principle of knowledge is the universal,

consciousness is freed from the self —identical relation of

sense-certainty whose truth is the bare act of intuiting, and
can ferret out the truth of multiple acts of perception.

At

this point in perception, truth is the object.

Consciousness,

in taking the object as the essential element,
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refers untruth to its perception and takes the object as the

true universal--the self-same.
In the case of perception,

consciousness is forced back

upon itself in that it takes the diversity of properties to
be due to the perceiving

I,

and any untruth of its perception

as being within consciousness rather than the object.

truth is seen to lie in the entire process of

I

Again

and object

rather than in either the one or the other.

Rather than

a

direct access to truth from subject to

object, we have a more complicated criterion for truth

emerging.

A criterion that requires ever more participation

on the part of the subject in order to provide any sort of

verification for knowledge at all.

At the end of

consciousness's experience of perception the object is no
longer a tenable criterion for truth-— it has broken up into
two opposing elements that can only be brought together

through the perceiving subject.

Perception maintains the object as truth by shifting
back and forth from the object as the "also" to the object as
the "one", the object for another and the object for itself,
it

is only from our philosophical perspective that we can see

the contradiction involved in thus putting forth first one,

then the other, aspect as the truth.

The shifting of

perception from the one aspect of the object to the other is
only enabled through the reflection of consciousness back
into itself.

Although at this stage this return of the

subject from the object back into itself is not effected with
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genuine awareness of consciousness as an object for

a

knowledge and as constituting its own truth,
capacity for such

a

its growing

role is here made apparent.

By tracing the shifting sub ject /object relation that

emerges in the search for an adequate criterion of truth in
the first two chapters of the Phenomenology

.

we see an ever

more complicated theory of truth emerging within the system
of Hegel's thought.

From direct apprehension of truth as

object we have gone to a criterion of truth that oscillates

between subject and object.

While the oscillation between

the two has not yet become apparent to the experiencing

consciousness,
a

"we" can see that the "truth" at stake here is

truth that emerges from a complex relationship between

subject and object.

And that the truth that emerges is

affected by the self-understanding of the knowing subject
that comes to know it

While Nietzsche strongly objects to the kind of system-

building endemic in Hegel's philosophy, he too will
problemat ize the status of "truth" by challenging traditional
notions about its relationship to the knowing subject.

Nietzsche
There has been an upsurge of contemporary interest in
N1

-£

z s che

.

[16]

One of the reasons for this interest has

been due to the decentering of self that Nietzsche

deliberately provokes in his texts.

Refusing to build

a

he
system, or to allow his philosophy to be systematized,
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writes in aphorisms.

Rather than presenting extended

philosophical arguments to support his views, he gives us
discontinuous passages, each one of which demands

interpretation in order to be comprehensible.

He

deliberately discourages "closure" in the interpretation of
his texts.

Closure would imply the definitive reading of

a

text, the reading that finally unravelled all the

significance the text had to offer.

If one could get such

closure, one could also get to the "real" self that spoke the
text,

implying that there was such

a self

who intended to

impart to the reader the significance that the reader's

definitive reading finally revealed.
The work of people like Gadamer in hermeneutical

philosophy and Derrida in deconstruction

[17]

has shattered

the notion that a text is the product of a unified self with
a

definitively "correct" interpretat ion--the significance

intended by the author.

Nietzsche's philosophical style

encourages the kind of deconstructive reading of conventional
concepts and his own text that deconstruction has made vogue.

Many contemporary figures have recently focused on

Nietzsche's radical use of language and the repercussions
this has for our conventional concepts.
In proclaiming such concepts as substance and the self

as fictions

[18],

Nietzsche helped lay the ground for the

decentered self that is currently getting increasing
attention.

We think we are people with a personal identity

that extends over time to which we refer our experiences.

We
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think we have selves

with a history,

a

a

sense of who we are, a personality

unified self that provides the basis for

our knowledge and our actions.

To give increasing attention

to a decentered notion of self is to increasingly undermine

the notion that a person has a unified self that provides

a

central perspective for knowledge and agency.
The self is a fiction,

something that we impose on

a

wide and conflicting range of forces that make up who we are.

Nietzsche's point in calling such

a self a

fiction was to

underline the fiction that we are unified and coherent
agents.

If we have a unified sense of self,

it

is only

because we have succeeded in subordinating our instincts in
such a way that consistency and coherence appear to reign.
It

is through mastering a conflicting torrent of impulses

and,

by setting up ruling instincts, bringing the rest into

a

hierarchy obedient to the ruling instincts that we are able
to preserve the illusion of a unified self.

The self, then,

carry around with us.

is not a thing,

[19]

not a substance that we

We

There is nothing stable about us.

are an intersection of forces that are forever in the process
of becoming.

[20]

If there is anything stable about us,

it

is the fictional self in accordance with which we constrain

those forces to act.

But this self is a dream, an illusion

by which we attempt to veil the reality of our constant

change and becoming

— the

chaos that we really are.

Just as

we need illusions to mask Dionysian flux when it comes to
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external reality, so we need the illusion of the self to mask
the terror of a complete loss identity.
If,

as Nietzsche says,

self and substance are but

fictions that we impose upon Dionysian process, and

Hegel suggests, the act of experiencing is

a

as

if,

double act in

which we constitute both self and object, then how we see
ourselves will be inextricably linked with how we see the
world.

Both our view of ourselves and of the world will be

no more than interpretations rather than essential truths,

and these interpretations will be seen as the creations of an

activity that constitutes both self and world at once.

To

investigate the how of self-constitution and the conditions
under which it si possible, would also illuminate the how of

object-constitution and the constraints under which our
conception of reality is put if we are to have selves at all.
Nietzsche introduced anti-systemic strands into Hegelian
thought that post-structuralists later picked up.

It

is

Heidegger, however, who emphasized the social web of forces
that converge to form a self.

Heidegger
Heidegger felt that the problem of skepticism arises
from the presupposition of

a

distinction between inner

experiences and objects in the external world.

he believes

that the Cartesian model presents a false view of ourselves.
The self as a res cooitans is an objectified description of
the self obtained by focusing on ourselves as passive
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spectators.

But our fundamental mode of being is one of

being actively engaged in the world.
human is treated as a relation where

On this view being
a

stand is taken on

one's Being in one's everyday activities.

human is to be

a

Furthermore, to be

place-holder in a network of internal

relations, constituted by a public language, of the communal

world into which Dasein (human existence, or the human self
as a relation

— see

Guignon 1983, 86) is thrown.

It

is the

cultural context that provides Dasein with meaningful

possibilities for its concrete ways of being engaged in the
world.

Since language is the medium in which both self and

world can first be discovered, there is no distinction to be
drawn between

a

private bundle of internal impressions and

the public ways that Dasein manifests itself in the world.
(See Guignon 1983,

ch

Thus, Heidegger,

.

III.)

like Hegel,

from its relation to the world.

considered to be a relation

— the

refuses to isolate the self
In fact,

the self is

active process of taking

particular stance vis a vis one's own Being.

a

Human beings

are the kind of entities that care about what it is to be

human.

death"

In living out their lives they are "Being-toward-

— that

is,

living with an eye to the significance that

their lives as a whole will have when it is complete
(Heidegger,

1962,

#51-52)

.

Because language is the medium by

which we create significance, it will be crucial to both our

self-interpretations as well as interpretations of the world.
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In B.ging and Time,

Heidegger taKes Being-in-the-world as

his starting point for investigating Dasein'

s

Being.

Thus,

his analytic of Dasein emphasizes the unitary wholeness of

Dasein and its environment.

This in turn shifts attention

from a world of entities in isolation from the Being which

questions their ontology, to entities whose meaning arises in
the particular context of Dasein’s concern.

ourselves thrown into
involved.
a

a

We find

world in which we are already

But we are free to make something of our lives as

whole within the confines of the factical situation into

which we are thrown.

To take a stand with respect to my life

requires a certain competence in getting along within the

interrelated system of my culture.

I

do not have a "true"

self private to me in the sense that the way

roles

I

act and the

take on are the acts and roles of the "they"

(Heidegger 1962,
a

I

#27)

.

Insofar as my acts have meaning it is

public meaning made available by the meaningful

possibilities for action with which my culture presents me.
That my life is mine means that

I

choose the possibilities

available to me in a particular way, but those meaningful

possibilities would also be available to anyone else.
In approaching the question of human existence

(as a

preliminary to the question of being in general) without
preconceptions of what constitutes

a

human being, Heidegger

develops a vocabulary of his own that indicates processes
rather than occurrences that have already taken place and are
now being examined after the fact.

Such an approach focuses
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attention on the dynamic nature of meanings and the shifting
frame of reference from which each one of us makes sense of
the world as our concerns change.

By bringing back into the

picture the questioning entity that traditional ontology
overlooks, Heidegger prepares the way for

a

conception of

knowledge that focuses on the totality of the questioning
subject and the object questioned rather than trying to

explicate knowledge in terms of an object in isolation from
the knowing subject.

Anything that

I

attend to is brought to my attention

within the context of my immediate interests which are in
turn meaningful to me within the context of who

myself to be.
how

I

Thus,

I

understand

how the world presents itself tome and

understand myself are inextricably linked.

Furthermore, the range of possibilities for self-

understanding is made available to me by my culture.
is therefore not a private entity,

My self

but an intersection of

interrelating cultural systems.

For Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger the pure

Cartesian philosophy is at best

experience of being selves.
in terms of an object.

of subject to object,

a

’I'

of

static abstraction of our

The latter cannot be described

Instead it is a process, a relating
an interpreting activity that

constitutes both self and world at once.

Hegel and Heidegger

stress the connection between the interpretation of self and
the interpretation of world.

Nietzsche does not stress the
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link between self- and world-constitution.

Both are

a

product of the same activity, but it is not clear that in

producing the one, one is also producing the other.

In

undermining the notion of essential truth, however, he also
undermines the notion of an essential self.

Nietzsche

deliberately works against falling into ready-made patterns
of significance by insisting on playing with many masks

— many

selves from which he can proclaim conflicting truths.

From

each self comes a different perspective.

A decentered self

entails a perspective that no longer privileges its viewpoint
as the "correct" one.

Thus, Nietzsche underlines our

creative power in playing with masks, in taking up selves
only to put them down again.

If the self is a fiction,

also not the constraint we once thought

— we

it is

are not bound to

our selves as if they were givens from which we can't escape.
The self as a relating process is an activity that may choose
to change its orientation, with profound results for both

self and world.

Thus,

a

self could be seen as an orienting

activity, a stance vis-a-vis the world,

interprets.
[21],

In urging us to play,

a

perspective that

to make our words dance

Nietzsche is urging us to take risks in our

interpretations

— to

risk the loss of self that a breakdown in

significance entails in order to create significance anew.
Heidegger introduces

a

note of caution into the

Nietzschean dance with his notion of the self, in the form of
the They,

as a "crossing point" of cultural systems.

only is the self

I

Not

am not an object, but is not even "my"
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self in the sense that the interpretations that make up my

consciousness are drawn from

a

public realm of the

interpretive possibilities made available by my culture.

Although my interpretations may be my own, they are

constrained by the possibilities my culture makes available
to me

.

Due to the grammar of our language it is hard to talk

about the self I'm referring to here in terms that aren't

misleading.
relation.

The 'self' implies a substance, not a process or

When

I

about someone that

describe myself
I

I

tend to list attributes

hope has some coherence and consistency-

-something that remains the same over time.

Subjectivity

might be a better term for the self as process or activity,
but it is often awkward grammatically.

Also,

there is a

difference between talking about the activity or experience
of being selves versus the selves that we consider ourselves

to be.

In the latter case

I

would probably be referring to

what in psychoanalytic terms might be called a 'self-

representation.

'

Self-representations are ideas we have

about who we are that guide our thinking and behavior.

They

change over time as our goals change, but they are static in
the sense that they are images we refer to rather than active

processes

.

If we take the Heideggerian notion that there is no

distinction between inner and outer, that our selves are the
words we speak, the thoughts we think and the action we take,

then these words, thoughts and actions are testimony to the
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self as a relation or process.

They are self-representations

we present to the world that tend to guide further processing

activity as we attempt to make sense of our life as

a whole.

Although Nietzsche emphasizes the creative possibilities in
self- and world-constitution [22], we would be hard put to

create interpretations in

vacuum.

a

No matter how much we

may push at the bounds of the language and social structures
at our disposal,

we are constrained by the limits of what

they can express.

Feminists have attempted to theorize the relationship of

specifically female self to the world.

a

In doing so, some

have attempted to characterize what might distinguish

distinctively feminist self- and world-constituting activity
from "masculinist " self- and world-constituting activity.
the next section

I

In

will review some of these attempts as well

as some of the problems with such a project.

1

.

5

The Feminist Context for

a

Gender-sensitive Approach to

the Self

Gender identity is one way that we have for representing
ourselves.

By labelling myself a 'man' or a 'woman'

I

am

also conjuring up a whole range of possibilities presented to
me in my culture and language.

bounds
me.

If

If

I

stay within conventional

will create a self on the basis of what

I

I

am more adventurous,

I

s

offered

will push beyond

conventional bounds, thus adding to my culture or language
new possibilities of what

a

man or woman could be.

Caring
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about the significance of my life as a whole means creating
self- and world- interpretations that work for me.
In our society gender identity is a key element in our

self-representations.

that is,

it tends to be a stable and

important feature by which we orient our actions.

In the

process of being selves we tend to orient ourselves

differently according to our gender.
interesting feature to look at when
of how we orient ourselves.

Gender would thus be an
it comes to the

question

Differences in orientation due

to sexual difference may give us further clues as to how

subjectivity is possible.

If selves are fictions and every

perspective is no more than that-— a perspective
clues can sexual difference give us to how

a

— then

what

perspective is

created?
In "Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality"

(Harding 1983)

,

Sandra Harding discusses the implications of

feminist gender theory for gender identity and perspectives

informed by that identity.

Gender theory developed by

Dorothy Dinnerstein (1977), Jane Flax (1978,

1983), Nancy

Chodorow (1978), "and others" draws on post-Freudian

psychoanalytic "object-relations" theory (e.g., Mahler,
Guntrip and Winnicott)

.

Traditional psychological theories

attributed the formation of gendered personalities to nature,
sex,

or "social learning" after the age of three.

In

contrast, gender theory attributes such formation
to the very same social/physical processes within
which initially androgynous newborns are
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transformed, and transform themselves, into
distinctive human persons (Harding 1983, 50)

.

Harding argues that gender theory is important due to
the centrality of gender identity to personality formation
[23]

and due to its ability to provide a causal account of

gender which is both "materialist" and nondeterminist ic
The account is materialist because the form of the
actual psychosocial-physical environment with which
the infant interacts is the variable determining
whether or not gender will be produced. The
account suggests that if, societywide, men shared
equally in infant caretaking and the day-today
maintenance of self and others, and if women shared
equally in the labor of ruling, gender would not be
produced at all (Harding 1983, 53)
On this view,

we can trace variations in gender formation to

historically specific psychosocial conditions, and we can
entertain the possibility that gender could be "eliminated

through political processes"

(p.

54)

On the basis of gender theory and additional feminist

literature that examines gendered perspectives arising from
the divisions of labor by sex/gender, Harding offers two

gendered perspectives on rationality:
A rational person, for women, values highly her
abilities to empathize and "connect" with
particular others and wants to learn more complex
and satisfying ways to take the role of the
For men, in
particular other in relat ionships
contrast, a rational person values highly his
ability to separate himself from others and to make
decisions independent of what others think to
develop "autonomy." And he wants to learn more
complex and satisfying ways to take the role of the
generalized other" (Harding 1983, 53-54)
.

.

.

.

—

The contrast of a feminine,

relational point of view that

emphasizes empathy and connectedness to

a

masculine,

oppositional point of view that emphasizes autonomy and

42

separation,

is a recurrent theme of this literature.

[24]

Emerging from this literature is the possibility of what some
feminists have called a "feminist standpoint"

— that

is,

a

distinctively feminist perspective based in distinctively
feminine experience that posits an alternative theory of

knowledge to go with it.

Nancy Hirschmann (Hirschmann 1987)

expresses this relationship of epistemology to a feminist
standpoint this way:
Feminist standpoint epistemology rejects the idea
that epistemology is "objective" or "universal;" it
holds that epistemology is itself a product of
particular social relations. Not just knowledge,
or what we know, is shaped by particular experience
and the relations we have to others, but how we
know and how we conceive of knowledge are also
similarly shaped (p. 251).
On this view, a feminist perspective would involve not only

experiencing aspects of life a masculinist perspective
wouldn't

(knowing different things),

it would also involve

experiencing aspects of life differently (knowing in
different way)

a

To give this difference in perspective

justice, we would have to give a thorough-going critique of

the conceptual frameworks of dominant

discourse

(masculinist)

.

In The Science Question in Feminism

(Harding 1986)

Harding describes feminists such as Jane Flax, Hilary Rose,

Nancy Hartsock and Dorothy Smith as being engaged in the work
of developing a feminist standpoint approach.

characterizes this approach as follows:

She
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Briefly, this proposal argues that men's dominating
position in social life results in partial and
perverse understandings, whereas women's subjugated
position provides the possibility of more complete
and less perverse understandings. Feminism and the
women's movement provide the theory and motivation
for inquiry and political struggle that can
transform the perspective of women into a
"standpoint" a morally and scientifically
preferable grounding for our interpretations and
explanations of nature and social life. The
feminist critiques of social and natural science,
whether expressed by women or by men, are grounded
in the universal features pf women's experience as
understood from the perspective of feminism" (p.

—

26)

.

In chapter

6

of this book she reviews some of the specifics

of the work of Flax,

Rose,

concerned with locating

a

Hartsock and Smith.

All are

gendered difference in perspective

based in gender theory and/or in divisions of labor by
sex/gender.

Hilary Rose (1983)

focuses on the unification of

the manual, the mental, and the emotional
heart")

("hand,

brain, and

that she claims is typical of women's work (and

atypical of men's work)

.

Nancy Hartsock (1983,

in

1984),

addition to drawing on gender theory, discusses the
implications of engaging in "subsistence" work (cooking,
cleaning,

clothing maintenance, etc.) and childrearing for

feminist perspective.

repercussions of

a

Jane Flax

(1983)

1979)

a

less-

first formed in early childhood and

then reaffirmed by patriarchal culture.
(1974,

emphasizes the

"defensive," masculine self versus

defensive, feminine self,

a

[25]

Dorothy Smith

examines how women's work:

relieves men of the need to take care of their
bodies or of the local places where they exist,
freeing them to immerse themselves in the world of
abstract concepts (Harding 1986, 156)
.

44

In addition to arguing that women's labor shapes male

concepts in specific ways, she claims that women's experience
of their own labor is "incomprehensible and inexpressible

within the distorted abstractions of men's conceptual
schemes"

(Harding 1986,

156)

All four attempt to make generalizations on the basis of

gender theory and/or relatively rigid divisions of labor by

sex/gender in our society, that could ground
feminist perspective.

As any feminist knows,

problems with this approach.

a

unified
there are

Despite the obvious advantages

of a unified perspective for collective political action, the

differences among women disallow such

a

perspective.

As

Harding, after characterizing the feminist standpoint

approach, goes on to ask:
if women

'

culture?"

s ...

"Can there be a feminist standpoint

social experience is divided by class, race, and
She goes on to argue for

(Harding 1986, 26)

"feminist postmodernism,

an approach that would be

"

profoundly skeptical toward any universal or universalizing
claims about "the existence, nature and powers of reason,
progress,

science,

language and the

by Harding from Flax 1986,

3)

'

sub ject /self

'

"

(quoted

.

Terry Winant deals with this problem by introducing

distinction between a feminist philosophical stance and

a
a

feminist standpoint, arguing that there is one of the former
and many of the latter.

She defines standpoints as locations

in the political and cultural world that carry with them

specific commitments to projects for political and cultural
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transformation.

Obviously, these will vary from feminist to

feminist according to her specific location.
the feminist philosophical stance, however,

The adoption of

entails the

following
...a commitment to bear full responsibility for a
variety of philosophical positions according to
which each individual epistemic subject can
establish his or her epistemic authority (i.e.
reliability as a knower) only as a function of his
or her place in the whole net of human
interdependency (Winant 1987, 143)
.

In addition to being competent in the dominant discourse,

women are competent in the marginal discourses of their

marginal identities as women, blacks, Jews, etc.

This gives

them epistemic competence in multiple forms of life depending
on the specific marginal discourses at their disposal due to

their specific background.

Thus:

The feminist standpoint is to be considered not as
a finished, fully elaborated standpoint, but as a
flexibly developing standpoint that can handle
whatever emerges in the process of eliminating
sexism.
.Our feminism is a stance from which to
articulate our concerns in the idiom we deem
appropriate, drawing on the full resources of all
the languages we know--including a multiplicity of
"mother tongues "--or as I shall dub such
resources, "cultural and discursive birthplaces"
(Winant 1987, 127)
.

.

,

.

Ann Ferguson has expressed a similar point in her

article "A Feminist Aspect Theory of the Self"
1987)

(Ferguson

To counter the essentializing tendencies of

a

feminist theory that makes universal claims about the

experience of being women, she proposes an "Aspect theory of
self."

This theory rejects the idea that the self is an

unchanging, unified consciousness:

46

Rather, conscious selfhood is an ongoing process in
which both unique individual priorities and social
constraints vie in limiting and defining one's
self-identity (p. 350).

Gender is only one aspect of a self that has many aspects,
none of which can be determined to be prior, more fundamental
or more or less authentic than other aspects of the self.

Instead

aspects of our selves are developed by participating

in social practices which insist on certain skills and

values"

(p.

If the skills and values developed by

351)

engaging in different social practices conflict, those

participating in these practices "will develop conflicting
aspects of self"

(p.

351).

Just as Winant points to competence in marginal

discourses as a resource for women, Ferguson points to
competence in what we could call "marginal" social practices.

Competence in both dominant and marginal discourses and
social practices can push women to

a

feminist viewpoint that

attempts to resolve the conflicts in self-identity such

competence entails.

While Winant doesn't discuss the content

of categories like "masculine" or "feminine," Ferguson's

article implies that we can make some general, historically
specific claims about these categories.

"developing conflict in gender roles"

(p.

Thus,
353)

due to a

men and women

"will have both so-called masculine and feminine aspects of

self as developed by their ongoing social practices"
351)

(p

Although we cannot look at men to determine what so-

called masculine aspects of self are, or at women to
determine the so-called feminine aspects of self, we can
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attempt to fill out the content of these gender categories by

investigating how they operate in our discourses and social

practices

.

In the chapters to come

I

will develop a theory of self

that views the self as a process engaged in an ongoing

struggle to maintain itself within and through the discourses
and social practices at its disposal.

As a feminist,

I

am

interested in the role gender categories have to play in any
process of self-const itut ion

.

I

attempt to articulate the

content of these categories in light of that interest.

In

keeping with the views presented here by Harding, Winant and
Ferguson, however,

I

am trying to move beyond any

essentialist notions about gender by moving beyond
essentialist notions about the self.

My investigation of

gender categories in the pages to come must thus be taken as
an investigation of socially constructed categories that

currently play a key role int he construction of selves and
identities.

I

believe that some generalizations about these

categories can be made along the lines of feminist standpoint
literature on the basis of an examination of gendered social
structures.

But my purpose in building on this literature is

not to make the line between genders any clearer.

Rather,

would like to articulate gender categories as still useful
categories for expressing different aspects of human

experience and modes of experiencing in the hopes of moving

beyond those categories and making
experience available to us all.

a

richer range of

I

NOTES
[1] "I shall now close my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I
shall call away all my senses... and thus
I shall try little
by little to reach a better knowledge of .. .myself " From
Meditation III of the Meditations (Descartes 1977, 157)
.

.

.

.

[2] "I never can catch myself at any time without a
perception, and never can observe anything but the
perception .... I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind
that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions.” From section VI, part IV, book I of A Treat sp
of Human Nature (Hume 1978, 252)

[3] For an interesting discussion of how philosophical
debate turned from a "self -approach" that took the experience
of being a self into account (represented by philosophers
like Descartes and Hume) to questions about personal identity
that no longer considered the subjective experience of being
a self, see C.O. Evans (1970)
[4] For a discussion of the French reception of Hegel
and its influence on French post-structuralist thought, see
Descombes (1982)
.

[5] This is, of course, a very abbreviated discussion of
Marx's contribution to theories of the self. Marx, along
with Hegel, has had a decisive influence on both poststructuralist and feminist thought. For discussions of some
aspects of this influence, see Descombes (1982) and Jaggar

(1983)

.

[6] For the purposes of this dissertation I am
restricting myself to exploring and developing Lacanian
insights into the self; I will not here defend what I believe
to be the positive contributions of other post-structuralists
Although I
such as Derrida and Foucault to the discussion.
Lacan's
importance
of
for
the
am not at this point arguing
the
next
clearer
in
will
become
this
contribution, I hope
chapter

will give a more detailed discussion of this
My remarks here are meant
in section 1.4.
feminism
strand of
to my current
literature
this
of
importance
the
to situate
self.
of
theory
a
developing
project of
[7]

I

The classic sources on this are Dinnerstein (1977)
I will discuss Chodorow in more detail
and Chodorow (1978)
4.
section
in chapter 3,
[8]

.

Ann Ferguson develops this concept in Ferguson
conceptual category sex/affective product ion is
"The
(1983)
and
a way of understanding the social organization of labor
[9]
:
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the exchange of services that occur between men and women in
the production of children, affection, and sexuality" (p
156)

.

[10] The cornerstone of theory on woman as other is
Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (de Beauvoir 1961)
[11] I oppose a "masculinist" to a "feminist"
perspective here because the kind of perspective I'm talking
about involves the self-understanding to go along with it
required for seeing one's perspective as a perspective rooted
in particular kinds of experience.
See the passage I quote
from Harding 1986, 26, on page
of this chapter.

[12] I realize this claim has a utopian ring, but it
speaks to current feminist debates about forming feminist
collectives despite the differences among women.
I will
follow up on this point in section 1.5.
[13] For some useful discussions of how poststructuralist thought affects the interpretation of texts,
see Harari (1979), Silverman and Inde (1985), and Felman

(1982)

.

[14]

See,

for example, Habermas

(1971)

[15] For an interesting review of different responses to
breakdown in this way of thinking rooted in various
philosophical traditions, see Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy

a

(1987)

.

See, for example, Allison (1977), O'Hara (1985) and
Also, for the French reception of Nietzsche
Lorraine (1987)
and its influence on post-structuralist thought, see
Descombes (1983), Deleuze (1983) and Kofman (1972).
[16]

.

[17]

(1978)

See,

for example,

Gadamer (1982) and Derrida

.

[18]

"...the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of

in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason.
Everywhere it sees a doer and doing; it believes in will as
the cause; it believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in
the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the egosubstance upon all things only thereby does it first crecLt£
the concept of "thing."" From Twilight of the Idols
(Nietzsche 1968a, 483)

language,

—

taught them all my creating and striving, to
cind carry into One what in man is fragment and riddle
and dreadful accident..." From Thus Spoke Zqrft thu5tE£
Also, see my discussion of Nietzsche
(Nietzsche 1966, 198)
in chapter 4
[19]

"I

.

.
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[20]

See Deleuze (1983) for an interesting discussion in
the post-structuralist tradition of Nietzsche's concept of
force
[21] "...thinking wants to be learned like dancing,
kind of dancing." From Twilight of the Trinl
(Nietzsche

1968,

512)

^S. a

.

[22] For an interpretation that emphasizes this aspect
of Nietzsche's thought, see Nehemas (1985).

[23] "...of all social characteristics, gender is the
earliest to be solidified in the individual, the hardest to
change, and the most inextricably connected with how we
conceptualize and relate to ourselves, to others, and to
nature" (Harding 1983, 49).
[24] See, for example, Bordo (1985), DiStefano (1983),
Gilligan (1982), Harding and Hintikka (1983), Lloyd (1984),
O'Brien (1981), Trebilcot (1983), and Wawrytko (1981).
[25] "...Flax is arguing that infantile dilemmas are
more appropriately resolved, less problematic, for women than
This small gap between the genders prefigures a
for men.
larger gap between the defensive gendered selves produced in
patriarchal modes of child rearing and the reciprocal,
degendered selves that could exist were men as well as women
primary caretakers of infants, and women as well as men
responsible for public life" (Harding 1986, 153)

CHAPTER

2

LACAN AND OBJECT RELATIONS
2

.

1

Introduction
In this chapter

I

will delve into the riches of

psychoanalytic theory guided by the requirements for
of self argued for in chapter one, that is,

a

a

theory

theory of self

that is
(1)

a

relational theory of self that looks at the self in

a

broader social context that forms and is formed by that
context

(as

opposed to

a

scientific model of investigation

that would attempt to isolate the self as an object of
study)
(2)

a

processional theory of self that looks at the self as

process in time

(as

opposed to

a

a

static object with essential

properties)
(3)

a

theory of self that takes the self as

a

solution to the

problem of effective human agency, i.e., that relates the
significance of an individual's "sense of self" to that
individual's thoughts and actions and the motivations that
give them significance;
(4)

a

theory of self that can explain thoughts and actions,

such as the writing of philosophical texts, as

a

self-

constituting activity of a particular type that can be linked
to the perspective it manifests.
In chapter three

I

that the theory of self

will address the further requirement
I

evolve be one that can account for

the role of gender in self-construction.
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Psychoanalysis is useful to the approach to
self

I

a

theory of

propose here because it explores the development of

a

self and the problems that can arise in such development.

Because it was created to "cure" people whose functioning as

socially acceptable persons was impaired, it explores

possible breakdowns in the various attempts made by
individuals to find

human agency.

Thus,

a

solution to the problem of effective
rather than take the self for granted,

it has problematized the development of a self and theorized

about the conditions that make selfhood possible.

encouraged both a relational and

a

This has

processional theory of

self: according to psychoanalytic theory the self is first

formed in the relational context of the family, and

a self

formed in that context is an on-going process that can

disintegrate (e.g., into psychosis or schizophrenia) at
later time.

useful for

In addition,
a

a

psychoanalysis is particularly

feminist theory of self due to its emphasis on

sexuality and the sensitivity to gender this emphasis
entails

.

Lacanian psychoanalysis is particularly useful to my

project because Lacan chooses to emphasize the

linguistic/symbolic aspects of Freud's thought rather than
the aspects that stress biological drive that were taken up

by classical Freudian theory.

In chapter one

I

argued that

the Hegelian tradition was more congenial to an approach to
the self that accounts for the dialectical interaction of

self and world.

Philosophers like Nietzsche and Heidegger
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have extended this tradition by further exploring the

relationship of human consciousness to the world it "knows"
and desires.

Lacan draws on this tradition

[1]

and extends

it into the terrain opened up by Freud with the help of

Saussurian linguistics (see below)

.

The Hegelian tradition

emphasizes the effects of concepts and symbols on human

consciousness and human reality.

In keeping with this

emphasis, Lacan deemphasizes the biological determinism of

classical Freudian theory and instead posits human behavior
as the effect of a broader context of social significance.

Thus, we can explain an individual's behavior as the effect
of both personal and social networks of meaning which relate

and interact in complicated ways.

Feminist work has substantiated the important role the

cultural coding of 'woman' and "women's experience" has

played in women's self-understanding.

[2]

The project of

emancipating women has thus included "consciousness-raising"
to help women see how their experiences have been coded by

images and concepts not necessarily their own, and the

creation of new,

"liberating," images and concepts.

Feminists advocate this approach because they have found

personally empowering

— i.e.,

it works.

it

Post-structuralist

work such as Lacan's can give us additional theoretical
impetus for explaining why the images and concepts with which
we code ourselves and our world are so important.

addition,

it can provide us with further insight

In

into how

social networks of meaning impact on individuals and vice
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versa.

This in turn can inform our social theory with new

possibilities for promoting social change.
Before expositing Lacan's views in more detail in
section

I,

I

will now set the context for the peculiar flavor

of Lacanian psychoanalysis by clarifying the linguistic

emphasis of Lacan's rereading of Freud.

Lacan's relationship

to more orthodox branches of psychoanalysis has not been

unproblematic.

The Societe frangaise de psychanalyse formed

upon a succession led by Lacan and Daniel Lagache of

a

number

of analysts and students from the Societe psychoanalytique de

Paris.

Although Lacan himself was never reconciled with the

International Association, the other members of the Societe
frangaise de psychanalyse have since rejoined it under

a new

affiliation
One of the important points of contention that led to
the succession involved Lacan's emphasis on the question of
the status of human discourse in analysis.

Lacan was opposed

to the tendency to reduce analysis to a study of behavior, a

quasi-biological theory of insnincts, or

a

"medical therapy

inclined to reduce the subject's psychical life to a series
of symptoms to be interpreted by the

(all-knowing)

analyst in

the way that a doctor interprets the symptoms of

physiological disease" (Wilden 1968, xxv)
Lacan felt that these tendencies failed to be true to
If one was to use psychoanalytic technique,

Freud's spirit.

one had to have a correct understanding of the underlying

concepts.

And

a

proper understanding of Freudian concepts
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could be obtained only by orienting them in the domain of
language
Lacan felt that people had turned away from Freud's more

radical insights and that these insights could be put into

more modern terms with the help of structural linguistics.
Saussure, a key figure in this discipline, provided the

foundation for Lacan's theory of the signifier, although
Lacan chose to radicalize Saussure
of Freud.

'

s

views in his rereading

According to Saussure, there is no one-to-one

correlation between words and things, between signifiers and
signified.

Therefore any relationship between the two is an

arbitrary one.

The meaning of each signifier is determined

by a signifying chain of signifiers.

At each articulation it

has a new meaning that is determined by its relation to the

context of signifiers.
of a signifier

Saussure represented the relationship

(psychic imprint of an acoustic image) to the

signified (concept) thus: S/s with an ellipse around it to
emphasize the relationship of a particular signifier to its

signified (Lemaire 1977, ch

.

one).

Lacan removed the ellipse
On his view,

to emphasize the bar between the two.

a

signifier signifies only by virtue of its relationship to the
whole chain (system) of signifiers.

This produces the

constant sliding of the signified under the signifier
any particular

signifieds rather than staying put vis

a vis

signifier tend to slip under the bar.

For the production of

meaning to take place, for signifiers to generate the
signified

— meaning--there

must be a third term to witness the
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meaning produced.

This third term is the subject.

The

subject who intends meaning constructs itself in relation to

meaning and thus completes the signifying chain by finding

a

place for itself in that chain (Lemaire 1977, ch. three, and

Coward and Ellis 1977, ch. six)
Lacan thus calls attention to the notion of
process.

Individuals of

a

in

society are not discrete entities

that provide the supports of a social structure.
unified,

a subject

We are not

consistent selves that adapt to the society we find

ourselves in.

Instead, we constitute ourselves as subjects

by taking up a particular position with respect to the

network of social relations that constitute society.

This

process can be traced, according to Lacan, in our use of
It is with our entry into language that we first

language.

take up the position of subject.

meaningful sentences
speaker.

If

I

I

In order to utter

must come to grasp my position as a

say 'snow is white.'

I

must have some notion

of the snow as the subject of the ascription of a property,

and

I

must have some notion that the snow

not me.

In other words,

a

I

am describing is

meaningful utterance locates the

speaker as well as what is spoken about.

"Lacan calls the

domain of the signifier, in which this perpetual

restructuring of the subject takes place, the Symbolic order
(Bowie 1979,

132)

.

The "domain of the signifier" in its

broadest form includes all the symbolic orders by which we
represent reality in meaning structures that operate via
opposition,

i.e.,

logico-mathemat ical symbolism,

language,
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and social and cultural symbolism (Lemaire 1977, 55)

.

The

more sophisticated one's descriptions of the world become,
the more clearly one articulates one's position with respect
to the world.
To use language at all, then, there must be a subject

who can distinguish herself from the world, and make further

distinctions about what lies outside of her, as well as about
what she is.

The Symbolic constitutes the possibilities for

being able to take up any position in language at all.

The

particular relations an individual takes up with respect to
the particular set of social relations she finds herself in
are fixed in the same process by which she produces herself
as a subject.

The prevalent ideologies of the culture will

determine the particular manifestations of positioning
oneself in one's culture.

An awareness of the unconscious—

that is the "gap" between the coherent subject that is

perfectly suited to

a

position in society, and the

contradictions within the subject that work against that

position--reveal the price one must pay to perpetuate the
illusion of a unified self (Coward and Ellis 1977,

93-94).

In "The function and field of speech and language in

psychoanalysis" Lacan says that the unconscious is:
that part of the concrete discourse, insofar as it
is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of
the subject in re-establishing the continuity of
his conscious discourse (Lacan 1977, 49)
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The conscious understanding we have of ourselves and the

words we utter doesn't give a full account of the meaning of
our words.

According to Anika Lemaire

Lacan's originality is to have wished to furnish
the proof that the signifier acts separately from
its signification and without the subject being
aware of it.
As a constituent element of the
unconscious, the figure, the literal character of
the signifier, makes its effects felt in
consciousness without the mind having anything at
all to do with it (Lemaire 1977, 38)

Lacan makes use of the discoveries of the linguist, Jakobson,
in delineating some laws of language.

signifiers may be related by

a

On this view,

principle of

combination/contiguity (e.g., cause/effect, part/whole,
sign/thing signified) or

a

principle of

selection/substitution (e.e.g, similarity/dissimilarity).
Lacan has assimilated these two principles or axes of
language to metonymy and metaphor respectively.

he argues

that the processes of the unconscious are structured like
language,

a

and so also follow the axes of combination and
Here he links the functions of metonymy and

selection.

metaphor to Freud's primary processes of condensation and

displacement respectively (Muller and Richardson 1979, 339344;

Lemaire 1977, ch

enunciated by

.

two).

The signifier that is actually

a subject of speech has

significance only in

the context of a whole "battery" of signifiers, unconscious
as well as conscious,

speaker.

of those who hear it--including the

Psychoanalysis is interested in investigating the

"unconscious

subject of speech

— the

effects of signifiers at
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play in meaning making that are not readily accessible
to the
conscious subject of speech.

Lacanian theory thus explores the various meaning

structures within which and by which human subjects come to

position themselves with respect to the world and one
another.

Like Hegel, Lacan posits human consciousness as

always searching for self-certainty and transforming itself
snd its world in its attempts to achieve such certainty.
Like Nietzsche, Lacan posits a fictional self always on the

verge of disintegration,

a self

that speaks to the desire of

the subject for the illusion of wholeness.

Lacan posits a self formed in and from
meaning.

a

Like Heidegger,

social matrix of

What Lacan adds to this tradition is a linguistic

rereading of Freud that situates the origins of individual
selves within the social matrix of meaning and further

explores the strategies by which selves are created and
maintained.

Because the strategies he explores are

linguistic and representational strategies humans use in
order to be persons that can function in

a

social whole, he

refocuses psychoanalytic explanations of human behavior.

Whereas before such explanations tended to restrict

themselves to the individual, his or her biological drives
and their interaction with the environment within the limited

context of the family and important others, Lacanian theory

extends that context to society as
turn,

a whole.

This impetus,

gives social theory new insights into how individual

selves negotiate larger social structures.

in
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Although

I

Lacanian theory,

am not in complete agreement with all of
I

think it deserves serious attention.

As

we take our identities and our world less and less for

granted, we are more and more confronted with the complicated

ways in which the two interact.

Lacanian theory addresses

the question of how our social meaning structures inform our

identities and how those identities in turn, navigate those

meaning structures.

Lacan's linguistic turn brings the

question of the relationship of self and other, self and
world,

into arenas already staked out by the contemporary

philosophical interest in language.

With the help of

Lacanian theory we can read individual philosophical texts as

meaning structures that make sense only within
context of social significance.

a

broader

We can also unravel those

texts as answers to the problem of effective human agency.
This kind of reading of philosophical texts can give us new

insight into how concerns about human identity within social

networks of significance inform and shape the content of
those texts.
On the Lacanian view

meaning produced by

a

I

am espousing here that the

subject of speech is the effect not

only of that subject's conscious discourse, but a whole range
of signifying chains that operate beyond the subject's

awareness, the traditional approach to philosophical texts

(interpretations constrained by some notion of the author's

conscious intentions)

reveals only

a

signifying activity actually at work.

small part of the

Furthermore, any
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production of meaning is also an act of self —constitution
For example, a philosophical text,

in addition to having a

meaningful "content "--the thoughts it communicates (or

miscommunicates --will also represent
)

a self

in process--the

evolving relationship of the authorial voice to the meaning
structures evoked in and by the text.

An examination of

Lacanian psychoanalysis will hence be an aid to developing my
thesis that philosophical texts represent
construction.

In addition,

a

from of self-

Lacan feels that taking up

a

position with respect to meaning structures is inextricably
gender-linked.

Thus,

his views on sexual difference will

help establish the role gender plays in that process of self-

construction

.

In section 2.2.

I

supporting such a view.

will give an exposition of Lacan
In section 2.3

I

will develop the

implications of Lacanian theory for the reading of

philosophical texts as an activity of self-construction.
section 2.4

I

In

will appeal to object relations theory to

critique Lacan's notion of a "fictional" self, and in section
2.5

I

will develop the implications of this critique for our

interpretive framework.

2

.

2

Lacan and the Fictional Self
To understand the Lacanian view of a "split" subject

unaware of much of the signifying activity motivating her
words, we must try and pin down some of Lacan's terminology.
In what follows

I

will characterize the pre-mirror, mirror,
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and post mirror stages of early childhood development

This

.

characterization will help us to understand Lacan's notions
about the dialectical aspect of subjectivity as well as the

distinction he makes between the Imaginary and the Symbolic
realms.

I

will then characterize the adult human subject via

Lacan's "schema L" and summarize the interrelationships of
split subject

— the

in various realms

a

"effect" of signifying chains that operate
(the unconscious and consciousness)

self /other dialectics

(me/other,

I/Other (Other/me))

,

and

— that

make any production of meaning an overdetermined and

inherently conflictual process.
Lacan's linguistic rereading of Freud presents the

unconscious as primarily symbolic and relational.

To

understand this conception of the unconscious we must be
aware of the careful distinction Lacan maintains between

Freud's notions of "instinct"

(Instinkt)

and "drive"

(Trieb)

The former is a biological term used to describe animal

behavior that is fixed by heredity.

The latter refers to the

energy which motivates human beings (Ragland-Sullivan 1986,
70)

.

French

We will see that on Lacan's reading this energy (in

— pulsion)

takes a representational form with the goal

of maintaining self-constancy and has very little connection

Tracing out Lacan's views on the

with innate instincts.

initial formation of identity as it unfolds in early

childhood will give us

a

better sense of Lacan's rereading of

Freud as a structural theory about human motivation rather
than a biological theory about innate instincts.

The stages
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I

am going to describe are not developmental stages in the

sense of Piaget

— they

biological organism.

are not genetically encoded in the

Instead, they are culturally encoded.

Becoming a subject within the cultural context of the meaning
structures of language and symbolic codes as we know them
requires a developmental process wherein the subject takes
her place in those codes
is what

I

.

How Lacan describes this process

now want to address

The "Pre-mirror" or "Prespecular " Stage
The infant is born without sub ject ivity--no unconscious,
no identity, no sense of "self".

He

[3]

has a highly

developed perceptual system, but very little muscular
coordination due to his prematuration at birth.

Lacan

describes this organic insufficiency as a "lack of

coordination of his own mot ility

.

.

.

int ra-organic and

relational discordance during the first six months" (Lacan
1977,

18-19).

Although the infant has neither individuality

or subjectivity and although he cannot walk, talk or obtain

food on his own, he watches and listens to the world around
him.

Lacan calls this stage the "pre-mirror" stage.

lasts from roughly

0-6

It

months and it is marked with the

experience of fragmentation.

At this point drive takes its

primary form and is synonymous with "need."

Need aims at the

suppression of all tension in order to keep the organism
constant through the satisfaction of physical needs (Ragland-

Sullivan 1986, 70)

The infant, being unable to actively

take charge of satisfying his needs, strives to maintain
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constancy through the introjection of part-objects.

That is,

drive as a primary representational energy, mentally

represents part-objects that satisfy.

There are four

prespecular drives whose images make up perceptual matrices
to which other images attach (Ragland-Sullivan 1986,

The voice and gaze of the primordial Other

satisfies his needs

— are

— the

73-74)

Other that

introjected as part-objects to paper

over his inability due to prematuration to maintain the

organism in

a

tensionless state of constancy.

These elemental signif iers--the voice, the gaze, partobjects, etc. --are recorded by the infant in his link with
the Other that maintains the organism's constancy.

Because

the infant can't place himself in the array of

representations of lived experience that he records, he
merges with them, becoming, for example, the part-object of
Phonemes,

breast, the gaze of his mother, or his own gaze.

bits and pieces of the language spoken to and around him are

taken in along with other images.

At this stage these images

are fragmentary and fleeting; there is no underlying

continuity to perception.
Freud describes this early stage of human existence in
"Instincts and their Vicissitudes"

(Freud 1957)

.

The

infant's "pleasure-ego" absorbs objects that are sources of

pleasure and "thrusts forth upon the external world whatever
within itself gives rise to pain"
is

(p.

82).

The pleasure ego

ego
so named because the criterion for distinguishing the
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from the external world is a subjective one based on what
gives the infant pleasure.
This stage, along with the next, are both narcissistic

stages where the infant has as yet made no distinction

between himself and the pleasurable objects that are (in
actuality) distinct from him.

He is self-sufficient; he is

his world insofar as he makes no distinction between himself

and the objects that give him pleasure.

It

is not until the

object stage (Lacan's post-mirror stage) that the infant

begins to realize himself as subject and pleasure and pain
denote relations of the ego to objects rather than the status
of those objects in terms of inner and outer.

The Mirror Stage
The "mirror stage," Lacan's term for the final phase of

narcissism that precedes the object stage, is crucial for the
development of subjectivity.

It occurs at roughly

months and is marked by the "jouissance"
a

whole Gestalt of the human form.

(joy)

6-18

of fusion with

Freud discusses the

interplay of the actual ego and the ego-ideals by which an
adult measures herself in "On Narcissism"

(Freud 1957)

In

the primary narcissism of the mirror stage the infant feels

himself to be ideal--his jubilation at the sight of his
reflection is not yet marred by any suspicion of lack.

In

the transition from primary narcissism to the object stage

sort of dialectic between the actual ego and the ego-ideal

comes into play:

a
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To this ideal ego is now directed the self love
which the real ego enjoyed in childhood. the
narcissism seems to be now displaced on to this new
ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, deems
itself the possessor of all perf ections
That
which he projects ahead of him as his ideal is
merely his substitute for the lost narcissism of
his childhood, the time when he was his own ideal
.

.

.

.

116)

(p.

Lacan's description of the origin of this dialectic given in
"The mirror stage"

(Lacan 1977,

1),

characterizes the

illusory identifications of the Imaginary realm.

It is the

nature of this dialectic that will lead Lacan to posit the

fictional nature of the self.
In the mirror-stage the infant is still narcissistic; he

has not yet experienced the rupture of the tie between him

and his mother that will confront him with wanting what is
absent.

Hence, the ego as subject has not yet emerged.

the glimmerings are there.

yet

The infant takes pleasure in his

reflection because it presents him with "the total form of
the body by which the subject anticipate in a mirage the

maturation of his power"

(p.

2)

.

The Gestalt reflected in

the mirror is a pregnant one which will give birth to the

self to come.

It

"symbolizes the mental permanence of the

I,

at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination"
(p.

2)

The dialectic between actual ego and ego-ideal is

.

prefigured here in primordial form as the infant assumes the
image of the total body (representing the mental permanence
of the

I)

in contrast to "the turbulent movements that the

subject feels are animating him"

(p.

2)

(which contrast
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prefigures the gap between actual ego and ego-ideal)

.

The

assumption of the image
would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the
symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a
primordial form, before it is objectified in the
dialectic of identification with the other, and
before language restores to it, in the universal,
its function as subject, (p. 2)
This first encounter with one's reflection sets a dialectic
in motion that prefigures the dialectic between self and

Other to come.
The primordial

I

precipitated from this original

dialectic "situates the agency of the ego, before its social
determination,

in a fictional direction which will always

remain irreducible for the individual alone"
is,

is

(p.

2)

.

That

the very origin of the dialectic between self and Other

founded on the assumption of an image in the form of

a

totality that belies the fragmented movements and responses
the infant actually feels himself to be.

The image of the

total form of the body is an anticipation of the mastery over

motor locomotion that at this stage of dependency is yet to
come.

Hence,

ego to come,

even the primordial
is a fiction,

not yet occurred.

the prefiguration of the

I,

based on

a

projection of what has

The infant assumes the image because it is

more pleasurable to feel one's self to be

a

functioning whole

rather than a random array of discrete movements and
sensations.

But to assume this image from the outside is to

internalize something that comes from the external world.

At

the pleasure-ego phase this is natural--but the primordial

I
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will emerge in the object-stage as the ego,

with it the fiction of an object

(the image)

still carrying

absorbed into

itself on the basis of the subjective criterion of pleasure.
Thus, at the very irreducible core of the self

call it a core)

(if one could

lies a fiction of totality assumed from the

outside that is later elaborated layer by layer in the

dialectic of identification with the other.
The gap in the primordial me initiates the rivalry

between these two "selves"
vs.

(the inner sense of fragmentation

the whole image of the human form)

and the aggressivity

of the me who defends against the feeling of disintegration

by identifying with an alien object.

Whereas primary energy

in the prespecular stage aimed at satisfaction of physical

need,

drive at the mirror stage becomes secondary energy or

primary libido that takes the form of Desire.

There is a

growing awareness of differentiation and otherness along with

psychic awareness, although the "pleasure-ego" still reigns.
The infant still feels himself to be what gives him pleasure,
but rather than merging with the part-objects of the

prespecular stage he wants to merge with the mother as
whole object.

To feel that he and his mother are one,

infant must gain the mother's recognition.

a

the

Pleasure becomes

linked with responses from the mother that demonstrate his
effect on the mother as

a whole.

is the Desire to be desired by the

Desire in its primary form
(m)

Other in order to fuse

with her; it is this recognition of the

(m)

Other that desires

69

him that allows ident if icatory merging to occur (Ragland-

Sullivan 1986, 72-73)

.

Thus Need matures into Desire via the recognition of the
(m)

Other.

To be desired the infant must forfeit certain

pleasures in order to conform to the desire of the

(m)

Other.

Need in its original undifferentiated form is repressed as
the infant becomes increasingly aware of him-"self" as an

object of the voice and gaze of the other.

primal repression

— the

It

is recorded as

fixing of a primary, signifying chain-

-the earliest representations of Desire in their link to the
(m)

Other.

The infant identifies with the mother,

fusing with

her so as to retain the sense of stability and continuity he

wouldn't otherwise feel.

At some point

(given all the

frustrations his mother causes him) he comes to realize that
he not only isn't omnipotent

(that is,

he isn't the whole

world that matters to him--the mother that supplies his
needs) but his mother is also imperfect.
to cater to his needs,

She wants more than

Not only

she has desires of her own.

does the infant still want to fuse with the mother

(as

in the

mirror stage proper) but he becomes increasingly aware of his
separateness.

The realization that the mother lacks

(i.e.,

has desires of her own) brings on the castration complex

which marks the end of the mirror stage.

With the advent of

the castration complex the primordial ego formed through

ident if icatory merging with the

secondary repression.
(m)

(m)

Other will succumb to

The child will displace his desire for

Other-fusion onto cultural substitutions that disallow
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such fusion, and the ego will be built up by layers of

identifications.

But representations of ident if icatory

mergings with the

Other who originally desired one in very

(m)

specific ways, although repressed, will continue to exert an
effect
The Post-Mirror Stage

For Lacan, the transition from narcissism to the object

stage is marked by loss; the tie between mother and child is
lost and the child is confronted with his existential

negativity.

That is, the child realizes that he is not self-

sufficient, and that objects important to him (such as the
mother)

can absent themselves and so are separate from him.

But what of love?

In "Instincts and their Vicissitudes"

Freud says that love "originates in the capacity of the ego
to satisfy some of its instincts auto-erotically through the

obtaining of 'organ-pleasure'"

(Freud 1957,

85)

It

is

originally narcissistic in nature, and is then transferred to
objects absorbed into the ego and "expresses the motor

striving of the ego after these objects as sources of

pleasure"

(p.

85).

Thus,

the infant discovers that some of

those stimuli it can't avoid, i.e., certain instincts, it can

satisfy itself.

This auto-eroticism is then transferred to

objects the pleasure-ego has absorbed, and is finally

expressed as love in the motor-striving of the ego after the
objects that give it pleasure.

In "On Narcissism" Freud says

that the departure of the developing ego from primary

narcissism results in

a

vigorous attempt to recover the
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primary state (where the infant was self-sufficient)

.

The

departure is due to the displacement of libido to an external
ego-ideal.

Thus,

object-libido and ego-libido become

distinguished, the latter being the narcissistic return to
the self, while the former is based on the displacement of

libido to an external ideal.

here we find the basis of the

desire and desire to be desired that Lacan will develop:
who loves has,

so to speak,

"He

forfeited a part of his

narcissism, which can only be replaced by his being loved"
(Freud 1957,

"an actual happy love corresponds to the

120);

primal condition in which object-libido and ego-libido cannot
be distinguished"

121)

(p.

.

that is,

it

is not

enough to

strive after the objects that give it pleasure; the ego, in
its attempt to return to the narcissistic state where it felt

no lack,

needs also to be loved, to have turned upon it the

libido of the Other.
For Lacan, the end of the mirror-stage inaugurates "the

dialectic that will henceforth link the

elaborated situations" (Lacan 1977,

5)

.

I.

to socially

The

I

is then turned

into an apparatus "for which every instinctual

thrust

...

should correspond to a natural

maturation

...

exemplified,

complex."

(p.

dependent

,

in man,

on a cultural mediation as

in the case of the sexual object,

5-6).

by the Oedipus

That is, at the object-stage the ego

strives after the objects it desires through the cultural
This means that a third

mediation of the Oedipus complex.
party is introduced into what was

a

dyadic relationship
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between the mother and infant, i.e., the father taken as
paternal metaphor":
a law,

a

"The father is a function and refers to

the place outside the imaginary dyad against which it

k r ®9-ks

(Rose 1985,

39)

.

Desire in its secondary form

emerges as the child confronts its existential negativity and
yearns for the happily self-sufficient state of narcissism

when he constituted his whole world.

In desiring the mother—

-the lost object--the child wants also to be desired; it is
in this reflection of libido from the Other that the self

attempts to restore the lost self-sufficiency of primary

narcissism
At this point the father and language step in with the

Law-of-the-Father that forbids incest (fusion with the
mother)

and gives the child something to compensate him for

his terrible loss

— the

symbolizing power of language.

Words,

due to their power to represent what's absent, help the child

to compensate himself for the pain of separation from his

mother.

In the famous fort/da game of the baby observed by

Freud (in Beyond the Pleasure Principle

)

,

the baby throws a

cotton reel out of his crib saying ooo (fort--gone) and
reeling it back saying da
Freud)

—

thus mastering (according to

the comings and goings of his mother by representing

them with the help of the spool, and words that will
eventually come to represent in and of themselves.

By

soothing the pain of absence, words allow the child to defer
his desires, to articulate them as representations that he
can keep until such time as satisfaction is possible.
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In the desire to be desired the child
identifies with

the object the mother seems to desire,

i.e.,

the father.

Thus,, the child assumes an image that anticipates
the power

that is not yet his in much the same way as the
infant

assumes the mirror-image.

This identification, however,

is

modified by the restrictions placed upon the child in the
symbolic matrix which encodes kinship relations (and

prohibits incest)

.

Hence, a dialectic between the actual ego

with all its inadequacies in getting its desires satisfied
and the ego-ideal the ego compares itself to (the ego-ideal

incorporating ever more of the restrictions the actual ego is

confronted with)

,

is mediated through successive

identifications with the Other within the Symbolic matrix.
The castration complex is the moment in which the

subject finds his signifying place and completes the

detachment from the dependency on the mother as source of

satisfaction of needs.

In the post-mirror stage the Desire

to be desired so that ident if icatory fusion can occur is

displaced from the mother who becomes identified with the

mysterious force of repression.

The child attempts to fill

in his libidinal lack through fusions with cultural

substitutions,

rather than the spontaneous fusions of the

narcissistic pre-mirror and mirror stages (Ragland-Sullivan
1986,

79)

Thus,

secondary libido, while still linked to the

Imaginary, manifests itself in the Symbolic.

The transition

from the Imaginary to the Symbolic is forced by the

assumption of castration which creates the lack "through
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which desire is produced in
(Coward and Ellis 1977,

a

way organized to cultural ends"

120)

In the primary processes of the unconscious system,

psychical energy flows freely by means of displacement and
condensation.

These processes are at work in the fleeting

and fragmentary mergings of the infant in the prespecular
stage as well as the narcissistic identifications of the

mirror stage.

In the secondary processes,

"satisfaction is

delayed while the mind tries different ways to satisfaction"
(Coward and Ellis 1977,

100)

In the post-mirror stage the

.

subject acquires the ability to exercise the secondary

processes of conscious thought

.

The processes of ego-

construction through the layering of self/other
identifications in accordance with paternal law are the same

processes as that by which the subject is constructed in
language.

The subject first splits itself off from "its

sense of continuum with the mother's body, then it splits

itself off from the ideal ego of the mirror stage, and

finally it separates itself in order to find itself
in symbol isat ion "

(Coward and Ellis 1977,

process which constitutes

a

100)

.

a

Thus,

place
the

subject of speech who can place

itself with respect to its world constitutes the unconscious
in the same movement

(Coward and Ellis 1977,

115)

The Schema L

For Lacan, a theory of "self" is a misnomer if what we

mean by a self is a unified subject of experience.

theory of self is better termed

a

Lacan's

theory of the human
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subject.

And rather than

and maintains itself,

a

theory about how an ego develops

it is a theory about a structure of

signification which can only maintain itself by repeatedly

reconstituting these significations in the present.
With the help of Lacan's famous schema L

[4]

we can

summarize our characterization of the pre— mirror, mirror, and

post-mirror stages:

In this schema Lacan characterizes the human subject as a

quadrature of dialectical structures that oscillate between
four poles.

The signifying chains that are activated in

these structures operate in the two realms of the Imaginary
and the Symbolic, as well as at the unconscious and conscious
levels.

It is not always clear just how to distinguish the

various features of this quadrature.

The following rendition

of their interconnections is bound to reduce some of the

complexity of Lacan's thought, but in doing so

I

hope to make

clear how Lacanian theory can support the view that

philosophical texts can be read as representative of

a self-

constituting activity.
The diagram represents four poles of subjectivity

through which an individual's signification oscillates.
represents the speaking subject

— the

'I'

of speech.

S

The 'me'
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is the subject of identifications and narcissism that informs

the

'I'

with libidinal energy.

The 'other'

(with a small o)

is the other that one addresses in the Imaginary realm

functions as
projected.

a

The

— it

screen onto which the identity drama is
'Other'

unconscious truth

— the

speech" is addressed.

(with a capital 0)

is the source of

Other to which an individual's "full
With any production of meaning the

subject is also questioning itself about its identity.
The Other is formed,

representations

(the voice,

discussed on page
stage.

in part,

by the primordial

gaze, part-objects,

of this chapter)

etc.,

of the prespecular

In the precipitation of the me that desires fusion

with the

(m)

Other,

representations of lived experience

dropped out, thus forming the primordial unconscious, as
irrelevant to the primary libido.
in the subject.

This forms the first split

The second split occurs when the

(m)

Other of

Imaginary merging in the mirror stage is repressed due to the

castration complex and the acquisition of subjectivity in the
Symbolic.

With secondary repression Desire for fusion is

deferred via symbolic representations and representations of
lived experiences of the

(m)

Other's Desire is relegated to

the place of the Other as well.
The split subject of the me of narcissistic

identifications and the

I

of speech make the project of self-

identity and self-constitution an on-going project of trying
to find some equilibrium between conflicting aspects of the

subject in order to maintain the illusion that the subject is
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unified self.

a

The place of the Other is the place of both

lived representations not incorporated into the me/other

dialectic and the place of meaning structures of the Symbolic
(i.e.,

language) not incorporated by the

signifying chains of the subject.

The

I

I

into the conscious

is the locus of

significance as determined by the rules of language.

The me

is the ideal ego first formed through identification with the

mother (or primary caretaker) and then diverted into
of identifications with ego ideals.

a series

Although the me/other

dialectic of narcissistic identifications originates in the
mirror stage, its origins have been relegated to the place of
the Other.

This dialectic operates in the realm of the

Imaginary where the me seeks to maintain the illusion that it
is without lack by repeating self/other identifications

reminiscent of mother-fusion.
The I/Other dialectic originates in the post-mirror

stage where the subject is introduced into the realm of
In the taking on of sexual

language and the Symbolic order.

identity and the subjectivity of

a

language speaker,

a

split

is created in the subject between the me of narcissistic

identifications and the
law.

I

that submits Desire to the paternal

In the Symbolic realm the

I

positions itself with

respect to the social categories of the Symbolic order,

activating signifying chains by placing itself as
with respect to those chains.

It

is

a

signifier

continually deflected

from a dialectical relationship with the Other, by the me

which wants to dictate the position the

I

takes with respect
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to an other.

In the on going search of the me for a sense of

cohesiveness, a stable, continuous identity, it enlists the

aid of the

to "translate” its ident if icatory needs by

I

adding the additional, intentional aim to the speaking
subject of tracing out the desire of the me.
The dialectic of the
forms.

The

I

with the Other can take two

can be the subject of "empty" speech, forever

I

deferring Desire by representing objects of Desire in the
Symbolic that are further and further removed from the

unconscious representations of lived experience.

That is,

layers of identification motored by the me are mechanically

played out in keeping with Symbolic meaning structures rather
than the representations of lived experience of motherfusion.

Or,

the

I

can be the subject of "full" speech that

addresses the Other of real Desire--thus activating

representations of lived experiences of satisfied Desire that
have thus far eluded the me/other dialectic.

[5]

The unconscious is the discourse of the Other.

It

speaks in the individual's dreams, slips of the tongue and so
forth.
other,

This speech will have an ostensible listener, the
to whom one is speaking, but will actually be

addressed to one's own Other, the source of unconscious
truth.

The truth sought by what Lacan calls the "true"

subject is the truth that the me evades with every

narcissistic trick of identification that it has at its
disposal.

It

is the truth of the subject's radical lack of

being, the primordial gap that marks it.

While the me
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continually searches to overcome this gap by papering it over
with identifications that give it the illusion of being
whole,

full speech confronts this gap by articulating one's

real Desire

— Desire

that has been repressed by the me in its

ruses to maintain illusions about its wholeness
The me is a function of the Imaginary while the

operates in the Symbolic.

I

The identifications of the me are

crucial to subjectivity, but they also lead to the alienation
of one's truth in illusion.

The Lacanian "ideal norm" of

selfhood (if we can call it that) is to objectify the
specular lures of the Imaginary other in language (thus

rendering Imaginary significance Symbolic)

The strategies

.

of the me were put into place in the preoedipal stage and

lost to consciousness with the resolution of the Oedipus

complex.

Others are searched for that will mirror back the

wholeness the me can identify with--that

is,

one seeks the

fairly

illusion of being a particular ideal ego with

a

predictable set of ego ideals to go with it.

These Imaginary

"lures" that "capture" the me can restrict the range of an

individual's conscious acts and thoughts.
Imaginary act as lures that motivate

a

The imagos of the

person's view of

reality, putting that person's range of available signifying

possibilities into the service of

narcissistic identifications.
a thing,

a

limited repertoire of

Since the self (the me)

isn't

but a dialectical structure dependent on the other

to maintain the fiction that it exists,

unceasingly motivating the

I,

libidinal energy is

another dialectical structure,
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to find and recreate the ident if icatory relationships
it

needs for its survival.
At the same time,

signifiers repressed first due to the

"no" of the father and one's insertion into the Symbolic,
and

then repressed due to one's subjugation to that Symbolic
order,

still exert pressure.

The illusions of the me are

belied by the signifiers that represent aspects of lived
experience the me has had to deny.

The "truths" of the

Symbolic order, reality as it is officially sanctioned by

socially imposed meaning structures, are also belied by
aspects of one's lived experience repressed in deference to
those structures.
The truth of the unconscious points to what Lacan calls
the Real

— the

realm beyond language, the ineffable, that

which slips away when we try to speak it.

[6]

The signifiers

of the unconscious use a different logic than that of the

conscious system.

But it is still composed of

representations of lived experience that form networks of
meaning.

When Lacan says that the unconscious is structured

like a language, he means that the signifiers that make it up

(representations of lived experience) are significant in

relationship to one another,
language are.

just as the signifiers of

They form signifying chains that operate on

the principle of condensation and displacement--which Lacan

assimilates to the linguistic principles of metaphor and

metonymy (Wilden 1968, 238-249)

.

The Real of the subject's

lived present activate the signifiers that operate in the
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Imaginary and Symbolic realms, on conscious and unconscious
levels, but finally eludes all attempts at definitive

signification
In listening to the discourse of the Other,

who responds to the full speech of the

I,

the Other

one is freed from

the lures of the Imaginary, and open to the possibility of

new meaning.

Shattering specular identifications shakes the

person's stability by threatening her "sense of self", but it
also allows the possibility for coming closer to articulating
the true Desire blocked out

(repressed)

maintain an illusory wholeness.

in the need to

Releasing significance

hitherto relegated to the unconscious releases truths of the
individual's lived experience not yet accounted for by the
range of conventional significance offered her given her

Desire as mapped out by the me.

While the Symbolic order of

language can lead one to further and further alienation by

deferring one's desire further and further through Symbolic
signifying chains in the service of the me, it can also lead
one closer to unconscious truth by representing one's Desire

more accurately

— the

Desire articulated in the discourse of

the Other.

Lacan went a step further than Saussure when he claimed
that not only isn't there a determined link between signifier

and signified, but that the signified is produced by the
signifier.

And that all signifiers have the same signified

that is, desire and castration (Juranville 1984, ch

.

III).

This common signified presents itself according to the
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primordial distinction between man and woman
difference par excellence.

— the

signifying

The signifiers are equivalent in

the sense that it is true for all of them that they only

exist due to their difference from the others.

For a

signifier to signify it cannot be taken in isolation, but
must be taken in tis difference from the whole battery of
signifiers.

No one signifier or signifying chain can render

either a timeless truth or a whole subject.

Meaning will

continually shift with the shifting of signifiers in
signifying chains.

The subject will never know a definitive

truth about either itself or the world because the signifieds
of meaning production can never be fixed.

The Desire to take

one's place in the Symbolic as the person one "really" is is

forever thwarted by the inadequacy of the signifier by which
one must represent oneself.

"castration."

Thus,

the subject is doomed to

Since there is nothing that can fill in the

subject's lack so it can finally be whole, the object of
desire as such is impossible.

The subject will never attain

the wholeness it seeks by deferring its Desire through

Symbolic signifying chains.

Without such an object one might

expect desire as well to be impossible.

But oedipal rivalry

dissimulates the impossibility of mother-fusion, leaving one
with the illusion that one can find the absolute object that
will replace the lost

(m)

Other and fill in one's gap.

absolute object or "objet a"

(the desired object)

is the

"lure" that makes Desire possible despite its futility.
Thus,

The

the signifier and speech creates both the law of
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castration imposed on the one who speaks as well as the
subject that desires.
The subject as a signifier, and the self as the effect
(that is,

the Other,

the signified) are linked through the discourse of
i.e.,

the unconscious.

A changing array of

signifiers at both the conscious and unconscious level will
effect changes in the signified.

Thus, my identity is the

outcome of a signifying network at various levels

(conscious-

preconscious and unconscious) and in three realms (the
Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real) that play themselves
out in a zigzag between the four poles of the Schema L.

2

.

3

Self-Construction and the Production of Meaning: Take

T

In section 2.2 we saw that in the act of speaking or

writing, the Lacanian subject is not merely attempting to

communicate information to his audience.

Instead, there is

an oscillation of meaning between the four poles that make up

the Lacanian quadrature.

That is, not only is the human

subject not a unified entity transmitting information to

another unified entity, but it is

a

quadrature in complicated

communication with itself who only incidentally transmits
information to another.
Such a view of the human subject requires us to change
the form of our interpretations of philosophical texts.

assumption that there is
a

a

The

unified self behind the text with

unified set of intentions leads the interpreter to cancel

out contradictions and discrepancies in the text to conjure
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up a picture of what the author "really" meant.

assumption that the author is a split subject,

The

decentered

a

self of signifying chains that oscillate between four poles,

renders interpretations that assume such a unified

subjectivity reduct ionistic

.

A reading that cancels out the

contradictory, and equally valid, meanings the text yields

doesn't do justice to the complexity of the text.

Desire

being
'I'

— is

— the

desire to fill in the primordial gap

the motivating force of enunciation.

in-

The speaking

strings together signifying chains according to socially

acceptable codes of meaning.

The 'me' directs these chains

in keeping with its desire to maintain the illusion of

wholeness and continuity.

The 'I' in enunciating a

signifying chain signifies the self by taking up
in the signifying chains enunciated.

a

position

This position is

motivated by the 'me' which ceaselessly reconstitutes its
position with respect to the other according to old patterns.
If the subject cannot reconstitute itself with respect to the

other

— that

is,

put into play the signifying chains that have

represented it in the past
with disintegration

— loss

— the

subject will be threatened

of continuity,

loss of meaning,

loss of self.

Although the 'me' attempts to direct the speaking
its interest,

'I'

in

the subject's "truth" which has its location in

the place of the Other will subvert those attempts.

We thus

have the picture of a subject at odds with herself.

A

subject with two sources of "truth"— the "truth" of the ego
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that would paper over its lack with illusion, and the "truth"
of the unconscious subject who would subvert that truth by

bringing into play the unanticipated meaning of signifiers
not yet incorporated into the me/other dialectic.

The gaps

and contradictions of a text can be seen as the collision of

these two orders of "truth"
(based on illusion)

— the

self-certainty of the me

and the unanticipated meaning of the

unconscious forever trying to subvert that truth and confront
the individual with its irreducible lack.
So,

the very act of writing theory is simultaneously an

act of self-construction in which the subject constructs

signifying chains that position it as a signifier.

In the

act of writing theory, the writer is attempting to assimilate

experience in accordance with rules of conventional language
as well as in accordance with the identity themes that give

coherence to that writer's experience.

To do only the first

would result in arbitrary strings of words that would have
meaning, but no impetus.

Without a speaking "self" that

informs the words with intent ionality, significance beyond
the conventional meaning of the words would be missing,

leaving us with the feeling that we were just reading

arbitrary strings of words.

What gives language impact is

the drive of a 'me' that through its drive to reconstitute a

relation to an other in continuity with an endless series of
such relations that extend back to earliest infancy, attempts
to communicate something beyond the conventional meaning of
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the words

— the

message of who the speaker is, what he is

about, what his relationship to the words spoken is.

Thus theory is simultaneously about the subject who is

writing it as well as about the object under examination.

We

can thus read it for the story it conveys about the positions
a

subject took in constructing self-identity as well as for

the meaning it -conveys in terms of a social pool of meaning.

What

I

would like to examine in philosophical texts is

the play of the me and the unconscious subject of truth as

two levels of meaning in a text--the identifications

translated by the

'I'

as well as the "symptoms" of the text

that subvert those identifications.
On a Lacanian view, a theorist wants to find the lost

object, that which will fill his lack and make him whole.

That object has been truth.

There are times when theory

pushes at the boundaries of meaning in order to incorporate
more of the lived experience that evades current (Symbolic)

meaning structures, and there are times when language is put
into the service of maintaining old, if comforting,

illusions.

Lacan gives us

a

way of reading out both.

As

Lacan says, although ideally we want to do away with the me
entirely, that is not possible.
no subjectivity whatsoever.

Without the me we would have

But what theory should be able

to do is to push at the outer limits of that subjectivity.

Any "self "-concept ion is going to be inadequate since it is

based on a fiction.
be whole.

Analogously no theory is ever going to

The illusion of the theorist is that she's finally
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found closure,
truth.

finally gotten the "whole" theory, the "whole"

She wants to maintain the illusion of that wholeness,

just as she wants to maintain the illusion of her own

wholeness, by evading the truth that would subvert that

illusion--the meaning that eludes her theory.

The desire of

the theorist is finally to take on the image of the whole

theorist --the theorist who's whole, who knows all, who has
filled in the gap in self, the gap in knowledge.

Lacan

suggests not only that that's impossible, but that the desire

motivating such a quest is inextricably bound with the quest
for wholeness of self,

the lost

for self-identity.

We will never find

'objet a' because we never had it to begin with.

And yet we will be forever searching for that object.
in fact,

And,

Lacan does not advocate giving up the quest for

wholeness--in fact, the "cure" consists not in giving up the
quest, but in adhering to it more rigorously,

in a less

alienated way, by escaping the lures of the me that would
delude us into thinking that we've already achieved what we
were looking for.

[7]

But while Lacan emphasizes the illusory nature of the
me

'

quest for wholeness,

I

will now turn to object relations

theory for a different reading of the me

'

activity.

A look

at the work of Winnicott and Mahler, presented in the next

section, will allow us to critique Lacan's conceptions of the

mirror stage and of the radically fictional nature of the me.
This critique will allow us,

in section 2.5,

to conceptualize

alternative to the strategy for self-constitution
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characterized by Lacan's schema L which, in turn, will allow
us to conceptualize an alternative strategy in the production

of meaning.

2

•

4

Object Relation s and

a

Critique of the Fictional Self

Although Lacanian psychoanalysis is attractive in light
of my project,

I

believe that it can be enriched with

insights taken from object relations theory.

Lacan makes

room for the pre-oedipal experiences of the mother/child dyad
that object relations theory tends to emphasize with his

notion of the Imaginary.

But on his view,

one takes up one's

Symbolic position in language by accepting the paternal law
(forbidding sexual access to the mother) and the father as

legislator of that law.

Although positionality in the

Symbolic order is influenced by effects of the Imaginary,

it

has more to do with the father (or the paternal law) than the

mother.

I

think that Lacan's emphasis on the Symbolic leads

him to overlook intricacies of relationships in the Imaginary
that could further illuminate how positioning in the Symbolic
is affected.

When we come to the question of sexual

difference and the role of gender in self-construction in
chapter three the emphasis of object relations theory on such

relationships will open the door to possibilities overlooked
by Lacan

Lacan's quadrature provides an illuminating conceptual

framework for understanding how the kinds of pre-verbal

identifications made in early childhood can interact with
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identifications rooted in the Symbolic, e.g., the taking on
of a particular role in life
chief)

(doctor,

lawyer or Indian

The latter involves inserting oneself into the

.

symbolic code, taking one's place in

a

network of kinship

relationships within the family (daughter/sister or

son/brother etc.) and in the broader network of social

relationships (black and rich or white and middle-class for
example)

.

These positions are encoded in language

— marked

out by the signifying chains connected with each position
(for example,

it sounds "funny" for me to say "I'm a menace

to society if "I" refers to an upper-middle-class doctor and

perfectly natural if "I" refers to a poor car-thief)

.

The

pre-verbal identifications of the Imaginary involve
identifications based on symbiotic fusion with the primary
caretaker.

Since such fusion involves a more "direct" form

of identification than an identification mediated by symbolic

representation,

it is less accessible to symbolic

understanding.

That is, analyzing what my uncle represents

to me as a role-model that

I

patterned myself after is more

straight-forward than analyzing the wordless fusion
experiences

I

had with my primary caretaker as an infant

Lacan's interrelating of the Imaginary and Symbolic realms

underlines the unconscious effects my original fusion had in
any later identifications that take place on a more

"conscious" level.

On his account,

Imaginary effects are

playing into the Symbolic identifications

I

later make.

And

these Imaginary effects remain unconscious for the most part.
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The

'me'

enlists the

'I'

in the attempts to repeat its

original identifications and so maintain "self "-continuity
Thus the preoedipal experiences that constitute the Imaginary

have a lasting effect throughout one's life, no matter how

much they are modified and diverted by the Oedipal complex
and the diversion of desire through the symbolic chain.
It

is to Lacan's credit that he underlines the interplay

of the Imaginary and Symbolic realms throughout life

— the

preoedipal realm where the mother predominates and the
Symbolic realm of the father introduced by the Oedipus
complex.

In this way we can see how both the mother and the

father (taken in the traditional sense) can exert an on-going

influence on one's self-identity, and we can untangle some of
the mechanisms involved in such an identity.

Lacan

emphasizes the "lures" of the Imaginary and the "illusion" of
wholeness that fusion gives

one— an illusion

shatter if we are to uncover "truth".

that we must

His technique of

analysis and the "short session" emphasizes the father role
of rupture

— breaking

off the analysand's session at arbitrary

moments in order to reveal the illusory nature of any
Imaginary identifications the analysand may be in the course
of carrying out.

[8]

We could contrast this kind of

technique to that of the object relations theorist,
Winnicott, who prefers sessions longer than the traditional
50 minutes,

sessions which foster trust and the creation of a

"holding environment" for the analysand.

This technique

would seem to be more in keeping with the analyst as mother.
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I

agree with Lacan that Imaginary fixations that lead

one to ignore or deny aspects of one's experience that don't

allow for the maintainence of illusory wholeness can

unnecessarily restrict one, leading to

a life

ever more

alienated from the "Real" that eludes one's rigidified
structures of meaning.

Lacan's technique, by involving the

analysand in the "death work" necessary to break one out of
restricted meaning structures, certainly has
liberating one from such fixations.

a

place in

His own "flight from

mother engulfment," however, has led him to underemphasize
the more positive aspects of the Imaginary

— aspects

that can

be revealed with the help of object relations theory.

While Lacan emphasizes the primordial gap in one's
"self "--the gap between one's own inner sense of

fragmentation versus the alien mirror image one identifies
with in order to feel whole--ob ject relations theory attempts
a

more complete account of the origins of self.

An important

feature of identification in the Imaginary for an object

relations theorist is the "match" between infant and primary

caretaker that make it possible.

Of course,

Lacan recognizes

the necessity of adequate mothering for the origins of self,
but object relations theorists trace out more completely just

what "adequate" might mean.

In doing so,

they bring

attention to a feature of primary identification that Lacan
overlooks

— that

is,

the necessity for an adaptation on the

part of both infant and primary caretaker in order to achieve
the particular kind of connectedness that allow

92

identification to occur.

This leads me to question the

completely illusory quality of such identifications.

True,

the infant's belief that caretaker and infant are one is an

illusion that will be destroyed, compensated for and

protected aqainst in various ways by the infant throughout
his life.

But contrary to Lacan's claim that most

communication is "mis "-communication, it seems crucial to me
that the feeling of identification (that for the infant

amounts to an experience of fusion)

is

based on a very real

adaptation of two entities, one to another.

In Lacan's

terms, one might say that identification involves actual

experiences of

a

match between two human beings with respect

to their desire to be desires.
at least,

That is,

for periods of time

the infant IS what the caretaker wants and the

caretaker IS what the infant wants.
involves the felt experience, for

a

Thus,

identification

period of time, of

actually being all to one another, with no need to defer
one's desire through the symbolic chain.

The infant can feel

at one with its caretaker because the caretaker identifies

with the needs of the infant.
It can be

argued that men have

a

more difficult time re-

experiencing this kind of fusion in their lives

— those

moments when two people can actually be what the other
desires at the same moment —because of their masculine need
to dis-identify with the mother

Dinnerstein 1977)

.

(cf.

Chodorow 1978,

Reading Winnicott and Mahler, we can get
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some sense of what a fusion experience involves, of what

a

"match" between two human beings might mean.

Winnicott felt that Freud presupposed the "separateness
of the self and a structuring of the ego"
41)

.

(Winnicott 1965,

Because Freud assumed that the patient was

a person,

he

overlooked factors involving the emergence of personhood.
Winnicott,

in his work with psychotics,

became interested in

the early developmental processes that facilitate the

emergence of personhood.

Psychotics are not "persons" in our

usual meaning of the term.

becoming

a

person?

Why not?

What is the process of

Where did it break down in the case of

his patients who never fully emerged as persons?

According to Winnicott, it is the mother who provides
the infant with the experiences necessary for the emergence
of a self.

At birth the infant is in a state of

[9]

"unintegration."

The infant has no self to act as the

subject of his experiences.

fragmented experiences.

Instead there are only

These fragmented experiences

correspond to the experiences of Lacan's pre-mirror stage.
The organization of the infant's experience is preceded by

and draws upon the mother's organized perceptions of him.
Due to "primary maternal preoccupation:" the mother offers

herself as an attentive medium for the infant's growth.
both provides

a

holding environment for the infant in his

quiescent states, and "brings the world to the child" in
response to his needs.

The mother,

in the case of "good-

She
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enough mothering," is attentive enough to her baby that she

anticipates his needs, presenting him with the object (e.g.,
the breast) that will satisfy him just as the infant craves

that object.

This creates a situation of infantile

omnipotence in which the infant experiences himself as the
source of all creation

— the

objects that the infant

hallucinate appear, leading him to believe that it was he who
created them.

This infantile omnipotence is the basis for

the healthy development and solidity of the self:

The simultaneity of infantile hallucination and
maternal presentation provide the repetitive
experiential basis for the child's sense of contact
with and power over external reality (Greenberg and
Mitchell 1983, 192)
The mother's responsiveness to her baby's needs provides
a

mirroring effect that allows the baby to become attuned to

his own bodily functions and impulses which become the basis
for his slowly evolving sense of self.

One of the needs the

mother must be responsive to for "good-enough-mothering" is
the need for a nondemanding presence so that the infant can

experience a state of "going-on-being" of needlessness and
complete unintegration out of which needs and spontaneous

gestures can emerge.
Just as Lacan stresses the necessity on the part of the

infant for turning to an external object for the feeling of

wholeness that constitutes the primordial self, so Winnicott
whole external object to which

stresses the importance of

a

the infant can turn.

Winnicott, however, gives

[10]

a

more

detailed account of what this mirroring effect involves.

The
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infant's identifications with its mother, the fusion

experience of feeling at one with its mother (and therefore
omn lpotent or in Lacan's te rms

certain conditions.

That is,

,

free of lack)

,

r e gu ires

for fusion to occur, as the

infant feels a need and hallucinates the object that will

fulfill that need (e.g., the need of hunger and the breast
that will satisfy it), the actual object must appear.

Without this "good-enough-mothering" the infant will not be
able to make the identifications of the mirror-stage.

He

will have no sense of creative mastery, no sense that what he

hallucinates is real--and therefore no confidence that the
mirror image of himself that he takes on as his own to

maintain constancy in the face of felt fragmentation, is
actually his.
a

Thus,

the mirror-image traced in his memory as

primordial self-representation--the first in

a

complicated

series of signifying representations that will make up his

self-identity, what it means to him to be him--occurs due to
a

nurturing context where his needs were attended to by the

other "good-enough" to tune in to and anticipate those needs.
This primordial self-representation allows the ordering of a

whole series of representations that hitherto were the

fragmented experiences of

a

being with no self.

It gave

those fragmented images order by grouping them (e.g., my hand
waving, my foot kicking, etc.)

into the gestalt of a whole

human form.
Once hallucinatory omnipotence is established, the child
needs to learn the limits of his power.

"Good-enough-

96

mothering

would not involve

a

shift from the all-consuming

attentiveness of the new mother to

a

anticipates her infant's every need.

mother who no longer
Thus,

maternal

responsiveness decreases in synchrony with the infant's

increasing ability to communicate his needs.

Now,

rather

than having his every wish anticipated, the infant expresses
his needs through gestures and signals that the mother

responds to.

The mother's "graduated failure of adaptation"

(Winnicott 158, 246)

is essential to the development of

separation, differentiation, and realization (Greenberg and

Mitchell 1983,

194)

Just as Winnicott stresses the role of frustration in

confronting one with the need for symbolic representation
(gestures and signals to an outside world rather than

hallucinations), Lacan stresses the role of the infant's felt
lack that leads it to the desire to be desired (being what

will draw the mother into fusion with one) and symbolization
that will master lack by making the absent present.

Again,

however, note the attention Winnicott gives to a decrease in

maternal responsiveness that is in "synchrony" with the
infant's needs.

In other words,

an on-going and real

synchronization of infant and caretaker is needed if the
illusory identifications the infant makes are to continue.
Two kinds of maternal deficiencies are "experienced by
the child as a terrifying interference with the continuity of
his own personal existence"
194)

(Greenberg and Mitchell 1983,

and result in the experience of the "annihilation of the
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s

self

'

(Winnicott 1958,

304)

One is the failure to

.

actualize the infant’s hallucinations; the other is

interference with the infant's quiescent states of
formlessness.

In "good-enough-mothering," the mother acts as

both the medium for formlessness and the instrument of
omnipotence.

Failure to provide such a medium results in the

fragmentation of the infant's experience into
and a "false self."
needs,

a

"true self"

The former is the source of spontaneous

images and gestures.

it goes into hiding to avoid the

psychic annihilation caused by expressing itself without
being able to get a response.

The latter's content rises out

of maternal expectations and claims.

The child thus becomes

the mother's image of him:
The false self draws on cognitive functions in its
anticipations of and reactions to environmental
impingements, resulting in an overactivity of mind
and a separation of cognitive processes from any
affective or somatic grounding. [11]

Winnicott here makes a distinction between two kinds of

possible identifications

— both

of which go into the layering

of identifications that make up the self.

In Lacan's terms,

the "true self" refers to those identifications made with a

caretaker whose desires are in synch with the child's felt
needs.

That is,

in the desire to be desired by the

caretaker, the child meshes with the desire on the part of
the caretaker to be desired by the child.

ground where the desires of both fuse.

There is a meeting

The "false self"

refers to those identifications made when no such mutuality
of desire occurs.

The child tunes in to the caretaker's
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desire, but the caretaker doesn't tune in to the child's

desire.

This distinction can help us better understand when

Imaginary identifications may release significance (by

allowing new gestalts of representations of lived experience)
that may be more than a replay of an Imaginary fixation that

alienates us ever further from ourselves.
The interesting feature about Winnicott's account that

Lacan glosses over is the particular context required for the

emerging significance of the self.

While Lacan emphasizes

the fictional character of the self, Winnicott emphasizes the

space created between infant and caretaker that allowed new

significance for the infant to emerge.

In Playing and

Reality he introduces the notions of the transitional object
and playing and discusses this space further.

The emergence

of the person involves the movement from a state of illusory

omnipotence to

a

state of objective perception; of

solipsistic subjectivity to objective perception; of the
inner world to the world of outer reality.

"Relations with

transitional objects constitute a third, intermediary, and
transitional realm between these two worlds."
Mitchell 1983,

195)

(Greenberg and

Such transitional objects are allocated

to neither of the two realms, thus allowing the baby to

gradually negotiate shifting from the experience of himself
as the center of a subjective world to the experience of

himself as a person among other persons:
we maintain access to
of our thoughts and
wellspring
private
most
the
accountable for them in
held
being
without
imagery,
In transitional experience,
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the clear and harsh light of objective reality
(Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 196)
.

The transitional object of a young child can be many

things,
to.

for example a soft rag or blanket the child clings

Winnicott believes that such objects relate to the

process a child (as well as the rest of us throughout life)

undergoes in relating inner to outer reality.

The parent who

doesn't challenge the importance of the object to the child
is agreeing to a neutral area of experience,

an area where

the question of whether the child conceived of the object or

whether the object was presented to the child from the
outside, will not be asked (Winnicott 1971,

12)

.

area of experience where one does not have to make

That is, an
a

final

decision on whether an object is my own creation or part of
an external reality.

According to Winnicott, this

intermediate area between inner and outer reality of

transitional phenomena continues to play

a

role throughout

our lives

There is a direct development from transitional
phenomena to playing, and from playing to shared
playing, and from this to cultural experiences
(Winnicott 1971, 51).
It

is this feature of existence that for Winnicott allows us

the capacity for creative living that makes life worthwhile,

and it is in the overlap of the playing together of two

people that real communication occurs.
The "playful" space in which the infant first originates
a

self is crucial for the layering of identifications

necessary to taking one's place in the Symbolic order.

Lacan
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would, of course, agree.

However, Winnicott chooses to

underline the creative aspects of

a

holding environment based

on trust and the reliability of the caretaker in which new

gestalts can spontaneously emerge, while Lacan emphasizes the
dangers of Imaginary "lures".

Winnicott underlines the need

for mutual attunement in an overlap of two play areas in

which neither makes the final decision on what is and what
isn't, as the appropriate environment for the emergence of

new significance.

experiences.

Such "play" can lead to fusion-like

In creative play

(for example two children

fantasizing together to two jazz musicians improvising
together)

,

two people play off of one another by anticipating

where the other is headed (in Lacan's terms, anticipating the

desire of the other and attempting to satisfy it in advanceeven if the other player could not have predicted in advance
what the next move desired was)

The "fun" comes in the

attunements of one to another that leads to

a

final confusion

in the end about who contributed what to the playing.

contrast,

In

Lacan emphasizes the "no" of the father that would

have us forever defer fusion through the Symbolic chain.

Mahler's work corroborates and complements Winnicott

'

work by giving us specifics about the attunement of the

mother-child dyad.

For Mahler, the child must struggle to

reconcile his longing for autonomy with the equally intense
longing to "surrender and reimmerse himself in the enveloping
fusion from which he has come."
1983,

273)

(Greenberg and Mitchell

She distinguishes three phases of development in
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the child

s

preoedipal development, the second of which is

further divided into three subphases.
normal autistic phase."

The first phase is the

In this phase the infant is

concerned only with the satisfaction of his needs and doesn't
associate that satisfaction with its source in the external
world.

The second phase is the "normal symbiotic phase."

At

3-4 weeks of age enhanced responsiveness on the infant's part

results in a dim awareness of the mother as an external
object.

The infant continues to behave, however, as if he

and the mother form a symbiotic, omnipotent unit.

"Islands

of "good" and "bad" memory traces form within the

undifferentiated matrix of ego and id."
Mitchell 1983, 275)

(Greenberg and

From 4-10 months there is a

differentiation subphase in which the infant becomes
increasingly aware of his mother as an external object.

In

the "practicing subphase" the infant begins to express an

increasing interest in exploring his world, but an interest
in mother still takes precedence over interest in the world

of things

.

It

is in this subphase that Mahler locates the

occurrence of "psychological birth."

With the achievement of

upright locomotion, the child's horizons widen, and he

concentrates on his expanding abilities which are perceived
by him as omnipotence.

In the rapprochement subphase,

which

usually occurs between fifteen to eighteen months of age, the
child experiences a kind of separation anxiety due to the

deflation of his illusion of omnipotence.

From approximately

eighteen to twenty or twenty-four months of age, the child,
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to consolidate his separation from the mother, denies
that he

needs help from another person, at the same time that he

experiences the need for such help.

"This leads to a

behavioral picture in which intense neediness and clinging to
the mother alternates with egually intense negativity and

battling with her."

(Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 278)

Mahler sees the successful resolution of this stage as
crucial for the avoidance of the more severe

psychopathologies,

just as Freud felt that the successful

resolution of the Oedipus complex was crucial for avoiding
neurosis

.

The next phase is the phase of libidinal object

constancy.

It

normally takes place during the third year of

life and its major task is to form stable concepts of the

self and of the other.

In this phase,

the child establishes

emotional object constancy by consolidating the

internalization of a constant, inner image of the mother that
was gradually developed in the previous phases.

stresses that the achievement of establishing

a

Mahler
reliable,

internal image necessary for a stable sense of self is not

possible without the trust and confidence developed in the
child's relationship with the primary caretaker.

Trust and

confidence is developed through the "regularly occurring
relief of need tension provided by the need-satisfying
agency" which over the course of the sub-phases of phase two

described above "is gradually attributed to the needsatisfying whole object (the mother) and is then transferred
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by means of internalization to the intrapsychic

representation of the mother" (Mahler et al. 1975, 101)

.

In

other words, for the child to internalize a "good"

representation of the mother,

a

representation that will

sooth the emotional distress caused by the inability to

maintain an omnipotent duality of mother and child, something
must occur in the real interactions of the caretaker/child's

relationship.

This something involves "need-satisfying".

In

delineating the various phases and subphases Mahler studied
in her observations of mother/child interactions,

she

stresses that this "need-satisfying" cannot occur without
what she calls "mutual cuing".

That is, as is obvious from

the description of the phases given above, the child has

different needs at different times.
the infant needs to sleep.

In the autistic phase

In the symbiotic subphase of

differentiation he needs to be cuddled and engaged by eyecontact.

In the practicing subphase,

increased motor

coordination (i.e., the ability to crawl) allows him more

opportunity for leaving the mother behind.

At this point the

kind of maternal behavior appropriate in the previous
subphase becomes a liability for the infant's need to
separate from the mother.

In the rapprochement subphase,

the

now-walking toddler needs emotional support from his mother
to calm his fears about separation and loss of omnipotence,

and yet encourage further separation.
The mothers Mahler observed also had needs.

mothers were much more comfortable with

a

Some

nursing baby and
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resented their growing child's increased independence.

These

mothers found it harder to give their child the freedom to
crawl at will, or the emotional support he needed as

toddler to explore.

a

Other mothers felt overwhelmed at an

infant's dependency needs and disrupted early symbiosis by

encouraging their child to be independent before he was
ready.

All these infants did become healthy children with

intact self-identity.

Mahler stresses the "mutual cuing" of

each mother/child pair that allowed this to come about.

child whose mother preferred

a

A

dependent infant tended to

remain a "lap-baby" longer, or reacted by refusing to meld
his body into the mother's.

A child who didn't get the

reassurance he needed at the rapprochement subphase tended to
become clingy, reverting to an earlier phase where he got
what he needed, or found tactics that would get his mother's

attention

.

Thus,

we can fill out Winnicott

'

s

picture of the mother

who adapts herself to the child's needs, with the mutual

adaptation of mother and child that Mahler observed.
Winnicott talks about "good-enough-mothering", Mahler of
"mutual cuing"

.

For both, the infant forms and stabilizes an

identity in the context of a loving other attentive to their

bodily cues whose bodily cues they also attend to in order to
get their need met.

Through attentive tuning in to the gestalt of the cues
given by the other (as opposed,

for example,

to the meaning

content of speech, say) and the anticipation of the desires
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of the other,

bond of communication is formed where who

a

wants what becomes blurred--where the self/other distinction

breaks down in

a

mutual recognition of desire.

moment of contact between two people,

a

This forms a

moment when one's own

desire is in synch with the desire of the other in such

a way

that the two become mutually satisfying and fuse into a place
of no lack.

For this to happen, both must be prepared to

anticipate the other’s desire, willing to desire that the
other's desire be satisfied rather than insisting that the
other satisfy one's own (fixated) desire.

It is through this

mutual adaptation of desire that fusion is born.

As a self

becomes more fixed such moments become extremely rare due to
the need to repeat past ident if icatory patterns for self-

continuity.

The trick becomes to find

a

meeting ground for

fusion between two people--a place where, for moments of
time, they "connect" through the fusion of mutually

satisfying desire at the same time that each maintains selfintegrity

— that

is,

continuity with the layers of

signification that they feel themselves to be.
infant

— starting

out fresh so to speak

— is

Of course, an

much less

restricted by that need than an adult, making fusion that
much easier.

For them, physical need will provide the

departure point for "authentic" contact.

This point of

contact, then, would be the meeting ground in an area in

which the appearance of an object would be

a

satisfying one.

Through mutual cuing and adaptation to the other of one's own
desire within the range of what would satisfy that desire
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one

s

physical needs

(the infant)

or the network of

signifiers that make up one's conscious and unconscious
systems

(the mother)

,

one can find those points where meaning

connects— where both find

in the unanticipated Real that

eludes current meaning structures, something that satisfies.
In light of Winnicott and Mahler's rendering of the

origins of the me, we can critique Lacan's characterization
of the mirror-stage.

According to Lacan, the self

precipitated in symbiotic fusion is

a "fiction."

The image

with which the infant identified was outside of him.
an illegitimate,

if necessary,

It was

move to take on this image of

wholeness as his own when he actually felt fragmented and out
of control

— and

not whole at all.

To maintain this

identification he was forced into the dialectic of desire
that leads him to identify with his father and the position
of phallic power and deny the loss of the mother by upholding

the paternal law that will provide him with substitutes for

that loss.
We can explain this misreading of the mirror stage with

Lacan's own views on the me

'

s

denial of its lack to

perpetuate the illusion that it is self-sufficient.

From the

start the mother is no more than a vehicle for the infant's

self-constituting activity.
fiction.

What occurs in fusion is a

The infant is actually self-sufficient, using his

mother to reflect himself back to himself.

The feeling of

wholeness is an illusion

—a

illusion nevertheless

The loss of the mother is thus not

.

necessary illusion, but an
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really a loss, because the infant never had the mother to

begin with

— he

just used his mother as the first image he

identified with.

this image, due to the nature of early

child care, carried with it many intensely felt

representations of the sensations of bodily contact with the
mother, but the feeling of fusion with the mother was still

illusory
The Lacanian theorist looking back on such early

experiences sees the infant and mother as two distinct
entities with clear-cut boundaries.

The self the me

maintains must be one, whole, and phallic —-the self of the me
without lack.

In reading the phallic self back into this

early childhood experience, the sense of connectedness, of
feeling one with another

— the

discounted as an illusion.

two as one of fusion--is

The self that is maintained is

reconstituted in experiences that repeat this conception of
the mirror stage

—a

me that projects what

I

need onto an

other in order to repeat an identification with something

outside of myself.

these identifications are always

illusions, always to be looked upon with suspicion as "lures"
we project upon the world to evade our primordial lack of

being.

Thus,

on a Lacanian view,

self-insuf f iciency becomes

synonymous with the illusory nature of connectedness with
others
Lacan breaks down the illusion of a unified self in
favor of a split subject that is continually reconstituting

itself in a dialectic of self and other.

But he assumes that
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if subjectivity is to occur,

specular in nature

this dialectic must be purely

that is, no real connection between me

and an other ever occurs.

Thus,

he assumes that the self is

entirely fictional when in fact the concrete connections in
which it is based are real

The mirror image is not merely

.

identified with, an image taken on from the outside;
created in connectedness with another in
are one,

pleasure.

a

a

it

is

space where two

place where desire is satiated and becomes

Fusion with another is truly experienced--as truly

experienced as the experiences of fragmentation.

It

is

within fusion that one experiences oneself in responsiveness
to another who also responds

.

These experiences are recorded

in representations that may never reach consciousness or play

into the repetition of narcissistic identifications.

To feel

that responsiveness one needs connection, one needs more than
an image projected by the me to identify with.

to be created,

For meaning

for the original images to be formed, the

subject must be in a state of responsiveness to a world which

responds to it.

Thus the illusion of the mirror stage is not

that one was whole in connectedness with an other, but that
one does not need an other for such connectedness.

2

.

5

Self-Construction and the Production of Meaning

;

Take II

Lacan's "cure" consists in freeing the subject from the
me's lures so that the

unconscious truth.

'I'

can address the Other of

Lacan seems to think that this truth will

always be that the subject is primordially lacking and so is
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doomed to

a

futile search for the lost 'objet a' that would

complete it.

The truth the unconscious lets slip as the me

attempts to maintain the illusion of

a

whole self is that

there is no object that will satisfy Desire.
The me Lacan characterizes in the schema L is the me of
the post-mirror stage who has repressed mother-fusion,

modifying its self/other identifications in accordance with
paternal law.

This me represents the objects of its Desire

via Symbolic categories.

Satisfaction is continually

deferred since Symbolic representations can never fill in the
subject's gap.

On Lacan's reading of the mirror-stage there

is no alternative to a self-constituting activity that

subjects itself to the Symbolic order since mother-fusion was
an illusion.

This means that the Lacanian subject is the

effect of the battery of signifiers in which and by which it

places itself.
by language.

The subject is subjected to and constructed

The me, being inherently fictional in nature,

provides only arbitrary guidance to the speaking subject.
is necessary for the continuance of subjectivity,

It

but the

"truth" of the subject is that it is an arbitrary effect of
the linguistic signifiers at play through the four poles of

the schema L.

Lacan's "cure" therefore emphasizes the

negative moment of undermining the subject at any point
may find peace or repose in

a

it

sense of wholeness.

Taking what we have learned from Winnicott and Mahler to
Lacan's schema L we might posit another me with an

alternative self-constituting activity.

Assuming that it was
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the kinfl of contact

(m)

Other-fusion provided, rather than an

identity that could take

a

fixed position within the

Symbolic, that the subject Desired, the subject could choose
to re-experience that contact.

That is,

rather than defer

Desire by representing objects of Desire via Symbolic
categories, the me could seek fusion with another in its

lived present.

The "truth" of a subject with such a me would

not be that its primordial gap dooms it to a futile search
for satisfaction, but rather that it is forever "doomed" to

seek its satisfaction in connectedness with others.

Such

a

subject would accept that it could never be whole in and of
itself and would continually reconstitute itself through

contact with others

A theorist who engaged in such self-constituting

activity would have a different attitude toward the concepts
at her disposal than the theorist
in light of Lacan's schema L.

I

described in section 2.3

The theorist depicted by

Lacan's schema would evade the "truth" that no matter how

masterful his theory, no matter how well he wields words in
keeping with paternal law, he will never find the lost 'objet
a'

that would complete him.

Instead he will be captured by

the lures of a me that structures reality via fixed imagos it

projects upon the Real of lived experience.

Such theory will

say more about the particular theorist's identity fixations

than the Real which continually eludes our attempts to

symbolize it

.

The theorist who has taken Lacanian analysis

to heart will refuse to become captured by the identity

Ill

fixations of his me.

Other that his

I

Instead, he will pay attention to the

attempts to address.

The Unconscious

— the

discourse of the Other--will subvert the subject's every
attempt to pronounce a truth, be it about himself or the
world, that can stand for all time in an enduring edifice of

Truth.

The Lacanian theorist will thus deliberately tease

his reader by refusing to make any final pronouncements

.

He

will attempt to follow the twists and turns of the discourse
of the Other

— thus

capture by his me.

demonstrating his prowess in evading
[12]

The theorist who engages in the self-constituting

activity that seeks fusion will neither evade the "truth" of
her inability to find the lost objet

a,

nor demonstrate her

prowess by forever evading the lures of her me.

Instead,

she

will engage in the playful open-endedness we saw in our

discussion of Winnicott's transitional object.

This kind of

theorist will hold in suspension any final decision on the

existential status (real or imagined) of the objects her
words represent.

her desire is not for the object

(e.g.,

truth about herself) that will complete her, but for

a

a

particular kind of contact with the other (the reader) as
well as her own Other (that speaks from the unconscious)
She is not looking for an object that will fill in her gap

and allow her to take up

a

final position in a timeless

Symbolic order of fixed positions, but for the word that will
enable contact with another.
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It

is not what the word refers to that matters,

as the feeling it evokes in the Other.

the word (or words)

so much

Contact is made when

sets off a chain of associations that

reverberate in the unconscious, activating representations of

experiences not yet integrated into the me

'

s

structure.

Through receptive attentiveness this theorist tries first one
word and then another, listening for the Other's response,
until the right word is found

— the

word that "fits."

This

theorist's desire for psychic wholeness manifests itself both
in the desire to maintain the me

'

s

structural coherence and

in the desire for contact with an other that will allow new

meaning to emerge.

She creates a playspace in which the

question of the word's viability as a substitute for Desire
(i.e.,

as a stand-in for the objet a that is in accordance

with paternal law)

is

left open.

In her willingness to

respond to the desire of the Other she holds her narcissistic

identifications in suspension, looking for the word that will
stimulate a yes from the Other.

In these moments of contact,

resolution and integration can occur.

The me,

rather than

seeking to obscure the subject's lack, seeks to compensate
for lack by incorporating new meaning into its dialectical

structure.

This,

in turn,

will allow the subject to make

sense of a broader range of sensations.

Receptivity to the

other's (the reader's) Desire and to one's own Other's Desire
(what the Other wants the me to be)

allows the theorist to

play with words in order to generate new meaning.

This

theorist will not merely tease her reader, but will allow
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moments of fullness

— moments

of integration when both she and

(hopefully) her reader discover a word or category that

characterizes hitherto inarticulate sensations in

satisfying way.

a

Just as the infant's sensations were

originally given meaning in contact with the caretaker who

articulated his desire for him by supplying him with objects
that satisfied him, this theorist finds a "fit" between
inart iculated experience and the word that could symbolize
it

For example,

could be developing a theory about

I

childhood development.

As

separation/individuation
that

contemplate the process of

may have feelings and sensations

I

can't articulate.

I

I

I

could choose to ignore them,

cranking out my theory according to familiar views I've long
held about children.
until

I

Or

I

could attend to those feelings

found words that made sense of them.

queasy every time
from mother,

I

I

If,

say,

felt

I

thought of the child's first step away

may finally connect that queasiness to anxiety

about separation

I

had myself experienced.

This could affect

not only my theory, but my view of myself as someone who

could easily leave people behind.

thus,

to incorporate this

new

insight into my theory would require incorporating

a

aspect of my experience into my self-system.

[13]

If

not to change my self-other pattern

for example,

I

could,

I

chose

continue to hold the view that the process of

separation/individuation is an automatic, relatively painless
experience

For the theorist to allow insights such vague
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feelings and "intuitions" can give, she must be willing to
cnate a space in which she holds both her conceptions of

herself and her "reality" in suspension.
By emphasizing the negative aspects of a me that evades

confrontation of loss with identifications based in the
"Imaginary," Lacan underestimates the positive moment of

a me

who seeks integrative contact based in lived experience.

To

counter the danger of the former, Lacan would have us unravel
the me entirely.

Although

I

agree that the danger of the me

who alienates the subject ever further from the "truth" of

unconscious Desire is

a real one,

I

don't agree that human

subjectivity entails the continual deferment of satisfaction.
Lacan describes one approach to subjectivity, but there is an

alternative approach.

We could characterize this alternative

approach as an alternative self-strategy that the me might
We would then have two self-strategies that could

choose.

enable human sub jectivity--one that forever deferred Desire

through Symbolic signifying chains (Lacan's version) and one
that sought to re-experience "Imaginary" fusion (the

alternative derived from our look at object relations
theory)

.

In the next chapter

I

will link the two self-

strategies delineated above to gender categories and develop

them further through
perspective.

I

a

critique of Lacan from a feminist

will then discuss the role of gender in the

self-constituting activity of writing philosophical texts.
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reading)
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160-162) and Wilden (1968)
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relations theory to Lacanian theory see Ragland-Sullivan
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.

[11] Greenberg and Mitchell (1983, 194-195).
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I
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have generally chosen to use the term self-strategy since
it speaks to the problematic I have set for selfhood as the
solution to human agency.
'

'

CHAPTER

3

LACAN AND THE FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
3

.

1

Introduction
In this chapter

I

want to explore the question of how

gender affects self-constituting activity.

We will find that

the two self-strategies laid out at the end of chapter

2

— one

seeking fusion and the other deferring Desire through the

signifying chains of the symbolic
what

I

— can

be characterized as

will call "female" and "male" self-strategies.

It

will turn out that women tend to make use of the former

strategy and men tend to make use of the latter strategy due
to their different resolutions of the Oedipus complex.

am

I

not presuming that this characterization of self-strategies
is either universal or necessary.

But it is a telling one

for those times and places where the Freudian and Lacanian

conceptions of the Oedipus complex can be said to illuminate
the socialization process of human beings.

Thus far

I

[1]

have developed a theory of self that pays as

little attention as possible to gender.

Of course, the

Oedipus and castration complexes can't be the same for girls
as they are for boys,

painting

a

but this has been accounted for by

somewhat deviant picture for the female path to
The full-blown self is that of the male adult

— if

the path to that self is different, even more difficult,

for

selfhood.

women, masculine identity is still the norm to which both the

sexes are compared.

[2]
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Much psychoanalytic theory today still minimizes the

problem of gender

there may be certain differences at key

points along the way, but otherwise the process is the same.
Thus, there is often no systematic effort to account for

gender differences.
posit woman as
man.

The tendency since Freud has been to

a sort of

negative reflection or complement to

Rather than provide a positive account of the category

'woman' that category became the repository of everything

that isn't 'man'.

Irigaray, a French psychoanalyst in the

Lacanian tradition, and Chodorow, an American sociologist

interested in object relations theory, have both taken steps
to rectify this situation.

different ways--to give

a

[3]

Both attempt--in very

positive rendering of the feminine

that goes beyond relegating woman to the inverse image of
man.

That is, they go beyond doctoring Freudian theory here

and there to fit in women in order to present a systematic

account of just where Freudian theory fails.

Irigaray does

this with a radical critique of Freud's approach to

femininity that reduces woman into the polar opposite, the
specular image, of man.

[4]

Chodorow does this by addressing

the question of gender in the preoedipal stage.

Both use

psychoanalysis to help account for the inferior status of

women— as the sex that

is man's specular image

as the sex that does the nurturing

(Irigaray)

and

(Chodorow)

The question of woman in psychoanalysis, then, entails
not only the question of accounting for the path of female

development, but also the question of sexual difference and
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the validity of the male model of selfhood as the model

Taking gender into account in

a

systematic way in the course

of developing a theory of self reveals two different

strategies for constructing and maintaining

a

self.

All

psychoanalysts agree that certain key turning points for the

developing child--the discovery of anatomical difference,
resolution of the Oedipus complex
for the different sexes.
is

— present

different problems

What hasn't been addressed as fully

just how the solutions to these different problems

represent different strategies for evolving

a self that have

lasting ramifications throughout the individual's life.

Freudian theory has tended to presume that the paradigm for
normal adulthood must be the same for both sexes--if women
are not as "mature" or "adult" it is because certain

obstacles, not faced by males, have blocked their

development.

[5]

The possibility that a woman may have faced

the problems presented her and overcome them, achieving

maturity in her own right, has been underplayed.
A theory of self that takes gender seriously

problemat izes the norm for "mature" selfhood.

If both sexes

equally successfully navigate the problems set for them and
yet one sex somehow achieves a "maturity" that the other sex

doesn't, then is it "lack" on women's part

biologically based) or

a

(perhaps

misconstrual of the ideal paradigm

of selfhood that's at fault?
In this chapter

I

will,

with the help of Lacanian theory

and feminist critiques of Lacan, delineate two positions,
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male and female, correlated with two strategies for self-

constitution.

In section 3.2

I

will address the question of

gender with respect to Lacanian theory.

In section 3.3

will critique Lacan on the basis of Irigaray's work.

section 3.4,

I

I

In

will balance that critique with Chodorow's

feminist perspective on object relations theory.

Taking the

male and female positions as positions that apply in one's

relationship to language and the self-constituting strategies
one uses in writing theory,

I

will argue in section 3.5 that

the positions revealed in a text are not biologically

1)

determined by the author's anatomy,

2)

the male position of a

text can be subverted by aspects of that text,

subversive aspects can be read as symptoms of

self-strategies by

a

3

.

2

a

a

these

conflict in

post-Lacanian reading that focuses on

the category 'woman', and

with

3)

4)

this conflict could be resolved

deeper understanding of the female position.

Lacan and the Gendered Self
As we saw in chapter two,

the castration complex

introduces the child to sexual difference and the Symbolic
realm.

static.

The mother/inf ant dyad is,

in a certain sense,

In the world of symbiosis where nothing lacks,

positioning with respect to difference need take place.
phallic signifier represents sexual different.

[6]

no

The

The

mother is not complete unto herself, but desires the phallus.
Thus the phallus is the signifier of lack that establishes

substitutive Desire.

Rather than desiring the mother, the
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child first identifies with what the mother wants

phallus

— and

— the

then relinquishes desire for fusion in order to

take up a position with respect to the phallus.

The power of

the phallic signifier comes from representing difference and

lack which introduces the child into the public realm of

individuation and language where exchange and communication
occur throughout a complex network of social relations.
While identification with the mother provided the infant with

victory over fragmentation, identification with the father

a

reaffirms the split in the human subject.

Ident if icatory

fusion with the mother in the Imaginary papered over the

primordial gap between the fragmentary experience of

prematuration and the gaze of the mother that reflected one
back as whole.

Identification with the father reaffirms that

gap by disallowing fusion, and stipulating the search for the

object that will fill in one's gap in accordance with rules
laid out by the Symbolic order.

Henceforth the child cannot

settle for Imaginary "illusion", but must continually defer

Desire for fusion by accepting Symbolic substitutions for the
objects of Desire.
Thus,

in

"normal" development, the child will ultimately

identify with the phallic signifier

— the

and the female by associating with it
293)

male embodying it,

(Ragland-Sullivan 1986,

That is, both sexes will accept castration.

They will

accept that they cannot remain in the world of symbiotic
fusion with the mother, that they will instead have to take
up a position in a network of social positions that are
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different from one another.

The boy accepts castration with

the understanding that he is heir to the paternal law--while

now he is subject to it, he will one day embody the phallus

himself and have a mother-substitute for his own.
accepts castration by turning to the father.

mother as

a

love-object is complete

— she

phallus, never have her mother back.

The girl

Her loss of the

will never have the

Her compensation is to

turn to her father who does have the phallus.

By association

with mean she will vicariously experience some of the power

they possess, and may also receive from

a

man one day the

child that can be her phallus.

Feminists interested in developing Lacan's work have

emphasized that according to Lacan both men and women are
castrated.

That is, we are all split subjects with a

primordial gap in our being

— we

all "lack," we are all

motivated by the Desire to compensate for our lack.

[7]

Ragland-Sullivan has argued that the inferior position of
women stems from a "secondary castration"
1986,

298)

(Ragland-Sullivan

In addition to acceding to the castration

complex, women have been subjected to the myths perpetrated

by the Symbol. in order that veil man's lack by symbolizing

him as the "tout," the whole that can fill in the hole, and

symbolizes woman as lack.

[8]

Thus,

the mother symbolizes

loss that is relegated to the unconscious

— lack,

the nether

side of conscious existence--while the father is privileged

because he symbolizes the opposite of need or loss.

But this

symbolization of man and the father is based on an illusion
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that would veil the primordial gap in our being that we all
share as human subjects.
Thus,

the truth is that we are all castrated.

How we

with that truth has taken the form of two different

strategies that take two different positions with respect to
the phallus

the signifier of sexual difference and lack.

The "haves"

(men)

"have-nots"

(women" deal with that truth in the Imaginary.

flee that truth in the Symbolic.

The

By further delineating these two strategies we may find some

means to transcending the impasse of sex polarization.
We can characterize the male and female positions of

Lacanian theory as follows
Male position

:

[9]

The boy learns that although the

paternal law forbids him to fuse with mother, he will one day
have a woman of his own if he identifies with his father and

upholds the paternal law.

That is, he "has" th phallus, he

isn't castrated after all, he has what his mother desires.
The Symbolic order represents paternal law.

It

lays out the

social hierarchy determined by the Name-of-the-Father

.

It

decides what the relationship of all the beings of the

society is according to socially sanctioned codes.
to the paternal law he will wield its phallic power

As heir

— making

judgments about the form relationships should take according
to his desire.

To identify with the father he will deny the

loss of his mother

— i.e.,

deny castration

— and

displace his

desire for his mother onto words that represent the objects
of desire.

he will continually defer the fusion sought by
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displacing his desire along the signifying chain in
keeping
with narcissistic identifications.

Through repetition he

will maintain the self first precipitated in
fusion with his
mother.

This will compensate him for the loss of that

fusion.

What was gained in fusion was a sense of wholeness

more pleasurable than the feelings of fragmentation
that

preceded it.

It

is this feeling of wholeness,

of mastery,

that he strives to maintain with the repetition of
c i s s i s t ic

identifications.

The Symbolic order assures him

he can maintain his self through the repetition of positions

first established in the Oedipus complex.
The male position thus involves the repetition of a self

through the Symbolic that translates and transposes the same
self precipitated in early childhood throughout life

according to the rules of the Symbolic.
deny the

(m)

In doing so he will

Other within in order to find the substitutes for

his primordial Desire

(the mother of fusion)

that are in

keeping with the Symbolic order and paternal law.
The female position

:

The girl learns that not only is

she not allowed fusion with the mother, but she will never

regain a woman-substitute for the mother.

doesn't "have" the phallus.

That is,

She is castrated,

she

she lacks, the

loss she is currently experiencing is final, her

compensations inferior to that of the boy.

Instead of

identifying with the father, with phallic power, with the
wielder of the paternal law, she can only passively enjoy

phallic power through association with

a man.

The paternal
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law doesn't interest her the same way it interests a man

because it guarantees her nothing.

She will never be what is

desired by the other and thereby regain the fusion she lost.
She can only be the other for some man, can only vicariously

enjoy his phallic pleasure at being the whole.
passive,

Being

she can never create the paternal law that orders

social relationships.

she is an object of exchange, waiting

to be exchanged by those who wield phallic power, those who

have the right to say where and when fusion can occur.
she cannot speak with the same authority as a man.

thus,

She can

only parody a power that is really not hers to wield.

The

self that she lost with the loss of fusion can only be

maintained passively by finding subjects to whom she can be
an other.

Instead of actively repeating the self she formed

in fusion in a layering of identifications according to the

rules of the Symbolic order, she will take on the position of
the sex that lacks.

Instead of maintaining the experience of

wholeness she experienced in the mirror stage in

a

layering

of repetitions where she repeatedly plays the phallic whole

that is mirrored in others' responses to her, she will find
her identity by mirroring others' wholeness back to them,

letting them define her by being the lack, the hole, that
their "wholeness" fills.

Despite the drawbacks with respect to social power such
a

position entails, woman does have

a

certain compensation.

There is woman only as excluded by the nature of
things which is the nature of words .... It none the
less remains that if she is excluded by the nature
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of things, it is precisely that in being not
all
(pas toute)
she has, in relation to what the
phallic function designates of i ou ssanrp a
supplementary iouissance (Mitchell and rose 1985
,

i

144)

f

[10]

.

On a Lacanian reading,

woman as woman can be

it

is not clear

a subject,

in the same way a man does

.

whether or not

playing out her own desire

Given that she is of the sex

that doesn't have the phallus, she can't want in the way a
man does.

mother.

A man desires objects that are substitutes for the
he desires to reconstitute himself by replaying the

dialectic of being desired by the other (originally his
mother)

according to the rules of the Symbolic order.

woman can't, properly speaking, desire at all.
of the sex that lacks,

the mother.
an other,

a

A

Since she is

she can’t hope to find substitutes for

She will never be able to regain the desire

of'

substitute for the mother, in some dialectic of

identifications that through the transformation rules of the
Symbolic represents the other as the other that can reflect
her back to herself as a whole.

What then, as a woman,

can

she do?

Ragland-Sullivan says that she is closer to the personal
and the narcissistic

(1986,

296-297).

That is, because she

is not allowed to find substitutes for the mother in the same

way as a man, she is closer to the primordial Desire of the

mother whose messages she received into the unconscious in
symbiotic fusion.

Lacking the same phallic power the man has

to find substitutes for the Desire to satisfy this primordial

Desire,

she is closer to the loss of the mother,

the loss of
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the feeling of fusion when mother was satisfied by the
inf snt

r

and mother and infant were one

confronted with this loss in

a

.

Because she is

way that someone who "has" the

phallus isn't, she doesn't have the male option of

reconstituting the situation of fusion in identifications
with images that replace objects associated with the mother,
that is,

she can't maintain the self of fusion by finding

others to mirror back to her that she is desired in

a

way

that is analogous to the way she was as an an infant
On the Lacanian view, this means that she has no

possibility of subjectivity at all.

Unable to find the

reflection in an other that will repeat ans so confirm her

primordial self in a layering of identifications, she is
reduced to being the other, the mirror, for the self-

representations of men.

Unable to wield the phallus herself,

she can maintain what little identity he has only by being a

screen for the imagoes that men project upon her.

By

conforming to their desire, responding to their need to see
themselves as forever the same, always the same self, she can
gain vicarious pleasure in phallic power through association.

While one can assume that Lacan intends the schema L we

discussed in chapter two, section 2.3, to represent the selfconstituting process of both the men and women that go to him
for analysis,

it is clear that his notion of pure femininity

excludes woman from this process.

Rather than projecting her

imagoes onto others and thus reaffirming herself through

narcissistic identifications, she is man's other.

It

is thus
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that Lacan comes to say that as a category woman doesn't

exist

[11],

that in fact if she were actually to exist there

would be no man.

For man to maintain himself he must be able

to find others that will support the repetitions of self and

other needed to provide him with continuity.

For this to

occur, an other that will conform to his imago is needed.

Woman, having no identity as woman of her own, being defined
as lack,

is

eminently suited for this purpose.

To ask what

woman wants, then, and be prepared to hear her speak, would

actually threaten this whole project of self-constitution.
[12]

Because Lacan himself is writing from the male

position, using the male strategy of self-constitution, he
cannot really ask the question of what woman wants.

To hear

the answer would undermine his own project of self-

construction in a way that would threaten him with loss of
mastery and loss of self.

Thus,

although he asks the

question, and although he admits to some perplexity about the
answer, he is not,

in fact,

able to hear the reply.

Since the male position requires evasion of Imaginary

fusion by finding Symbolic substitutes for Desire in

accordance with the paternal law that veils his lack, any
rendering of the feminine could only undermine his own
strategy by unveiling it.

Male satisfaction does not include

the jouissance of a genuine fusion experience because

preference has been given to the Symbolic--the other is not
the Real other in her specificity, but a projection screen

upon which one can play out one's fantasies.

Preference is
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to representations that replace concrete objects of

desire— abstract images that stand

in for what was lost and

will be forever deferred through the Symbolic chain.

Once

the category of woman is unveiled as a different strategy, a

different way of dealing with lack, rather than lack itself
that only the phallic male can fill, the male strategy of

displacing loss and lack onto 'woman' will no longer work.
Instead, men will have to find other ways of dealing with
lack.

Articulation of the female position, while undermining

the tenability of the male position, could open the door to

a

new relationship to origin and lack.
Due to having to mourn the loss of the mother in a way
the boy doesn't, the girl is forced to maintain the self

formed in fusion in other ways (Ragland-Sullivan 1986, 297)
Instead of basing her self on the fiction of whole selfsuf f iciency—that is,

instead of assuming that the self she

formed in fusion with the mother can continue without the
mother,

she accepts the loss of that fusion state and is more

open to finding that fusion state, or something like it,
elsewhere.

That is,

she accepts that the self formed in

fusion with mother is not her own self
as one.

Thus,

— but

the two of them

to rediscover that feeling of wholeness,

she

will need to connect with others the way that she once

connected with mother.

Instead of deferring substitutions

for the mother through the Symbolic chain she will adhere

less strictly to the paternal law (which after all guarantees

her nothing) and instead allow fusion to occur

— other

moments
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when through connection with another she can feel whole.
What she takes away from such fusion is not an identification

with an image that is actually outside of herself (and so not

actually her at all)

,

but the concrete feelings and

sensations of having been close to another.

Feelings that

she can't necessarily repeat in other interactions a la the

schema
manner,

L,

but which reside in her unconscious in a fluid

ready to be activated by other encounters that evoke

them
The female self-strategy is thus less subjected to the

Symbolic and the paternal law and more inclined toward
"Imaginary" fusion.

With no promise of inheriting the

paternal law to inhibit her, she deals with loss in ways that
subvert that law.

Fusion is not as taboo for her.

closer to the primordial unconscious,

less afraid that fusion

experiences will confront her with castration.
a

She is

different attitude toward Imaginary fusion.

She thus has
An attitude

that can't be allowed full expression in the Symbolic if the

paternal law is to stand unchallenged.
view, however,

Contrary to Lacan's

the feminine does not have to be any more

ineffable or mysterious than the masculine.

That it has not

yet found full expression in the Symbolic does not mean that
it can't be expressed.

The task at hand is not to veil the

"mysterious" feminine in anymore veils than already cover
but to reveal the feminine as a particular strategy for

dealing with the problem of subjectivity that is different
from the male strategy.

[13]

it,
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Thus,

Lacan gives a one-sided view of the picture.

While his insistence on the castration that we all
share is
an important feature of his theory that undermines
phallic

power by rendering its illusions more visible, Lacan has
not

succeeded in stepping outside of the male position enough to
be able to characterize the female position as anything
but

the negative counterpart, the other, of the male position.
In the next section

I

will explore a more positive

characterization of the female position with

a

look at Luce

Irigaray's book, Speculum (Irigaray 1985a).

3

.

Irigarav; Woman as the Specular Other

3

Luce Irigaray was excommunicated from the Lacanian

community for writing Speculum

.

Her critique of Lacan and

her valorization of the feminine was too radical to be

embraced by the Lacanian psychoanalytic community (Moi 1985,
127)

I

.

will argue that Irigaray's position with respect to

femininity,

radical as it is, finally falls into some of the

same assumptions she tries to avoid.

useful, however,

her work is still

for delineating the female position.

On the basis of our discussion of Winnicott and Mahler
in chapter

2

and of gender with respect to Lacan in the

previous section of this chapter,

I

will make some

preliminary claims before amplifying them with an examination
of Irigaray's work.
'woman'

My first claim is that the category

is a projection screen for playing out a male fantasy

of wholeness that is finally untenable,

as well as a category
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representative of the lost joys
experiences

.

(jouissance)

of fusion

My second, claim is that the female strategy

involves accepting the original loss and compensating for it
by repeating fusion experiences with others.
The male strategy denies the loss of mother— fusion and

continues to evade confronting it by finding Symbolic

substitutes that forever defer satisfaction.

being dealt with, is displaced onto woman.

The loss, not
'Woman'

is thus a

category associated with loss, fusion experiences, and the

possibility of confronting that loss along with the threat of
complete disintegration of self that that brings.

It is the

fear of such disintegration that makes confrontation of
'woman'

so hard from a male position.

And yet even from the

male position, the experiences of fusion and the possibility

they hold for another way of dealing with lack, still remain
in the unconscious.

The "deathwork" of Lacanian analysis is

one way of unraveling the layers of identification built up
on symbolic identifications that lead further and further

away from the concrete objects that originally satisfied in

symbiotic fusion.

But fusion-experiences in the present

saying yes to fusion rather than rigidly adhering to the no
of the father--is another.

The principal function of the Symbolic is to mediate

between the Imaginary and the Real--that

is,

to process

experience as it is lived into meaningful form given the

narcissistic layers of identifications previously enacted by
the self.

The unanticipated of the Real

— the

specificity of
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concrete experience, that which has not yet been made

articulate according to current meaning structures
(Juranville,
of.

1984,

84-86)

— is

continually being made sense

But the Imaginary has a more important role to play in

this process than that which Lacan gives it.

Imaginary

fusion does not happen just once, and then play itself out in

repetition through Symbolic substitutions.

Not only do

Imaginary narcissistic identifications of the self motivate
the speech of the 'I', but fusion can continue to occur at
the Imaginary level that allow new gestalts to form, and

provide fresh impetus for narcissistic identifications.

For

self-continuity to be maintained fusion has to be contained
within the context of one's past identity.

But within given

parameters fusion can still occur.
The problem with the female position is that it can

remain inert

— trapped

in fusion,

in dyadic experiences where

two form the whole and the new relationships this generates

with respect to the whole network of positions is lost.
Without the male strategy of deferment of desire, the

connections made in fusion experiences could not be

translated by the exchange and communication the paternal law
allows.

But the assumption that the phallus is whole is no

longer needed.

it was that assumption,

that illusion of

self-sufficiency, that pushed men to leave mother behind and
seek their positions in the larger social group.

To do so

they denied loss, pretended mastery, and drove themselves to
seek their desire by spinning out Symbolic chains--exchanging
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words and women.

established

Through abstraction, individuation was

[14]

individuals could assert themselves as

individuals by seeing one another as signifiers easily

assimilated according to Symbolic rules.

But as the

connections of the Symbolic order are established, the need
to fill in the picture with the specificity of concrete

(as

opposed to abstract) differences that only fusion can bring
becomes more pressing.
Irigaray questions the paternal law in
doesn't.

a way

Lacan

Instead of assuming that the father's law, the

phallus, the Symbolic, represent features of subjectivity
that, unfortunately or not,

women,

lead to the subordination of

she valorizes the female position.

Her rendering of

the female position wrenches it out of the negative role of

other to the phallic position in order to give it a positive
characterization.
to fill out what

I

I

will make use of this characterization

believe Lacan has missed.

Irigaray

counters Lacan's blindspot by depicting the male and female

positions in the extreme of their polarization.

One the one

hand there is male specularization and the logic of the same.
[15]

On the other,

heterogeneity.

[16]

there is female pleasure and
Like Lacan,

that the feminine can be spoken.

Irigaray doesn't believe

Language is male.

That is,

it operates according to a male economy of representation.

For women to speak,
Thus,

language would have to change.

Irigaray believes that there are two distinct

economies— one male, one female.

[17]

The male economy
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disallows the female one because it requires the category
of

woman to be the negative inverse of 'man' if it is to
function.

By filling out what Irigaray means by this male

economy of representation that operates according to the
logic of the same, we can fill out our picture of the
male

strategy for self —const itut ion

.

By examining Irigaray'

views on female pleasure, heterogeneity, and the possibility
of woman's language,

we will get some clues as to how to

break through Lacan's impasse of female subjectivity.
Irigaray starts off her book. Speculum

,

with a

discussion of Freud's views on female sexuality.

In the

style of mimicry she developed to speak the female without

reducing it to the logic of the same of typical theory, she

questions Freud's rendering of female development as an

aberration from "normal" male development.

What Irigaray

wants to posit is that instead of one strategy for self-

constitution, there are two

— but

the female strategy has been

reduced to the male one, due to the blind spot of the male
position.

According to Irigaray this blind spot is due to

the dream of symmetry

(Irigaray 1985a,

13-129)

— it

is due to

the nature of the male strategy of self-representation that
it

is blind to another strategy that takes a fundamentally

different approach.
Both Lacan and Irigaray agree that an infant is born
from the body of another, and that the primordial self of the
infant is first precipitated in symbiotic fusion with the

primary caretaker.

Where Lacan and Irigaray disagree is on
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the nature of each individual's relation to this origin
of
the self.

While Lacan accepts the representation of that

relation according to what Irigaray terms the "logic of the
same," Irigaray is convinced that there is another way
of

representing that relation.

Because representing that

relation according to another, a feminine, logic would

disrupt and undermine male logic, it cannot yet be done
(Irigaray 1985a,

42-44)

.

Yet Irigaray holds out the

possibility that through attempting to speak the feminine in
ways that subvert the male logic of language, women could

finally dispel the illusions of the male position.
We could thus say that Irigaray'
of the same,

s

rendering of the logic

of the male economy of representation,

economy played out in Lacan's schema

L.

man desires the same, the self-identical.

is the

On Irigaray 's view,
he denies his

origin in the mother and determines his relation to origin
himself.

That is, the origin of his primordial self in

fusion with the mother is relegated to the unconscious.

The

layers of identifications built up on those unconscious

representations are linked to that self through the
signifying chains of the conscious and unconscious systems,
but this primordial origin of the conscious self is veiled.
The self is reconstituted in the dialectic of self/other

identifications that continue to occur, but man has lost
sight of the active role played by a real other that

originally helped create him.
confirm his identity.

he projects imagoes that will

To do this,

he needs real people upon
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which to project those imagoes
them,

— people

thereby threatening his identity.

socially sanctioned other.
imagoes,
same.

who will not challenge

Woman is the

By conforming to the man's

she insures the maintenance of his identity as the

he is thus free to continue to believe in the illusion

that he is whole, that he is the phallus that the other

desires, that his identity is not contingent upon the mother
that gave birth to him, or the other that reflects him back
to himself.

The woman has abandoned her own relation to the

origin, to her birth, her self,

in order to allow men to

inscribe upon her their relation to their origin, their
desire, their self-representations.
Thus, woman is required by the male position to be

silent, to be the other that will support the repetition of

his self-representations as the same.

The primordial self

formed in mother-fusion is translated and transposed into the

Symbolic order through a layering of identifications

sanctioned by the paternal law.

Anything that would upset

this economy of representation that repeats man as having the
same self is relegated to the unconscious.
stable,

In this way a

socially functioning identity is formed and

maintained despite the constant onslaught of chaotic
experience that besieges it.

Anything that doesn't fit, that

can't be ordered according to the Symbolic rules of analogy,

resemblance and identity is dismissed.

Experience is ordered

according to repetitions of identifications that support the
self as self-identical.

Woman comes to be associated with
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the unconscious, the fusion— experiences of infancy and the

chaotic flux of experience that the self has mastered through
this logic of the same.

In the puzzlement men express to one

another with respect to the question of what woman wants,
lies the dim awareness that the male strategy is based on an
-^-^-lusion

the illusion that he seeks in the other recognition

of what he already is.

If woman were to speak,

to articulate

her female desire for contact, the connectedness with an

other that represents her relationship to her origin, man

could no longer posit himself as self-identical.

Instead, he

would be forced to realize that he was created in and by
contact with another

— that

the other that recognized him in

fusion not only saw him as he was but, at least in part,

created him through the contact of that recognition.
According to Irigaray, that women don't have the
phallus, that they have instead a "nothing" where there

should be something is threatening to men because it

represents a hole in men's signifying economy (Irigaray
1985a,

She suggests that this "nothing" might have been

50)

interpreted as the symptom of an other libidinal economy that
would recall heterogeneity rather than the identical or
identifiable.

Thus,

she opposes two economies to one another

that we can delineate as her versions of the male and female

positions.

In choosing to render these positions

"phallic" language of typical theory,

I

into the

am flying in the face

of Irigaray's insistence on the ineffability of the female

position--at least in language as it stands.

Irigaray feels
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that attempting to represent female desire and sexuality
in

typical theoretical language can only reduce the feminine to
the male logic of the same and so deprive it of its

specificity.

If there is not system of representations to

assist the girl in her conflictual relationship to her mother
and to her sex/organ
reason.

(Irigaray 1985a,

68),

it

is

for a

The girl's relationship would have to be expressed

in another economy of representations than that of the schema
L.
I

believe that this is only true given the extreme

polarization of the sexes as Irigaray depicts them.

Just as

there are times when men relate to women as more than their

mirror reflection, there are times when women represent
themselves according to the logic of the same.

If we insist

on the two extremes Irigaray describes as the extreme of two

positions with room for varying shades of grey in between, we
may see beyond the polarization of the sexes

helpful to relate Irigaray'
schema

L,

it

s

.

Just as it is

logic of the same to Lacan's

is helpful to relate Irigaray 's notion of

heterogeneity to my earlier discussion of the deficiencies of
Lacan's account of the Imaginary and fusion-experiences.
What

I

would like to do here is characterize Irigaray 's

version of the male and female positions from that
perspective, although this may not be in keeping with her own

project
The male position

:

Upon discovering that he and his

mother are not one and that the self formed in fusion is thus
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at risk,

he makes "the very place and space of being his own"

(Irigaray 1985a,

137)

.

That is, he denies the mother's

contribution to the self of fusion and makes his existence as
a

human being one of his own making.

He then "becomes a

prisoner of effects of symmetry that know no limit"

(p.

137).

Barred from fusion-experiences due to his denial of the
other's part in the making of his self, he is doomed to
forever repeat that same self by setting up narcissistic

identifications of self with the other.

For man, these

identifications must exclude activating any representations
of primordial connectedness with an other so that he can

maintain a self in separation from others.

This means that

the other must repeat past identifications.

Anything about

the other that might subvert these identifications must be

relegated to the unconscious.

Nothing that would challenge

the boundaries of his self can be admitted.

Instead the self

of the Imaginary will push the 'I' of speech to organize all

experience in conformity with the Symbolic rules of analogy
and resemblance.

Boundaries remain fixed.

The Real is made

intelligible by repeating the same self/other relationship
over and over again according to transformation rules that

relate the multiplicity of experience without endangering his

layering of self-representations.

Thus,

into the walls of his palace of mirrors"
In "Plato's Hystera"

"Everywhere he runs
(p.

137)

Irigaray rereads Plato's cave

analogy as representative of the male position.
the womb,

.

The cave is

the empirical connection with the mother, and the
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fantasmatic images that lie at the subject's origins.

In

leaving the cave, the subject is denying these origins lost
iri

fluid darkness" and the "shimmering imprecision of

reflections" in order to replace them with "the neat, clear
cut,

immutable, unambiguous categories that characterize,

divide up, classify, and order everything, every "being,"

according to rational intuition"

(Irigaray 1985a,

281)

.

The

subject denies his origins in the mother in order to

represent his relationship to his origins as that of the son
to the Father.

The Father is represented by the sun--"the

keystone supporting the whole

— phallic — edifice

of

representation that it dominates, illumines, warms, makes
fertile,
(p.

267)

and regulates by scattering its beams everywhere"
.

Thus, the shadowy reflections of mother-fusion are

relegated to the unconscious and denied, to be replaced with
the clearcut categories and interdictions of the Symbolic
order.

Through the chain of associations created in

repetitions of the self that "pivot the scene around axes of
symmetry"

(p

.

259)

the most recent layer of self-

representation maintains a link with the primordial self of
mother-fusion.

But the shadows of the subject's origins are

denied so that he can maintain the illusion of

a

self that

was never merged with an other, a self that is forever self-

identical, able to take its place in the Symbolic order of
"being" where everything already is what it is, and

everything already has a place.
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:

Upon the loss of mother-fusion the

is coerced by the Symbolic order into abandoning her own

relation to her origins
boy.

— which

is different from that of the

Due to the need on the part of the male for a

cooperative other, she is forced into the position of having
"nothing" and submitted to the "projects and projections of

masculine consciousness"

(Irigaray 1985a,

141).

Thus:

By resubmitting herself to the established order,
in this role of delirious double, she abandons,
even denies, the prerogative historically granted
her: unconsciousness (p. 141).

The prerogative of unconsciousness is the prerogative of the
sex associated with fusion and loss; with representations

that are relegated to the unconscious because they are sunk

— dreams

and fantasies that don't conform to any of

in shadows-

the categories of the Symbolic (the realm of the clear-cut

and already-known)

.

It is the specificity of women's

relationships to other women that allow this prerogative,

something about the nature of a girl's relationship to her

mother that is different from that of

Due to this

a boy's.

special relationship she is unconsciousness,

"but not for

herself, not with a subjectivity that might take cognizance
of it,

recognize it as her own"

(p.

141)

.

thus,

she is the

"reserve of "sensuality" for the elevation of intelligence,"
the "matter used for the imprint of forms"

(p.

141)

.

Instead

of activating unconscious representations by associating them

according to the dictates of her own desire, she allows
herself to take on the identity of the other that will
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fulfill man's desire.

That is, the layering of

identifications a woman builds up in the self/other dialectic
have more to do with the dictates of some man's own

search for lost objects associated with his mother than her
own

.

What is the special relationship to the mother and her
own origins that grants her the prerogative of

unconsciousness?

What does it mean to have this prerogative?

How could it be represented if it weren't coopted by man?

Although Irigaray is wary of giving it expression in language
which operates according to the male economy of
representation,

she gives us some clues.

In "La Mysterique"

Irigaray "mimics" mystical literature to articulate

a

way of

relating that isn't based on the male logic of the same.
This kind of relating constitutes a "marriage of the

unknowable" where "everything is relentlessly immediate"
(Irigaray 1985a,

196)

Here two

(whether it is a human

subject and God or two human subjects is not entirely clear
(who have no "possessions" are "wedded only in the abolition

of all power,

elsewhere"

(p.

all having, all being, that is founded
196)

The ranking of social positions as laid

out by the Symbolic order are left behind.

Two come together

without the attributes assigned them by the place they take
as speaking subjects.

Rather than placing themselves vis

a

vis one another according to the self /other relationships

laid out by the Symbolic--relat ionships where the boundaries
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between self and other are fixed

consumption

— "each

becomes the other in

.

Each will not in fact have known the identity of
the other, has thus lost self-identity except for a
hint of an imprint that each keeps in order the
better to intertwine in a union already, finally at
hand.
Thus I am to you as you are to me, mine is
yours and yours mine, I know you as you know me,
you take pleasure with me as with you I take
pleasure in the rejoicing of this reciprocal
living and identifying together (p. 196)

—

—

.

If we take this passage as an attempt to articulate the

desire specific to woman, we can contrast this female desire
to male desire.

Male desire motivates the narcissistic

identifications of the schema

L.

The desire for the desire

of the mother is replaced by the desire for the desire of

objects offered by the paternal law as substitutes, i.e.,

recognition from others taken as ego ideals in the self/other
dialectic.

For the speaking subject, the

'I'

of speech has

translated the desire of the 'me' of narcissistic
identifications into the Symbolic order of language which
stakes out the social network of positions.

The kind of

desire expressed in the above passage has nothing to do with

obtaining the desire of an other who has
social network.

In fact,

a

given place in a

this "female" desire is a desire

for another kind of connection where the boundaries of self

and other as laid out by the Symbolic melt, and two become
one in a fusion-experience reminiscent of mother-fusion.

This passage can be compared to our earlier discussion
of fusion-experience based on Winnicott and Mahler
2)

.

(chapter

Fusion-experiences involve the melting of self/other
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boundaries

—a

way of relatedness that doesn't abide by the

rules of the Symbolic.

The desire for the desire of an other

from its position as laid out by the Symbolic is not what
is
at issue.

Instead, the desire is for contact,

connectedness

— the

for

kind of connectedness where the self/other

boundary breaks down and instead two desire as one.
a

Through

reciprocal attentiveness to the specificity of the other--a

specificity that defies all categorization by the Symbolic,
that eludes any articulation one could give it in terms of

attributes, properties and possessions available in the

Symbolic order

— two

merge desire by desiring exactly what the

other is in all his/her specificity.

This kind of

attentiveness is thus an attentiveness beyond language in the
sense that it is a reciprocal responsiveness of two bodies
that may or may not find expression in conscious thought.
Just as the primordial fusion of primary caretaker and child

resulted in fantasmatic images associated with bodily
sensations eventually relegated to the unconscious, later

fusion-experiences based in body sensations can activate such
earlier sensations in

a

dialogue that may not be immediately

translatable into language.

This reciprocal responsiveness

of two bodies allow the self/other boundary to break down and

the two to become one organism.

Just as an organism

instantaneously communicates sensation from one area to
another,
as one,

so do these "two" bodies.

moving with

a

Just as an organism acts

single goal or desire,

desire of these "two" converge into one.

so does the

In the desire for
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the desire of the other in his/her specificity, the pleasure
of the other rather than recognition is the goal.

The

pleasure of each is instantaneously communicated to the other
via subtle body cues, and the desire of the two become one as
the mutual goal of pleasuring the other is satisfied and

communicated
Thus, the Imaginary realm is not merely a function of

"illusory" identifications with objects outside of oneself.
It

is a real arena where body-sensations are communicated and

where desire is not for a particular "lost" object but for
the pleasure of merged desire.

The "non-knowledge" of this

realm may find partial, and perhaps subversive, translation
into the Symbolic in the mode of sensat ion-ideas--"half

thoughts.

Thoughts that are connected with the indistinct

meaning of body-sensation and have not yet attained the
clarity of the clear-cut distinctions laid out by the

positions of the Symbolic.

These body sensations are

retained in the body (and so activated by experiences that
recall earlier experiences that evoked such sensations)
That is, body-sensations can be recalled by experiences that

reevoke them due to the signifying chains of representations

associated with them.

These representations of body

sensations are part of the unconscious and so are grouped

according to the laws of primary process (condensation and
displacement) rather than those of secondary process.
are connected with words,

They

images and other representations
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that are associated with that earlier experience which they

represent

Body-sensations reevoked in the present can be given
conscious significance if attended to.

The attunement of

another to one's body-sensations can activate them more
intensely.

Thus,

the body has a sort of language of its own—

-one that is neither distinct from, nor synonymous with,

actual speech.

Women, with their desire for the

connectedness that makes two one organism, are more
conversant with the language of the body than men.

While men

vie for the recognition that will place them within the

social network, women attune themselves to the more subtle

body signals that each in their specificity continuously send
out.

Just as the mother learns to "read" her infant's

signals

— the

slight grimace that means they're about to cry,

the restlessness that means they'll soon be hungry--she

learns to read the body cues of those around her.

And due to

the lack of representation for the desire for such

connectedness, this communication will usually take place on
an unconscious level--with neither mother,
man,

nor child, nor

stopping to bring this kind of connectedness to

conscious awareness.

Furthermore, this kind of connectedness

is not peculiar to mothers.

Every infant who has desired the

desire of its mother has had to learn the same kind of

responsiveness to the body-sensations of an other.

it

is

this kind of "non-knowledge" that is so difficult to

represent in terms of the logic of the same.

For instead of
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placing of two with respect to one another, it involves
the

fusion of two into an organism that desires the same

pleasure.

is this pleasure of connectedness where two

It

become one, and the pleasure of the one is the pleasures of
the other, that is the pleasure of jouissance

—a

pleasure

that transcends boundaries and revels in immediate,

"naive",

sensation, a pleasure that is unmediated by the social

network of positions of the Symbolic.
Despite the difficulty of translating this kind of

connectedness into Symbolic language, however, it has
traceable effects.

In leaving the cave of his empirical

origins in the mother, man has "left the place, still based
in the senses,

inscribed."

where the traces of his desires were

But the effects of the body-based connectedness

of mother-fusion are still felt:

The wound suffered by being thus torn away might
leave scars in the memory.
Reminders, rejoinders.
Passages, and hemorrhages, between sensible and
intelligible.
Resulting in sensation-ideas, ideal
sensations.
Any self-respecting philosopher avoids
confusion like that (Irigaray 1985a, 299).
The male position disallows the blurred boundaries of his

childhood.

Instead,

the male subject must leave the cave of

shimmering reflections and rediscover his "true" origin in
the bright light of the sun.

people and things are more or

less perfect copies of ideal forms whose boundaries are

unambiguous and immutable.
Eclipse of the mother, of the place (of) becoming,
whose non-representation or even disavowal upholds
he no
the absolute being attributed to the father.
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longer has any foundation, he is beyond all
beginnings (p. 307).

"Sensation-ideas" or anything hearkening back to man's

foundation in mother— matter and sense— experience that

respected no boundaries, would threaten the logic of the
same.

To maintain the self /other relationship of

separateness where loss of the mother no longer poses the
threat of loss of self, experience must conform to fixed
categories.

A woman,

her origins,

is capable of a different kind of language.

due to her different relationship to

When she is not co-opted by masculine speech she has

a

different way of speaking.
Hers are contradictory words, somewhat mad from the
standpoint of reason, inaudible for whoever listens
to them with ready-made grids, with a fully
elaborated code in hand. Fo in what she says, too,
at least when she dares, woman is constantly
touching herself (Irigaray 1985b, 29)
The self that motivates the

*

I

*

of feminine speech, due to

that self's different relationship to the primordial self of

mother-fusion, is not bound by the same need to repeat the
same relationship of self and other in layers of narcissistic

identifications

.

Rather than translating that primordial

self into the Symbolic network of positions via the

transformation rules of analogy and resemblance, she is
"constantly touching herself."

Identification with an image

outside of herself doesn't give her the contact she craves.
What she wants is the pleasure of connectedness, the

spontaneous response of her body to sensed experience that
defies all categorization.

Since her identity doesn't depend
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on the logic of the same,

she uses words differently.

The

self that motivates her speech is a self with less
respect
for the paternal law.

it therefore makes less difference to

her whether or not she upholds it, whether or not her words

make "sense" according to the socially sanctioned Symbolic
code.

her self is closer to the narcissistic self of the

unconscious

the self that remembers mother— fusion and

connectedness, a self that refuses to accept Symbolic

substitutions.

Instead of repeating a self /other

relationships that hearkens back to

a

precipitation of self

in mother /fusion she no longer remembers,

she wants to feel

again the physical response of her body to an other or to the

discourse of her Other that would reevoke such forgotten
responses.
Symbolic,

When the

*

I

*

translates this self into the

it is not with the intention of finding that self's

position in the larger network of social positions.

The

feminine intent is that of representing the spontaneous

response of the body to a concrete situation in order to give
it a local position with respect to other such responses she

may have had.
It

is unclear why Irigaray thinks that woman's relation

to her origins is different from that of a man's.

precipitated

a

primordial self in fusion with

if both

a woman,

the origins for both would seem to be the same.

then

From her

discussion of the male denial of his origins in "Plato's
Hystera" Irigaray would seem to grant this.

And yet woman is

coerced through submission to the Symbolic order to abandon
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female desire and a peculiarly female relation to origins.
On a Lacanian account, what makes women different from men
is

the different position they take with respect to the phallus.

Each has to resolve the crisis of the castration complex, but
the way of resolving that crisis will differ.

On Irigaray’s

account, woman would already seem to have a different

relation to the mother.

Because she is unable to represent

this relation due to being coerced into playing man's

"delirious double" by the Symbolic order, she doesn't know

herself the way a man does (Irigaray 1985a, 141)

.

She is

denied the economy of representation that would reflect
female desire and sexuality.

This suggests that female

desire and sexuality is essentially different from that of
man's.

a

Although some have argued that Irigaray is not

advocating an essentialist view of sexual difference, there
are certainly strains in her work that can be given an

essentialist reading.

Unless some explanation is given of

why a girl's relation to her origins is different from that
of a boy's one could gather from Irigaray'

female genitals

(two lips

— the

s

valorization of

sex which is not one

that sexual difference is based in anatomy.

[18])

That is, that

one has specifically female desire and sexuality due to

having female genitals.
The limitations Irigaray points to in the male position
are important ones.

There are equally debilitating

limitations to the female position as Irigaray depicts it.
If wielding phallic power involves defining social
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relationships, the it's about time women wielded
more of that

power themselves.

If all of us were to take Irigaray's

advice, we might experience more of the female
jouissance

that eludes our grasp from the male position, but we
would

also have no more power than before.
1®

i ^ ing

I

see no point in

either position over the other.

We need to

articulate the female position, and to explore the

possibilities for that position blocked by the male one.

It

is my belief that doing so will get us past the impasse that

both Lacan and Irigaray leave us with

— that

how to make

is,

sense of female subjectivity.
If we read Irigaray in light of Lacan's Symbolic and

Imaginary realms, we can find

a

way of accounting for the

difference in male and female desire that is contingent upon
the position one takes up with respect to the phallus

regardless of one's anatomy.

This leaves open the

possibility that not only are both positions open to both,
but that they remain open throughout one's life.

Both men

and women have had the experiences necessary for taking up

either posit ion--whether those experiences have been

relegated to the unconscious or not.

the question

Thus,

becomes one of why women tend to develop

a

different strategy

for maintaining the self in the face of loss of mother-fusion

and what that strategy is.

Chodorow gives us some clues as to why

a

girl's relation

to her mother would be different from that of a boy's that

allow us to avoid

a

biological explanation.

While there are
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some problems with using her work to fill out Irigaray's

story due to differences in their theoretical frameworks,
it
can be done.

In the next section

I

will discuss Chodorow

from this perspective and offer my own view of

a

female

position--one that doesn't problematize the possibility of
female subjectivity in the same way that Lacan and Irigaray
do.

By theorizing sexual difference as a difference in

strategies with respect to the problem of subjectivity, as

opposed to a difference in anatomy,

I

hope to pave the way

for examining how a conflict in strategies could manifest

itself in philosophical texts.

3

.

4

Chodorow; Woman as Nurturer

Nancy Chodorow,

in her book,

The Reproduction of

Mothering (1978), uses object relations theory in the attempt
to answer the question of how women today come to mother.

Chodorow is by training

a

sociologist.

her perspective on

psychoanalysis and object relations theory is thus that of an
outsider using psychoanalysis to answer
concerns her as a sociologist.

a

question that

By raising the question of

how women come to mother, Chodorow not only opens the

question of how the nurturing qualities of the primary

caretaker of children is reproduced, but of how women as

a

gender are socially reproduced with the personalities
requisite to mothering, in contrast to men.

Thus, the

question of the gender difference of selves is introduced,
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the question of the material conditions for the creation

of gendered selves becomes important.

[

19

]

That there are two genders and a sexual division of

labor point to two kinds of subjectivity, two kinds of

possibility for selfhood.

Thus far, men have been privileged

in cultural accounts and manifestations of self

— at

the dominant discourse.

legitimate

Taking mothering as

a

least in

expression of self and exploring the conditions that allows
this kind of self to evolve is a step toward opening up other

possibilities of selfhood.

As long as the male self is taken

as the paradigm of selfhood proper,

we lose sight of the fact

that the masculine self is only one possibility for selfhood-

-and not the only one.

The feminine self as a socially

reproduced gender, that

is,

a socially created category,

is a

self deserving of a richer and more appreciative account.

Women are not "failed" men, but human beings with selves that

tend to be socially constructed in

a

way that is

systematically different from that of men.

Chodorow's book

is one attempt to account for the material conditions of that

difference in the context of the family where it is first

produced
According to Chodorow's reading of object-relations
theory, the mother acts as an external ego for the infant,

providing holding and nourishment.

In the earliest stages

the infant doesn't experience the mother as separate and uses

defensive mechanisms such as introjection to retain primary
identification.

"Separateness during this early period
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threatens not only anxiety at possible loss, but the infant's

very sense of existence"

(Chodorow 1978,

60)

The self originates in the inner physical experience of

body integrity, and the demarcation of that body from the
object world.

This demarcation is achieved, as we saw in our

earlier discussion of Winnicott, through frustration.

As the

infant is confronted with the mother's failure to anticipate

and satisfy its every need, anxiety spurs the development of
ego capacities.
The infant internalizes representations of aspects of
its mother to counter the anxiety of frustration.

It comes

to define aspects of its self in relation to these

representations.

Since the mother must help the child

achieve separation, she also evokes the child's ambivalence.
The process of separation and individuation thus provokes

frustration and anxiety in relation to the mother that the
infant must cope with if it is to achieve

a

stable sense of

self

Chodorow suggests that preoedipal experience is likely
to differ for boys and girls.

In addition to resolving the

castration crisis differently, girls have
relationship to their mother.

a

different

This difference is based on

the mother's unconscious attitudes toward her same-sex offspring.

"A woman identifies with her own mother,

identification with her child, she
a

cared-for child"

(

and through

re experiences herself as

(Chodorow 1974, 47)

)

A mother is more

likely to experience her daughter as an extension of herself.
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Thus,

she discourages her daughter's process
of separation

and individuation.

On the other hand,

she is more likely to

emphasize her son's masculinity in opposition
to herself,
thus pushing him to individuate at an early
age.

Both girls and boys develop

a

deep personal

identification with the mother during their early
years.

The

girls can maintain continuity with this identification
based
on daily,

on-going, concrete contact with someone who is the

same sex as themselves.

identification with

a

Boys must replace this early

masculine one.

Because fathers usually

work outside the home the concrete nature of their day to day

activities is a mystery.

fantasized masculine role.

The boy must identify with a

This often leads him to define

masculinity as that which is not feminine or involved with
women.

He tries to deny primary identification with the

mother by repressing the feminine inside himself, and by

denigrating and devaluing whatever he considers to be
feminine in the outside world.

The development of a girl's

gender identity doesn't involve this kind of rejection of her

primary identification with the mother.
Feminine identification is based not on fantasied
or externally defined characteristics and negative
identification, but on the gradual learning of a
way of being familiar in everyday life, and
exemplified by the person ... with whom she has been
most involved.
It is continuous with her early
childhood identifications and attachments (Chodorow
1974

,

51

)

.

Furthermore, taking the father as her primary love-object

doesn't mean the girl completely rejects her mother.

In
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she usually continues her relationship of dependence

upon and attachment to her.
The care and socialization of girls by women
ensures the production of feminine personalities
founded on relation and connection, with flexible
rather than rigid ego boundaries, and with a
comparatively secure sense of gender identity
(Chodorow 1974, 58)

Because the mother was also

a girl,

she tends to grow up

without establishing adequate ego boundaries or
of self.

a

firm sense

This leads her to experience the same boundary

confusion with her daughter that she experienced with her

mother
These object-relational differences, and their
effect on defenses, splits, and repressions in the
ego, better explain the important differences in
masculine and feminine personality and the
important aspects of feminine personality that
emerge from the oedipus complex than does the more
conscious and intended identification with the same
gender parent (Chodorow 1978, 114).
What

I

take Chodorow to be suggesting here is that from

the start, male and female infants learn different ways of

handling the emergence and maintenance of self according to
the different problems in separating from an opposed-sex or

same-sex primary caretaker, in addition to unconscious
attitudes of the mother to the different sexes.
The Lacanian reading of psychoanalysis emphasizes the

linguistic aspect of the unconscious, thus suggesting that
the unconscious is accessible in our speech and writing.

American psychoanalysis tends to look to empirical data for
confirmation of theories about the genetic development of
people.

Lacanian psychoanalysis looks at linguistic output
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to see how a self that is inherently contradictory
and

fictional is currently maintaining its fictional unity.
Chodorow, with her emphasis on genetic development, misses
the revolutionary impact of the repressed feminine that

Irigaray makes possible through

reading of Freud.
of their past

a

radicalized Lacanian

For Chodorow, women are finished products

— there

is a certain closure to the process

whereby their selves were formed.

In Irigaray'

s

reading of

Lacan and Freud, the self is always provisional, always
subject to the conflict within it, thus leaving open the

possibility for radical change.

It is this

questioning of

the givenness of self hood--whether one grants an initial

formative period or not

— that

I

find exciting in French

psychoanalysis
Chodorow'

s

analysis is an empirical one.

She starts

with the question of how women come to be psychologically

equipped to be mothers, assumes that there is

a

social/cultural explanation for this, and pulls together the
empirical data as theorized by object-relations theorists to
explain it.

her question is different from the question of

how subjectivity is possible.

unproblematic

— it

She assumes the self as

is the formation of a particular kind of

self in a social context that she is concerned to explain.
She is not looking for the divided subject, but looking to

explain why the unified subject we have is as it is.
The self that Chodorow describes is determined in early

childhood and forever fixed in place.

It

develops and
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matures over time, but this development will unfold in the
social setting according to the dictates of the original

situation of early childhood.

Instead of a system of

signifying chains that can result in

a

whole new

configuration of meaning upon the shifting of

a signifier,

we

have a self whose internalized representations cohere into

stable patterns.

Thus,

once the self is developed,

it

is not

threatened with constant disintegration and the notion of ongoing reconstitution of the self in each and every meaningful
word or act

— with

its implications for the possibility of

self-t ransformat ion--is lost.

This may be one reason why there is a pessimistic tone
to Chodorow's polemic for change.

She advocates co-

parenting, and yet if it is women who are psychologically

equipped to become (even want to become) mothers and not men,
how are we to bring this change about?

Although Chodorow

reclaims the unconscious as the aspect of Freud that American

psychoanalysis has tended to repress, she is still within the
American tradition.
Chodorow, however, does something that Irigaray does
not

.

She attempts to give a story about the material

conditions under which two initial situations for internal
object relations are formed

— male

and female.

believe that Chodorow's analysis can be used as
to explain patriarchy.

do not

I

a

universal

The conditions she describes are

those of the nuclear family under capitalism.

But given due

restraint with respect to its application, Chodorow's work
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illuminate the structures that Lacanian psychoanalysis
tries to analyze.
What I'm interested in taking from Chodorow is not that
female selves end up being different from male selves, but

that a strategy for maintaining selfhood is put into

operation differently according to gender

— and

that this

difference in strategy continues to operate throughout one's
life.

The interesting questions here are the material

conditions under which one initially creates

a

self--and how

those conditions still have ramifications in the way that we

recreate ourselves in the on-going process of being selves.

Irigaray talks about the repressed feminine, but Chodorow
fills out the picture of how that repression

into motion

— and

is'

first set

why it is that if anyone can speak the

feminine it is more likely to be

a woman.

Developing Chodorow 's work to bring it in line with the
theory being developed here, we can characterize the male and
female solutions to the problem of separation and

individuation as two different strategies.

Both males and

females have to deal with the anxiety of loss of motherfusion.

Our characterization of the male and female

positions a la Irigaray gave us some clues as to how these
strategies differ.

Chodorow allows us to fill out the

picture further by giving us some clues as to why and how the
girl's relationship to the mother and her origins differs
from that of a boy's.
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The male position:

Due in part to the mother's

unconscious attitudes towards him, the boy is pushed toward
individuation.

Not only does the castration complex confront

him with the no of the father, but the mother has already
been discouraging symbiotic fusion.

In the situation of

fusion, two become one in the communication of body-sensation

that leads to the fusion of desire for the pleasurable body
state of both.

Due to the mother's attitude toward an

opposed-sex child, she is less apt to prolong this situation.
She assumes the separateness of her child from herself at an

earlier stage of his development

— and

thus assumes that the

child's desires will be different from her own.

She stops

expecting the child to pick up on her body-cues as intensely
and starts expecting that he'll become more difficult.

His

desires will no longer seem as accessible to her, or vice
versa; she will expect less fluid communication along with

increasing conflict in the relationship.
of the Oedipus complex,

"having" the phallus.

With the resolution

the boy will take his position as
The more subtle communication of

fusion already having been discouraged, he will be quick to
take up the compensation offered him--identif ication with the

father who upholds the Symbolic order.
Due to the abstract nature of a boy's masculine

identity, the male position as we have already laid it out is

natural to him.

He is more comfortable building up layers of

narcissistic identifications in keeping with the logic of the
same because he's not entirely sure what masculinity means.
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The concrete, body based contact with his mother is with a

woman

the opposite,

inferior sex.

His experiences of her

and mother-fusion cannot, therefore, be validated.

Instead

he must come to distrust his body-based self and turn to the

abstract positions of being as laid out by the Symbolic for
guidance.

He must "be a man" and learn how to get an other

to give him the recognition he needs to repeat his self/other

pattern.

Because he cannot allow connectedness reminiscent

of fusion with his mother or other women, he adheres rigidly

to the transposition of the same self throughout the

conventional network of meaning encoded in language.
The female position
the same sex as herself.

:

The mother sees her daughter as
It

is therefore more likely that

she will continue to see her as an extension of herself.

Instead of pushing her away, she will continue to act as if
she and her daughter are one

— one

organism, communicating

body-sensation instantaneously via subtle cues, with one
desire.

She not only continues to expect that her desires

are one with her daughter's, but that her daughter will

continue to conform to her desires.

Thus,

instead of

breaking fusion entirely, another kind of connectedness is

developed that is reminiscent of the intense body-based
communication of symbiotic fusion.

To compensate for the

loss of fusion the boy learns the strategy of obtaining

recognition from others that fit his self/other pattern.
girl compensates for her loss by maintaining connectedness

with others.

Both feel terror at the prospect of finding

The
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themselves helplessly dependent and alone, cut off from the
source of nourishment and the origins of self.

The male

strategy involves relying on the phallic power to obtain

recognition to compensate for this break.

The female

strategy involves transferring the connectedness once only
felt with mother to others as well.
In taking on her position of "not having" the phallus

the girl accepts that she lacks, that she has been cut off

from the mother, that she thus has a nothing waiting to be

filled by another.

With that acceptance comes a receptivity-

-an awareness of the other as subject,

as desiring,

and the

desire to fill in one's lack by listening to the other as

desiring subject.

Accepting that she is not whole, not self-

sufficient, mere repetition of the same self in a self/other

dialectic based on recognition is insufficient.

She wants

more, wants to know what another's desire is, what another

wants, and to conform to that desire and satisfy it in order

to regain the connectedness that she has lost.

She is thus

receptive to the other that will form her, that will tell her
more about who she is by eliciting her desire to conform to

his/her desire, to fit.

She needs an other to tell her who

she is because she admits that she doesn't yet know.

When

she can anticipate some unarticulated desire of the other,
she also learns something about herself,

something about

where she fits, due to the response within herself such

satisfaction evokes.
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Symbolic layers of identification are stripped away in
fusion-experience, leaving only the actuality of the moment,
of allowing a reciprocity to form that transcends all

labelling, all attributes that define one, all signifying

chains that conform to paternal law and one's position as
laid out by that law in the social network.

Instead of

traveling all the circuits of one's Symbolic layering in
order to place the other with respect to oneself

a

la the

paternal law, there is a breakdown of that circuitry that
results in fusion,

a

merging of positions.

Instead of the

Desire for contact deferred through the signifying chains
that determine one's position, there is the pleasure of

immediate contact.

In the Symbolic each signifyer can

signify only through the position it takes up in opposition
to all other signifiers.

In fusion there is contact.

Through a heightened awareness of the other that involves
minute adaptations to minute signals--signals that involve

body movements, tone of voice, gaps and pauses in speech,
etc., that 11 point to the other's desire, what would

constitute the other's other, what would feel like
the other,

contact is made.

a

"fit" to

While the subject thinks he

wants to merely repeat the relationships of identity where he
was subjected to the law of the father and its rules of

substitut iton, actually he wants to get all the way back to
the kind of immediate identity he had with the mother.

The

mother who helped him articulate his desire by anticipating
it and giving him what satisfied before he asked for it.
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fusion can occur without the man realizing it sine© the
-

woman is conforming to his other

— he

huving to change his identity

When fusion is reciprocal,

both are transformed

— real

.

gets sustenance without

fusion occurs as both realize that

they both desire the same thing
the other and be one as two.

— to

conform to the desire of

Instead of merely projecting an

imago, projection of an imago along with allowing oneself to

be imprinted with the imago of another is allowed.
a

There is

receptiveness to being the other for another that, when

reciprocated, allows one to transform one another's imagoes.
The unconscious, the nether side, the other, holds suspended

representational chains that work according to the logic of

primary process and heterogeneity.
new meaning to emerge in
the same.

a

Fusion-experiences allow

different manner than the logic of

Instead of translating the self through

repetition, transformation is allowed that doesn't overwhelm

— each

bouncing

off the other, thus mutually grounding one another.

Instead

all meaning structures through mutual shaping

of a fixed anchor point for one who repeats a self-

representation, there are two beams orienting one another

without the need for

a

fixed anchor.

Self-representations

become mutually adapting.
In the unravelling of identity layers through careful,

reciprocal attention to the imago projected upon you, the
patient looking for the point of contact, the point where two
imagoes can merge, fusion can occur without destroying selfidentity.

A point of contact is found where space for new
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meaning is made.

If too much new material is released from

the unconscious then chaos would ensue.

But in the space of

Imaginary fusion mutually bounded by the Symbolic layers of
the other's other, only enough new material is released to

become what another desires.

Patterning of the logic of the

same is maintained, but the self is transformed in the fusion

with another's desire.

Just as the extreme of the male position assumes the

imposition of a same self onto an other, the extreme of the
female position assumes the complete conformity to that

position of other.

is this position that Lacan describes.

It

Irigaray fills out what that position means in

a

more

positive way, without being able to make female subjectivity
much more plausible.

On her view, woman as woman is still

unable to make herself understood.

[20]

I

have used

Chodorow, with her description of the female sex as the sex

with "permeable ego boundaries,

"

the sex that operates on the

basis of relatedness rather than opposition, to fill out

Irigaray 's story in light of two strategies--male and female.
I

think this can be extended to finding

female subjectivity

—a

a

way of envisioning

female subject who can articulate

female desire and female sexuality.
language, that they are subjects

— if

Given that women learn

imperfect ones

— who

operate according to the logic of the same of language, then
the question is, how is their use of the Symbolic different

from that of

a

man's.

Irigaray has given us some clues, but
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she takes the extreme of the female position as her point of

departure.

Using Chodorow's notion of connectedness, we can

see female subjectivity as a different position with respect

to the Symbolic

one that allows the kind of Imaginary fusion

that the extreme of the male position cannot tolerate.
the description of fusion-experience

I

Thus,

give above is not

necessarily of an experience that is and must forever remain
ineffable.

Rather,

such experience involves the ability to

suspend the Symbolic as a complete and closed system of
signifiers,

in order to articulate experience locally

— in

a

way that may contradict and even wreak havoc with the broader

realm of positionality.
The female subject who wants the power denied the mute

feminine of Lacan's or Irigaray's characterization, in

addition to being the other for another, wants her desire
taken into account as well.
the desire of the other,

her own desire.

In addition to being shaped by

she wants the other to be shaped by

She wants a receptivity to her desire, an

attentiveness to her other that will allow her to see her
reflection as well.

Connection is made in the mutual overlap

where each is stretching equally, reciprocally transformed,
in order to fuse desire.

and object.

Thus there is a merging of subject

One feels both that one is the other for the

other and that the other is one's own other.
thus created new meaning can arise

— room

In the space

is made in the

suspension of old categories for new categories and patterns
to form.

In the playspace,

the rules of the Symbolic order
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are suspended and traveling along the path of the logic
of

the same isn't required.
The process doesn't require a human other.

It can

happen any time the subject relinquishes the position of
imposing objectivity on the other, and allows the object the
status of subject

— that

boundaries on meaning.
shaped by the object

is,

allows the "object" to set the

The subject allows herself to be

repetition of self-representations is

suspended in order to merge with the ob ject-as-sub ject
Thus, one's own self of repetitive identifications is left

behind, allowing the backlog of unconscious representations
not yet brought into the self-system [21] to be activated by

the object.

The kind of process described in the mirror

stage continues throughout life, but not
it

— as

a

— as

Lacan would have

mere repetition, a build-up of layers

— but

in a

build-up of fusion-experiences as well where we are affecting
and influencing through connectedness who we are.

Both Lacan's version of the Imaginary and Irigaray's

downgrading of the function of the logic of the same need
modification.

Both the Imaginary and the Symbolic are
The

equally crucial in the maintenance of subjectivity.

Symbolic order is composed of signifying chains that have
been exchanged and communicated over the social network of
individuals.

Adhering to these chains, guaranteed by

paternal law that says no to fusion and so insures their
stability, thus guarantees stable identity.

The nether side

of meaning threatens this order and subjectivity.

This
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netherside is the storehouse of representations that don't
fit the current Symbolic order.

be death,

To lose these meanings would

to unleash them would overwhelm.

Imaginary fusion

recognizes them without having to incorporate them into
conscious meaning structures or the Symbolic.

position allows for

a

The female

different order of meaning, one that

might conflict with the Symbolic order.

It

allows for a

suspension of disbelief, for the non judgmental merging of two
into one that requires a reciprocal shaping on the part of

both in order to fit one another and make contact.
requires a suspension of the Symbolic order--not
like

(or unlike)

a

This
"you are

me" but a "I am you and you are me" that

takes place simultaneously; an oscillation of perspectives
that finally ends in merging both without losing either.

The

Symbolic holds together representations in patterns that
relate them in particular ways--relat ionships where they are
laid out in time and space.

The Imaginary suspends such

relationships, allowing an "irrational" fusion of

representations.
"reason,

"

The Symbolic sorts things out according to

the Imaginary operates according to more local

hold representations

positionality.

It can thus

simultaneously,

in a fullness that doesn't overwhelm because

no attempt is made to sort it out.

3

.

5

Self-Construction and the Production of Meaninqj—Take
Since both men and women are "castrated", what men

project onto the other (woman) to maintain their own unity

HI
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gives us a clue to the difficulties that we all
face in

trying to be subjects.

Women are also subjects who have had

to develop another strategy to maintain subjectivity.

There

are structural differences between a quintessentially

masculine" vs. "feminine" perspective.

We can characterize

the difference as involving a different relationship of
the

Symbolic to the Imaginary.

The quadrature that Lacan

describes is that of masculine identity.

A "feminine"

quadrature would place more emphasis on the Imaginary,
allowing fusions to take place that would subvert layering of

narcissistic identifications in the Symbolic.-

We can thus

link the "masculine" perspective to the self-strategy that

defers satisfaction through the Symbolic chain we discussed
in chapter two.

In turn,

we can link the "feminine"

perspective to an alternate self-strategy that seeks fusionexperience

.

The theory of self developed here has given some reasons
for why a female strategy of creating and maintaining a sense
of self might be different from that of a male self-strategy.

The problems presented to the female child were different

problems necessitating different solutions.

One aspect of

this difference is reflected by the kinds of experiences that
are repressed as inappropriate to the self-image one is

attempting to construct.

That we can delineate two gender-

linked self-strategies in this way presents interesting

questions for meaning-productive activity such as the

activity of writing theory.

One question is how congenial
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theoretic language is to the expression of the repressed
"feminine."

Another question is how this "feminine" realm of

experience threatens to emerge and subvert the works of the
men who are represented in the philosophical tradition.

Woman as other represents

a

category that stands in for

aspects of experience repressed by both men and women, but

particularly by men.

This repressed material constitutes a

threat to the constitution of selves and to the social order
as we know it.

And yet repressed material that needs release

does get represented through symptoms.

A reading of a

philosophical text that examines its gaps and contradictions,
its blind spots and repetitiveness,

opposed to what it does, is
"psychoanalyze" the text.

a

what the text says as

reading that attempts to

How one positions oneself in one's

production of meaning is motivated as much by the need to
continually reconstitute one's identity as by the need to
communicate information to one's reader.

these gaps

Thus,

and contradictions can be read as conflicts in self-

constitution.

Such a reading assumes that the self is not a

coherent unity, but that any self that is presented on

a

conscious level is subverted by the unconscious in a way that

threatens its very existence.
By attempting to articulate fusion-experiences and a

female position that does enable subjectivity,

delineated
then,

a

a text

I

have

position that contradicts the male one.

If,

attempts to speak from both positions, it is

bound to run into problems.

It will seem

contradictory and
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irrational" from the perspective of "correct," i.e., male,
theorizing.

Fusion-experiences have been relegated to the

unconscious and woman in order to preserve order.

Through

the building up of Symbolic meaning in a social context

individual experience is given meaning and selves are formed
that can take effective action.

If too much of the concrete

experiences that evade such meaning structures at any one
time were not filtered out via the unconscious, chaos would
ensue.

To lose these experiences on the other hand would

impoverish life, leaving us only abstract categories with
nothing to fill them.

Fusion-experiences proved

a

means for

releasing some of this unconscious meaning into conscious

meaning structures.
law,

Women, being less attached to paternal

are more apt to enjoy these fusion-experiences that tend

to subvert the Symbolic order.

The male position involves denying fusion-experience--

even though it was through such experience that their

primordial selves were formed

— and

instead takes flight into

the Symbolic through the repetition of self in transposition

that rigidly avoids fusion.

Fusion-experiences have to be

denied due to the male fallacy that they are self-suf f icient-the phallic whole that is desired by woman because he is

whole while she lacks.

If her were to uncover his own lack,

to confront the fact that he isn't the phallus his mother
lacked, and he certainly isn't whole, but in fact is

confronted with lack himself, he would face loss of identity.
He would be threatened with mother-engulfment and chaos since
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the male position involves assuming that the seif he had with
the mother is his own self

(which illusion he maintains in

repetition of the self /other dialectic)
lack,

.

Women who know they

are less threatened by the notion that they are only

whole selves in relation to others, that it is in

connectedness that they are whole.
An impasse between the two kinds of self-strategies can
be shown in the symptoms of a text that speak to what can't

actually be said due to the limitations presented by gender
categories.

Aspects of the text can speak from the female

position, thus pushing against the confines of the male

position, only to cave in at certain pressure points.

Looking at the text's version of 'woman' and the 'other'
gives some idea of just how much in the way of fusion-

experience the subject signified in the text has relegated to
the other.

One of the "lures," of the me is 'woman'

— not

women themselves, but the various ways that women are
perceived.

Lacanian theory gives us a way of understanding

how talk about the other can be revealing of ourselves and
our strategies of self-constitut ion--the repetition of

identity fixations that we use to maintain our self-identity.
What philosophers say about women can be shown to be more

indicative of their own intrasub jective experience than any
real truth about women.

Woman as other, then, is

a

particularly interesting category for understanding how these
men constitute themselves

— the

fixations that they repeat,

and the aggression that any threat to these fixations
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unleashes

.

This in turn can allow us to analyze what these

fixations are trying to veil— the truth that an analysis of
the gaps in the text can reveal.

constituted by

a

Thus,

if the identity

text pushes against the boundaries of the

male position, the extent and content of that pushing will be

limited by the particular version of 'woman'

(which according

to Lacanian theory and Irigaray is an unspecified category

from the male position that takes the form of male fantasy)

which the text represents.
In the next chapter

I

will explore this interpretative

strategy with examples from the work of three male

philosophers who take up different versions of
strategy

.

a

male self-

NOTES
[1] Although I think psychoanalysis and Lacanian theory
has explanatory force for patriarchal, capitalist societies
in the Western tradition I will not make "universalizing"
claims about its explanatory force for two reasons: 1) I want
to avoid imposing my story about the self upon individuals
who don't feel it speaks to their experience, in keeping with
the feminist sensitivity to experiences that may be alien to
one's own (see chapter one, section 1.5) and 2) I think any
story about gender is subject to continual change and
revision over time since gender categories are social
constructions rather than categories based on essential
differences between men and women.
.

[2] In addition to Freud's depiction of the male path to
selfhood as the norm (see my discussion of Irigaray's
critique of this view in section 3.2), women have been and
still are denigrated for being less "developed" than men.
There is a long tradition of this kind of denigration in
philosophical literature (see Osborne 1979, Mahawald 1978,
and Okin 1979) as well as in other forms of culture
(literature, popular culture, religious institutions, etc.).
[3] The key works I will be dealing with in the
following expositions of Irigaray and Chodorow will be
Irigaray's Speculum and This Sex Which I Not One (Irigaray
1985a; 1985b) and Chodorow' s The Reproduction of Mothering

(1978)

.

[4] "Disguised as reflections on the general conditions
of man's Being, the philosopher's thinking depends for its
effect on its specularity (its self-ref lexivity)
that which
exceeds this reflective circularity is that which is
unthinkable
It is this kind of specul (ariz at ion Irigaray
has in mind when she argues that Western philosophical
discourse is incapable of representing femininity/woman as
other than as the negative of its own reflection." Toril Moi
on Irigaray (Moi 1985, 132)
;

)

.

"...for women the level of what is ethically normal
Their super-ego is
is in men.
never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its
emotional origins as we require it to be in men." From "Some
Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction
I will discuss
Between the Sexes" (Freud 1963, 193)
Irigaray's critique of this bias in Freud's thought in
sect ion 3.2.
[5]

is different from what it

—

I" and Rose's
See Mitchell's "Introduction
"Introduction II" in Mitchell and Rose (1985), as well as
the essays by Lacan on feminine sexuality that are gathered
in this book.
[6]

—
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[7] See, for example, Mitchell and Rose (1985) and
Ragland-Sullivan (1986, chapter five)
.

[8] Also, see gallop (1982, 22)
"So the man is
'castrated' by not being total, just as the women is
'castrated' by not being a man.
Whatever relation of lack
feels, lack of wholeness, lack in/of being, is projected
onto woman's lack of phallus, lack of maleness. Woman is
then the figuration of phallic 'lack'; she is a hole."
:

[9] In the following discussion the male position is
derived from the exposition of Lacan given in chapter two and
the female position is derived from my earlier discussions of
Lacan as well as discussions of 'woman' in Lacan from the
following sources: Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986, chapter 10),
Freeland (1986), Gallop (1982), Lacan (1975), Mitchell and
Rose (1985), and Ragland-Sullivan (1986, chapter 5).

[10] "There is no such thing as the woman since her
essence ... she is not all" (Mitchell and Rose 1985, 144).
Also see Ragland-Sullivan (1986, 297), Gallop (1982, 23) and
Irigaray's "Any Theory of the "Subject" Has Always Been
Appropriated by the "masculine"" (1985a, 133-146)
[11] Benvenuto and Kennedy make the following comment on
Lacan's notion of woman's iouissance (enjoyment): "She has a
surplus of enjoyment which cannot be integrated into
language, unless it is placed under a prohibition, such as
Might the woman, who after all does
the law of castration.
not risk much when faced by the threat of castration..., be
partly exempt from the pursuance of this law?" Also see
Freeland (1986) on this point. We will find that Irigaray
picks up this notion of female pleasure in positing a logic
different from the male "logic of the same" (see section

3.2).
[12] According to gallop (1982, 43) Stephen Heath starts
his article (Heath 1978/79) "by informing us that Encore
Lacan's 1972/73 seminar (is) devoted to "what Freud expressly
left aside, the Was will das Weib ? the What does woman
want?"'" Of course, to devote a seminar to this question
implies that Lacan thinks he knows the answer to this, but
strangely enough, he's not interested in encouraging women
themselves to speak on the subject. For more on this point
see Freeland (1986)
'

.

Cynthia Freeland, in "Woman: Revealed Or Reveiled?"
criticizes Lacan for holding a romantic view of woman and
comments that "Lacan leads the way not to women who voice
their heart but to women who embrace their inability to do
so, rejoicing in their own mysteriousness" (1986, 69)
[13]
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[14] For more on women as objects of exchange, see
Irigaray's "Women on the Market" (1985b, 170-191).
[15] In addition to Irigaray's Soecnl nm (1985a), also
see "The Power of Discourse" (Irigaray 1985b, 68-85)
Also
see Toril Moi s discussion of these concepts (Moi 1985, 131.

'

143)

.

See Speculum (Irigaray 1985a) passim, and "Cosi Fan
(Irigaray 1985b, 86-105)

[16]

Tutti"

[17] See "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination
of the Feminine" and "The "Mechanics" of Fluids," both in
Irigaray (1985b), as well as "Any Theory of the "Subject" Has
Always Been Appropriated by the "Masculine"" in Irigaray
(1985a)
.

[18] "Woman "touches herself" all the time, and moreover
no one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are formed
of two lips in continuous contact.
Thus, within herself, she
is already two--but not divisible into one(s)
that caress
each other." From "This Sex Which Is Not One" (Irigaray
1985b, 24)

—

.

[19] See my exposition of Harding's account of feminist
gender theory in section 1.4 for a reiteration of this point.
[20] "I can thus speak intelligently as sexualized male
(whether I recognize this or not) or as asexualized.
Otherwise, I shall succumb to the illogicality that is
proverbially attributed to women. All the statements I make
are thus either borrowed from a model that leaves my sex
aside--implying a continuous discrepancy between the
presuppositions of my enunciation and my utterances, and
signifying furthermore that, mimicking what does not
correspond to my own "idea" or "model" (which moreover I
don't even have), I must be quite inferior to someone who has
ideas or models on his own account or else my utterances are
In that case
unintelligible according to the code in force.
they are likely to be labeled abnormal, even pathological."

—

[21]

See footnote

[10]

of chapter two.

CHAPTER

4

SELF-CONSTITUTING ACTIVITY IN PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS:
THREE EXAMPLES
4

.

1

Introduction

According to one common sense approach to the nature of
the self,

I

am a unique individual with

and unified world-view that
as incoming "facts" require.

I

relatively coherent

a

continually refine and correct
Thus,

I

might think as a child

of five that it's the car rather than the driver who knows

how to get to where we want to go, but

I

learn by the age of

ten that if the driver doesn't know the directions we'll get
I'm the same individual at ten that

lost.
I

know more about myself and the world

I

I

was at five, but

live in.

This view of the self posits me as a substance whose

attributes, such as bodily appearance and items of knowledge,

may change over time, but who endures from the moment of my

birth (or some arguable point in time in the womb) to my
As a child

death.

which

I

I

have relatively primitive categories in

arrange the incoming data provided by my senses

These categories become more refined (allowing

a

more nuanced

break-down of data) and more sophisticated (with respect to

cross-referencing of data) as one becomes older.

At five,

cars are in the same category of animate objects as cats and

dogs and human beings; at ten, they've been moved into the

category of inanimate objects manipulated by people.

This

view of the self assumes that my knowledge of the world will

build in

a

systematically meaningful way--that a subject who
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endures throughout time will orient herself with respect to
the world which is the object of her knowledge and desire.

One feature of existentialist philosophy is an emphasis
on concrete lived experience as opposed to the abstract

categories in which we organize and generalize our particular
experiences.

On this view the self as an enduring substance

is cast into doubt

category

I

— my

self is no more than an abstract

use to organize the whole range of experiences

that seem to belong to me.

The concrete particularity of

experience that can't be contained within our categories
becomes threatening since it implies that there's always an
excess, as supplementarity, of existence that we can't

account for.
ourselves,

If there is no enduring substratum to

if we're no more than the series of concrete

experiences located in a body that continually changes, then
who are we?

What kind of stability and coherence do we have?

What kind of meaningful action can we take?
In the face of a growing awareness that we don't have

the immediate access to either the world or ourselves that we

thought, philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and

Sartre struggled with the question of who we are and what

makes our lives meaningful.

With the emphasis of the

concrete particular over the abstract came an emphasis on the
self as action,

rather than a self whose actions are mere

attributes of an enduring substratum.

The self came to be

seen more as an on-going process than as a thing that
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processes.

As such it was less clear where the self ended

and the world began

Where does the self end and the world begin if the

abstract category of 'self' is no more than
invent?

a

construct we

How do we distinguish a subject that is a process

rather than an entity out of the flux of experience?

Instead

of a fixed subject processing input, we are faced with the

prospect of a self that is no more than

a

continuous stream

of sensation on the verge of melting into a vast sea of

sensations

—a

subject without background, with no means for

distinguishing her own outline in
sensations.

a

chaos of bodily

In such a chaos there can be no inner or outer,

the ability to reflect upon a stable image that provides one
a

centering point is lost, and subjectivity is swallowed in

a

ceaseless flood of sensation that is neither controlled nor

directed
The old dichotomies of sub ject/ob ject and self/other are

thus brought into question.

In the texts of these

existential philosophers a new kind of subjectivity struggles
to emerge--a subjectivity that sees itself as the creative

process of constituting a self from a superabundance of
sensation; a self that is always in question, always

contingent, always on the verge of disintegration;

a self

that cannot be taken as a given but which must be continually
chosen; a self that must be held accountable for the choices
it makes

in choosing itself.

articulate

a

But in the struggle to

new kind of subjectivity that leaves behind the
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category of substance in order to affirm itself as

continually becoming, old categories are used as landmarks.
To stabilize a self that might otherwise be threatened with

complete extinction, thus rendering human agency impossible,
each of these philosophers ends up reaffirming the very
s ub

j

e c t / ob j e c t

dichotomy that he had been in the process of

undermining
In the last two chapters

I

have developed the notion

that there are two, gender-linked strategies that take two

different approaches to the problem of how to organize self
and a world out of a chaotic range of sensations.

I

suggested that one strategy made the abstract categories of

a

socially sanctioned Symbolic order primary, while the other
strategy made the pleasure of connectedness with an embodied
other primary.

i

suggested that in

culture where

a

psychoanalytic theory has explanatory force, the former
strategy could be characterized as "masculine" and the latter
strategy could be characterized as "feminine."

My

[1]

characterizations of the two strategies have drawn upon the
Hegelian idealist tradition as well as

a

psychoanalytic

theory (i.e., Lacan's) and feminist theories that make use of
that tradition.

Whether these characterizations apply

equally well in all situations for all philosophical

traditions is

a

question that

I

leave open.

What

I

want to

explore in this chapter is whether or not the theory of

gender-linked self-strategies that

I

have thus far developed

could be brought to bear in an interesting way on
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philosophical texts also based in the Hegelian tradition.
Attempts to subvert abstract categories in favor of a

connectedness that defies self /other dichotomies could thus
be read as attempts to more fully incorporate a feminine
ss 1 — s t rat egy into one's theorizing,

while reversions to

self /other dichotomies could be read as the effects of a

masculine self-strategy.
I

have thus far given

a

polarized version of the

difference in two gender-linked, self-constituting
strategies.

Due to the correlat ivity of self and world

argued for in chapter one, groups of people with

fundamentally differing self-strategies will live in
different worlds

— that

is,

they will have a different

perspective with their own epistemological standpoint.

Thus,

self-constituting activity is also world-constituting
activity.

In addition to grounding the emergence of

differing self-strategies in the child-rearing practices of
Western society, psychoanalytic theory opens up the

possibility that we all have both self-strategies available
to us.

Since masculine identity is the "norm" for full-

fledged personhood in Western society,

it

self-strategy that is culturally devalued.

is the feminine

We have seen,

in

chapter three, how this cultural devalorization and the

masculine need to repress the primordial self of motherfusion encourages repression of possibilities for

kind of self-strategy.

a

different

Self /world-constituting activity

continually strives to make sense of

a

chaotic array of
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sensations and symbolic input.

For the theorist who attempts

to enlarge his perspective to include as wide a range of his

lived experience as possible, it is likely that the

alternative,
play,

feminine" self —strategy will be brought into

and that this alternative self-strategy will create

problems for his masculine identity.
In the last two chapters

feminine self-strategies.

I

have delineated masculine and

In this chapter

I

will give

examples of male and female positions from which
speak.

a text

can

That is, taking the production of theory as a self-

constituting activity as well as

a

meaning-reproducing

activity, we can say that the "voice" of a text is situating

itself with respect to a whole network of social positions.
In the last chapter

I

characterized what such positioning

might mean when it comes to gender.

Having characterized

"masculine" and "feminine" self-strategies that position one
as male or female in the social hierarchy of positions

(Lacan's Symbolic order), we can give a philosophical text a
By "gender-sensitive"

gender-sensitive reading.

I

mean a

reading that will highlight how gender categories inform both
the position from which the text speaks

speaking

'I'

of the text puts forth)

(the self the

as well as the

theoretical perspective the text presents.

Given my

assumption, taken from Lacanian theory, that any speaker of

language is "decentered,

"

position from which the

'I'

I

assume that there is no one
of the text speaks,

and that the

text will manifest "symptoms" that speak to conflicts in
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positioning.

"Symptoms"— gaps, contradictions, puzzles— of

the text can be read as a conflict between the position from

which the

'I'

attempts to speak and unconscious forces that

undermine or subvert that position.

We should be able to

resolve some of the puzzles these symptoms present— i

explain their presence in the text

— by

.

e

.

analyzing the gender

categories put forth by the text, and by examining the puzzle
in light of a conflict between two kinds of self-strategies.

The kind of reading

"deconstructive"

[2]

I

am proposing here is

in the sense that it focuses on gaps and

contradictions in the text rather than assuming textual
integrity and explaining away contradictions as mere

aberrations in what is presumed to be

a

coherent whole.

It

is not deconstructive in the sense that it attempts to

explain those contradictions via
I

a

coherent theory.

That is,

want to explain the "symptoms" of a text in a way that will

render them intelligible via

author himself lacked.

Thus,

a

theoretical framework that the
rather than proliferating the

possible meanings of the text into infinity with no way of

valuing one interpretation over another,

I

want to interpret

symptoms of the text in light of the broader project of

understanding how gender informs our identities and our
perspectives as theorists.
On the view being put forth in this dissertation,

writing theory is both a self-constituting as well as

meaning-producing activity.

a

In addition to communicating

meaningful content to the reader,

a

text tells the story of

a
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subject in communication with him or herself.
that

I

Both positions

outline here are positions taken up by the text with

respect to the other (the reader) and the Other (the site of

representations of lived experience not incorporated into the
conscious self— system)

.

We can trace the strategy a subject

utilizes in positioning him or herself with respect to the
reader as well as with respect to his or her unconscious by

examining the text that that subject has produced.
positions

The two

delineate here are related to polarized versions

I

of two self-strategies that

I

have argued are gender-linked

at least in social contexts where psychoanalytic theory can

be said to have explanatory force.

Generally speaking, our examination of these two selfstrategies has led us to the following schematic rendering of
the two positions:

"Male"

:

The speaking

'I'

or grammatical subject of the

text is positioning itself in keeping with two constraints.
On the one hand what is articulated needs to make sense

according to socially sanctioned codes.

On the other,

a self

with some sort of continuity needs to be continually
reconstituted.
two,

On the Lacanian view discussed in chapter

this means that in addition to stringing together words

in a way that will have some significance to other members of

the speaking community, the

'I'

is motivated by the

retain self-continuity and self-coherence.
'me'

'me'

to

The primordial

is the ego originally precipitated out of identification

with one's primary caretaker.

A male self-strategy maintains
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continuity with this ego by seeking objects that will
confirm
his self by repeating past self-other patterns.
'me'

is looking for the lost

that is, the

"objet a" that is associated

with the lost mother of mother-fusion.

Through a complicated

series of substitutions this lost object of primordial fusion

with another has been translated via cultural codes into
objects of current desire.
The child originally learned to compensate for the loss
of mother-fusion by using symbols to fill in for that loss,

and by coming to desire the desire of the other.

The boy,

being of the sex that is not castrated, had, or rather would
inherit, what the mother wants

signifier of desire.

— the

He can be,

phallus, primordial

or hope to one day be, that

which doesn't lack, and therefore that which can fill in his

mother's lack.

The gaze of the other is the gaze that

desires him, the gaze that confirms him as self-sufficient
and whole.

As upholder of the paternal law,

he is entitled

to cultural substitutes for the lost mother,

the other that

originally reflected him back to himself.

To maintain self-

continuity he will find cultural substitutes that will
reflect back
fusion.

a

self in keeping with the self of mother-

This means that the speaking

'I'

will always be

positioning itself with respect to an other that will provide
the 'me' with the kind of recognition that it craves, the

other that will confirm the same self by repeating

self-other pattern.

Such

a

a

past

self-strategy assumes that the

self is self-suf f icient--if it weren't,

it couldn't be what
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the mother desired.

This self, being self-sufficient, must

deny any dependence on the other and posit the other's gaze
as only affirming what is already there

sufficient self.

— the

same,

self-

For this strategy to work, objects of

desire must conform to the other of the subject's self-other
pattern.

This positioning of self with respect to an other

may take many different forms via complicated translation in

keeping with Symbolic codes, but the 'me' will strive to

maintain the same relationship between self and other.
From this position there is reverence for and rigid
adherence to what Lacan calls the Symbolic order

— socially

accepted categories that generalize and universalize
experience.

The motivating force of the self-strategy

associated with this position is the desire to repeat
self/other positioning.

Here,

one seeks to position oneself

with respect to an other within socially sanctioned codes in
a

way that retains associations with the self formed in
That is, one seeks cultural substitutes for

mother-fusion.

the other originally played by mother that are sanctioned by

paternal law within the Symbolic order.

The speaking 'I' of

the text will position itself with respect to others

explicitly or implicitly referred to in the text, to the
reader as other, and to the subject's own Other

— the

All such positioning will abide by pre-

unconscious.

established categories of the Symbolic order.
"Female”

:

Since the girl is already castrated and

therefore doesn't have the same need to deny dependence on
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another,

she has a different self-strategy open to her.

Her

relationship to her primordial self assumes that it took two
to make the pleasure of mother-fusion possible.

Since the

paternal law doesn't guarantee her objects to fill in for the
lost mother in the same way it does for a boy,

toward another kind of compensation.

she tends

Instead of needing to

affirm the same self by finding an other to reflect back
self that she recognizes,

she seeks to re-experience the

pleasure of mother-fusion.
other and remains in

a

a

She admits her dependence on the

state of receptive responsiveness to

the desire of the other.

Thus,

rather than seeking cultural

substitutions for the lost mother in keeping with Symbolic
codes,

she seeks contact with an other that may require her

to violate both the demands of the 'I' that would produce

meaning in conformance with Symbolic codes, and the

'me'

that

would add the additional constraint of conformance to past

self-other patterning.

From this position there is a relative lack of regard
for the Symbolic order.

The socially sanctioned categories

which encode experience are subverted, if need be, in
deference to

spontaneous response to the specificity of

a

experience that eludes those categories.

The subject

speaking from this position tends to subvert the Symbolic
order

— she

is more concerned with maintaining responsive

attentiveness to the desire of the other than she is with
"making sense"

.

What she attempts to communicate will have

significance to the specific other she addresses, but this
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significance will take the form of shared pleasure with an
other rather than positioning with respect to an other in the

Symbolic order.

The specific others she addresses are the

others explicitly or implicitly mentioned in the text, the
reader as other and the subject

'

s

own Other

— the

unconscious

Rather than repeating past self /other positioning via social

sanctioned categories, the speaking

'I'

will attempt to break

down categories in order to respond to the other's desire to
be recognized/reflected in all his/her specificity.

These characterizations represent two extremes.

To

follow out the effects of gender categories in a particular
text we can examine the specific content the theorist gives
to the category 'woman.'

'Woman,' on the Lacanian view,

an empty category filled in by man.

what he is not,

is

She is man's other,

[3]

she who can affirm his self-sufficiency.

What he projects onto her is often what he feels he himself
cannot be and still be a man.

It can thus give us clues as

to the particular form the gender categories of the text

take

.

The "male" and "female" positions

I

characterized very

generally above will be filled out differently by different
theorists according to their particular gender categories.

Taking the above characterizations as two ends of

a

continuum, each theorist will be able to conceive of a range
of positions in between that will fall under his categories
of "male" or "female."

The two self-strategies

I

have
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described in

a

polarized, mutually exclusive form thus turn

out to have varying degrees of overlap according
to the

gender categories that inform

a text.

That is,

I

have argued

that both self-strategies are available to both male
and

female persons.

How far one can go in conceiving of a man

using what I've called

a

"female" self-strategy or vice

versa, and how far one can go in conceiving the possibility
of & person who makes full use of both self —strategies,

will

hinge on the conceptual barrier posed by one's gender

categories
'woman'

.

How a particular text fills in the category of

can give us a clue as to where that conceptual

barrier for a given text is.

This,

in turn,

can help explain

why the attempt to use two self-strategies in a text ran into

conflict due to the need of the speaking

to maintain a

'I'

masculine identity.
I

have picked a specific text to focus on for each

philosopher to underline the particular way
gender,

I

am linking

identity and the production of meaning.

trying to psychoanalyze the author of the text

blood philosopher who if put on

a

a

— the

am not

flesh and

couch might free-associate

far beyond the confines of a particular text

doing is taking

I

particular text as

a

.

What

I

am

particular attempt on

the part of the flesh and blood philosopher to both create a

self and produce meaning.

It

is thus the particular identity

put forth in the particular production of meaning of a text

that I'm interested in.

And it is how gender affects this

identity and the content of the text that

I

want to examine.
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One could, of course, then correlate the various identities
put forth in the various texts of a given author--do all

those identities speak from the same position? what factors

play into any shifts in position that may occur from text to
text?

— but

for the purposes of this dissertation

will put

I

those problems aside.
For each text
into four parts.

I

look at

I

have broken my analysis down

In the introduction

I

lay out what

the male and female positions of the text
'I'

it

— places

I

see as

where the

of the text is using a masculine self-strategy and where
is using a feminine self-strategy

— according

to the

general characterizations of these two strategies given in
chapters two and three.

This means establishing the

particular philosopher's terminology for what

take to be

I

his version of what Lacan calls the Symbolic order, and the

"feminine" forces that threaten that order.
part,

entitled "The puzzle,

by the text that

I

"

I

In the second

lay out the puzzle presented

want to address.

The puzzle will be some

problem in the text that challenges our notion that the text
was written by a completely unified,

rational subject whose

intentions and motivations were transparent to him.

Rather

than explaining the puzzle away as an aberration in order to

argue for what the author "really" meant to say,

I

will use

the puzzle as an indication of conflict in the position from

which the

'I'

of the text attempts to speak.

In the third part,

entitled "'Woman,'"

I

lay out what

content the text gives to the category 'woman.'

This will
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help us to locate the conceptual barrier presented by the

particular form gender categories take in the text that
prevents the incorporation of the two extreme positions we
^ ave characterized into one.

I

leave it entirely open

whether or not we ever could incorporate the two positions

entirely (thus leading us beyond gender distinctions
entirely?

)

but

,

I

am interested in how far a particular text

goes in using both self-strategies and where use of the

feminine self-strategy is curtailed due to gender categories.
In the fourth part,

entitled "The positions,"

I

make use

of the analysis of the text's category 'woman' to fill out

specific content of the two positions and their selfstrategies according to the particular gender categories of
the text.

I

then explain the puzzle described in the first

part as a conflict in these self-strategies.

The use of a

feminine self-strategy, despite "unconscious" forces that
come out in the symptoms of the text, must be curtailed in

order to maintain a "masculine" 'I'.

Thus,

although this

feminine self-strategy continues to exert effects
symptoms of the text)

(the

it cannot be incorporated into the self

put forth by the speaking 'I.'

I

then make some suggestions

about what kind of self and what kind of theoretical content

might have emerged as

a

solution to the puzzle if the

conceptual barrier presented by the particular gender

categories informing the text had been broken down.
What

I

am trying to get at with this kind of reading is

how our gender categories affect our identities and our
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perspective in the world.

Do philosophical texts espouse

timeless truths that are gender-neutral, or does the presence
of a male-identified voice create certain limitations in

perspective that we can articulate and explore?

Characterizing an alternate self —strategy to the typical
"male" strategy of our traditional views of theory allows us
to release the repressed "feminine" of

a

text.

My contention

is that if we took an alternative approach that valued

contact and fusion rather than translating desire into the
Symbolic, our approach to our own identities and to language

would be different.

This alternative could then be seen as

having a logic of its own just as valid as the male logic.
The following explorations of particular texts written

by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre are not meant as a

definitive response to the question of how gender categories
inform the production of meaning.

They are meant, rather, as

initial forays into possible approaches to philosophical
texts that could take this question into account.

I

am using

these "gender-sensitive" readings as examples of how the
account of self-constitution

I

developed in chapters one, two

and three could be applied in the interpretation of

philosophical texts.

Perhaps the most "radical" claim of my

reading sis that the theoretical content of the text might
had not been

have been different if the speaking

'I'

motivated by the need to maintain

masculine identity.

a

Once

released from the conceptual barrier of the text's gender
categories, further development of a line of thought in the
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text that was unavailable to its author becomes more

apparent.

To highlight this particular perspective,

have

I

chosen to relegate references to pertinent secondary

literature to footnotes

.

I

believe the interpretations

I

give here can be supported and complemented by other

interpretations extant in the literature.
with gender categories, however,
of that literature,

I

Since my concern

is not in keeping with most

will restrict the main body of my text

to clarifying the kinds of questions and insights a gender-

sensitive perspective might elicit.

4

.

2

Kierkegaard: FEAR AND TREMBLTNC4

Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship is particularly

interesting in light of my project.

In taking on various

authorial personae Kierkegaard tries on, and discards,
various positions in the spectrum of male positions.

In

doing so he is underlining the active positing that goes on
in taking up any position.

In the leap that can come only

from a personal decision made in the concrete setting of

particular situation, one takes up

a

a

position in the

aesthetic, ethical or religious spheres.

[4]

Kierkegaard

does not refer to this positioning with respect to gender

categories.

But by looking at one of the personae he takes

on in light of our discussion,

we can relate his positioning

with respect to his spheres of human existence to our

positioning with respect to the extremes of the male and
female positions.

[5]
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In what follows

I

will place Johannes de Silentio, the

pseudonymous author of Fear an d Trembling (Kierkegaard
1983)
in the spectrum of male positions.

I

will look at his

position as a rendering of a male position pushing against
the gender barrier.

Although the whole question of the

relationship of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works to himself
is an interesting one

[6]

I

am here interested in what

I

will take to be an exploration of a possibility in male

positioning
Silentio'

s

perspective in Fear and Trembling is that of

an ethical man with enough understanding of the religious

sphere to attempt to articulate its perspective.

[7]

He is

thus striving to articulate a perspective that he knows is

beyond his own.

The exact nature of the relationship between

the perspectives of the ethical and religious spheres is

debated in the literature on Kierkegaard, but it is generally
agreed that Kierkegaard considered the religious perspective
more "advanced" than the perspective of the aesthete or the

ethicist

.

To approach this perspective beyond his own

Silentio makes use of two terms that we can correlate to our

polarized schema of male and female positions.
is the

First, there

"universal"--the universal, socially accepted

categories that encode values and communicate experience in

a

way that is readily understood by other members of society.
[8]

This term can be correlated to Lacan's symbolic order—

both concern socially accepted categories of thought to which

members of the society must defer in order to position
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themselves with respect to others.
Silentio,

The ethical realm,

for

is the realm in which one situates oneself with

respect to others in regard both to one's ethical

responsibility and to one's production of meaning.

[9]

This

can be compared to Lacan's use of the term "Symbolic order"
to refer both to a hierarchy of social positions that involve

taking up certain responsibilities to others who occupy other
positions in that hierarchy, as well as to the order of
language and the communication of experience.
Second, there is the "paradox of faith"

[10]

—a

movement of

faith that takes one out of the ethical sphere into

a

religious realm where the categories of the universal can be

suspended due to the demands of faith.
taking up what

I

call a female position.

This constitutes
That is, the person

in this position will defy Symbolic categories in the

concrete context of a relationship with another.

This

paradox can take one not only beyond the duties encoded in
the universal, but can take one beyond language itself as

socially acceptable categories become inadequate for

expressing the experience of the religious person in this
paradox.

We can correlate this terminology to "feminine"

forces that defer to concrete relationships and experiences
that cannot be captured in the general categories of

language

Silentio himself, of course, does not qualify these
terms with adjectives like masculine or feminine.

What

I

hope to show in the following pages is that correlating his
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terminology with two gender-linked self-st rategies in this
way

light of an examination of his category of 'woman'

will help us resolve a puzzle in this text in an interesting
way

The pyzzle:

In Fear and Trembling Silentio discusses the

paradox of faith in the context of the story of Abraham and
Isaac.

In this story God commands Abraham to sacrifice his

only son.

Abraham proceeds to do

God at the last moment.

[11]

so,

only to be reprieved by

While most accounts of the

story emphasize Abraham's willingness to obey God's

incomprehensible demand [12], Silentio emphasizes the double
movement of Abraham's faith.

Not only does he resign himself

to Isaac's death in obeying God, but "by virtue of the

absurd" he never stops believing that God will keep his

promise of making him the father of nations through Isaac.
Silentio repeatedly says that Abraham's movement of
faith is beyond him:

"I

cannot make the movement of faith,

I

cannot shut my eyes and plunge confidently into the absurd"
(p.

34).

He can only marvel at Abraham's greatness without

making the movement himself.

To help us,

his readers,

do the

work of understanding just how great Abraham was, he presents
some poetic sketches in the Preliminary Expectoration and in

Problema III that intimate the incomprehensibility of

Abraham's faith.
to Abraham.

None of the stories are meant as analogies

They are told "only in order that in their

moment of deviation they could, as it were, indicate the
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boundary of the unknown territory"

(p.

112)

.

In these

sketches Silentio explores the difficulties of relationships
that would take one beyond the universal of the ethical
realm.

The single individual has the ethical task of

annulling his singularity in order to express himself in the
universal that applies to everyone

(p.

54)

Asserting

himself in his singularity before the universal is

a sin.

The impulse to do so puts the individual into a spiritual

trial "from which he can work himself only by repentantly

surrendering as the single individual in the universal"
54)

.

(p.

In each sketch a lover feels the impulse to defy the

universal due to

a

relationship with

a

loved one.

[13]

Why is it that Silentio digresses in order to give

a

series of sketches of unconsummated male/female relationships

before returning to his discussion of Abraham's God-

relationship?

One could respond that the comparison of love-

relationships and God-relationships is

a

"natural" one due to

its history in the Christian tradition and due to the deeply

personal nature of such relationships.

But in the context of

my concern with the importance of the other to self-

constituting activity, Silentio'

s

use of these sketches to

intimate Abraham's faith bears further attention.

First,

there is the series of self/other, lover/beloved

relationships that Silentio abandons one by one with no
solution.

A God-relationship is the only one with a solution

to the problem of connection— even if Silentio still despairs
of understanding how such a connection was effected.

In his
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struggle to understand a position (i.e., the religious one)

beyond his own, he struggles to understand positions vis
vis embodied others that are also beyond him.

a

What kind of

struggle with respect to his own self/other positioning is

Silentio engaged in here, and why is it only in the context
of 3 God - re lat ionship that he can articulate the successful

connection of a self (i.e., Abraham) with an other (i.e.,
God)

?

Silentio,

in his insistence on the lack of analogy

between these sketches and the story of Abraham, wants to put
the God-relationship in a class by itself

context of a God-relationship that

ethical is justified.

But- the

— it

is only in the

suspension of the

a

puzzle of why Silentio chose

these particular sketches to help us understand Abraham,
remains.

I

will argue that Silentio

's

reading of gender

categories makes it problematic for him to conceive of taking
up the feminine position with respect to anyone except God.

On the one hand, he wants to move away from the masculine

position of appealing to fixed categories as the ultimate
justification for meaning and action.

On the other hand, he

cannot allow the chaos that would result if those categories
were permitted to crumble.

He is thus caught in the dilemma

He does this

of wanting to maintain both positions at once.

by maintaining a masculine position with respect to other

human beings, and positing the possibility of

position with respect to God.

a

feminine

If his gender categories had

not prevented him from doing so,

the kind of connectedness he
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posits in

a

God-relationship could have been posited in

connectedness with other human beings as well.
connectedness,

in turn,

This kind of

could allow new meaning to be

translated into the universal that could result in social
change
In the rest of this section

I

will present five sketches

from the Preliminary Expectoration and Problema III with the

following questions in mind: When does Silentio feel that the
impulse to assert singularity against the universal is

justified? and How do the male/female relationships he looks
at relate to Abraham's relationship to God?

The situation of the sketch in the Preliminary

Expectoration is as follows:
A young lad falls in love with a princess, and this
love is the entire substance of his life, and yet
the relation is such that it cannot possible be
realized, cannot possibly be translated from
ideality into reality, (p. 41)

Silentio doesn't say why the relation can't be realized.

He

only says that upon examining the conditions of his life, the

thoughts the lad convenes and scatters come back and "explain
that it is an impossibility"

(p.42).

The lad is thus

presented with the dilemma of desiring something his rational
understanding tells him he cannot have.

[14]

Not being a

"frog of the swamp" he doesn't merely give up his love, but

undertakes the movement of infinite resignation.
In this movement he concentrates "the whole substance of

his life and meaning of actuality into one single desire"
(p.42)

.

This focuses him so that his soul isn't dissipated
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into multiplicity.

[15]

He will recollect his love in pain,

but his infinite resignation will reconcile him with

existence

:

His love for that princess would become for him the
expression of an eternal love, would assume a
religious character, would be transfigured into a
love of the eternal being ... (p 43)
.

.

Although his desire is denied fulfillment in actuality, the
knight of infinite resignation makes consummation possible by

expressing it spiritually.

Thus, the "desire that would lead

him out into actuality but has been stranded on impossibility
is now turned inward"

(p.44)

.

From this point onward it no

longer matters what the princess actually does, although if
she too chooses to become a knight of infinite resignation

these "two will in all eternity be compatible" despite the
failure to actually consummate their relationship.

[16]

If the lad were to make the double movement of the

knight of faith, he would make the additional movement of

affirming that he would get the princess by virtue of the
The absurd lies beyond the proper domain of the

absurd.

understanding.

It defies human comprehension:

can perceive that it takes strength and energy
and spiritual freedom to make the infinite movement
of resignation; I can also perceive that it can be
The next amazes me, my brain reels, for,
done.
having
made the movement of resignation, then
after
of
the absurd to get everything, to get
virtue
by
one's desire totally and completely--that is over
and beyond human powers, that is a marvel, (pp.47So

I

48)

Silentio presents this sketch to give

a

concrete example

of the difference between the knight of infinite resignation
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and the knight of faith.
follow,

The movement of the former he can

it is the movements of the latter that bring us to

the border of the unknown.

The lad of the sketch loves a

princess that he cannot have.

He feels the impulse to defy

the universal since it thwarts his desire.

Having the

spiritual strength of a knight of infinite resignation,
however, he submits his singularity to the universal and

renounces his love, only to give it expression in spiritual
inwardness.

Thus, he converts action that would defy the

universal into spiritual expression that leaves the universal

untouched
is only once this movement involving submission of

It

the individual to the universal is made, that the further

movement of faith could justify the suspension of the ethical
that would allow actual consummation of the relationship.
But since such a movement defies rational understanding or

any attempt to communicate its justification in words,

Silentio can only marvel at the possibility.

The knight of

infinite resignation demonstrates his spiritual power by

refusing to give up his love at the same time that he adheres
to his ethical task of remaining within the universal.

In

exercising this power he has, however, gone beyond the
ethical by developing a spiritual inwardness that allows him
to maintain the love denied him by the universal.

Thus,

his

love for another has led him to assert his singularity by

taking

a

first step in achieving a relationship with the

absolute that is higher than the ethical.

It

is no until he
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can make the movement of faith that the lad is able
to

translate his impulse into the universal by marrying the
princess, despite the fact that according to his rational

understanding such

a

union is forbidden

This relationship of the knight of faith to the princess
int imates Abraham's relationship to God.

Just as the lad

manages to translate his love for the princess into actuality
by virtue of the absurd, so does Abraham translate his love
for God by believing God will keep his promise.

Both put the

relationship with another above the universal, believing that
the connection with the other would be consummated despite
all rational evidence to the contrary.

It is in the context

of this relationship that they assert the singularity of

their experience against the universal that mediates

individual existence in society.

Silentio grants that if the

lad were a knight of faith, he could have the princess in

actuality, but he can't himself conceive such a happy ending.
We will see in the four sketches of Problems III that he

continues to explore the assertion of singularity against the

universal within the context of male/female relationships.
He will increasingly emphasize the difficulty of determining

when one is justified in consummating

a

relationship that

brings one in conflict with the universal.

In the first

ideal case of the Preliminary Expectoration, Silentio assumes
for the purposes of illustration that the knights described

actually make the movements of infinite resignation and faith
that justify asserting singularity to varying degrees.

In
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the sketches

I

will now explore, the individual's

justification will be more problematic.
In the first sketch of Problema III:

The bridegroom, to whom the augurs prophesied a
calamity that would have its origin in his
marriage, suddenly changes his plans at the crucial
moment when he comes to get his bride
(p 8 9)
.

The bridegroom must decide what to do.

.

.

.

To remain silent and

get married would be an offense to the girl since she would

never assent to an alliance that would cause him harm.

To

remain silent and not get married would also be an offense

against the girl.

Ethics demands disclosure of the

individual; it therefore demands that he speak.

[17]

If the

pronouncement of the augurs was public property he could
speak because the suspension of his commitment to the girl

would be superceded by a higher ethics

.

Everyone would be

able to understand that the consummation of their

relationship had to be viewed in light of the higher ethical
consideration of a divine sign.
would be to place himself as

a

To be silent in such a case

single individual higher than

the universal, and so to forsake the individual's ethical

task to "work himself out of his hiddenness and to become

disclosed in the universal" (p.82).
If,

however, the will of heaven had come to his

knowledge privately, then he could not speak.

In being put

into a purely private relation to the will of heaven he would

have been placed as the single individual in an absolute

relation to the absolute (p.93)

Here again we approach the
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unknown territory of the paradox in the context of

male/female relationship.
love for the bride.
on the union.

a

The groom wants to consummate his

The will of heaven would seem to frown

The groom's impulse is to gratify his desire.

This could mean defying the universal (if the information
came through an augur) or it could mean complying with the

universal at the expense of his relation to the absolute

(if

the information was private knowledge)
In the sketch of the lad and the princess the question

was how to make the ethical relative to the absolute.

It was

assumed that both knights had some sort of relationship to
the absolute.

But this relationship could not obviate the

need for a relationship to the ethical.

Justification of

asserting oneself against the universal could come only after
submitting to the universal and making the movement of faith
that put one in an absolute relationship to God.

In this

sketch we have the additional problem of one's ethical

commitments to others.

The groom has already pledged he

would marry the bride.

It

is thus not merely a matter of

consummating his love, but of a promise made to his beloved.
It

would put him outside the universal to break such

a

promise unless there is a higher ethical consideration that
supercedes that promise.

[18]

If,

however,

the information

was private knowledge, then doing his duty to the absolute

places him outside of the universal.

he cannot hope to make

the singularity of his experience understandable, and the

bride will feel wronged.

This gets us closer to Abraham's
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dilemma whose faith put him outside the universal when
God

requested what was, in ethical terms, murder.

Here a

relationship with the absolute puts the groom in conflict
with a relationship that is in the ethical.
In the second sketch,

a

merman sees Agnes standing on

the shore and wants her as booty.

That is, he wants to

seduce her and make her one of his conquests

— "he

cannot give

himself faithfully to any girl, because he is indeed only
merman"

(p.

in her.

He calls to her and elicits what's hidden

95)

She "trusting with all her soul ,... gives herself to

the stronger one"

innocence

a

— the

(p.94).

Because of the power of her

absolute confidence with which she entrusts

her whole destiny to him

— he

is crushed.

her; he can never seduce again.

He cannot seduce

Instead he struggles with

repentance and his desire for Agnes.

Due to his guilt about

having wanted to seduce Agnes a love-relationship with her is
outside of the universal.

Agnes fell in love with him in all

innocence, thinking that he loved her.

Silentio lists some alternatives opened to

over what to do.
him.

[19]

The merman agonizes

He could tear Agnes's love away from her by

1)

belittling her and making her love ludicrous.

He would

remain silent about his anguish at treating her thus with the

assistance of the demonic, putting himself as the single
individual higher than the universal:
The demonic has the same quality as the divine,
namely, that the single individual is able to enter
This is the
into an absolute relation to it
of which
paradox
that
analogy, the counterpart to
we speak
(p 97
.

.

.
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2)

He could return to the universal, becoming a tragic hero

by speaking and crushing Agnes with the knowledge that he

could never make her happy.
(e.g.f

3)

He could remain in hiding

by going into a monastery) and hope that Agnes would

be saved by taking an absolute relation to the divine.
4)

Or,

he could be saved by Agnes, become disclosed and marry

her.

For the last option he would have to have the spiritual

power to make the movement by virtue of the absurd after

having made the infinite movement of repentance (p.99).
Silentio assumes that the lad and the groom share the
desire to carry out the ethical task of translating

themselves into the universal.

[20]

Their dilemma is how to

go about that task and when that task should be suspended in

the interests of an absolute relation to the absolute.

Here Silentio adds the dimension of guilt.

[21]

The merman is

guilty of wanting to seduce an innocent girl and take her
outside the universal

— for

he had no intention of making the

ethical commitment of marriage to her.

Her loving trust that

he is good and will keep them within the bounds of the

universal disarms him.
a

[22]

way to right his wrong.

all innocence.

marriage.

He feels guilt and tries to find

[23]

She fell in love with him in

The ethical way to translate that love is

But marriage means disclosure of his guilt which

could crush her if he doesn't have the spiritual power to
first make the movements of repentance and faith.
The merman comes to realize that his original impulse to

seduce Agnes was wrong.

He repents having wanted to take
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Agnes outside of the universal.

He wants to save her,

though he's not sure he can save himself.
them,

Saving the both of

and in addition consummating their relationship,

to him (and Silentio)

a

miraculous act.

even

Thus,

seems

just as God

moves Abraham to assert his singularity against the universal
in a relation to the absolute,

Agnes moves the merman to

assert his singularity by consummating

universal when he is outside of it.

[24]

a love

within the

Both Abraham and the

merman would defy rational understanding by asserting their

experience of connectedness with another against the
universal that denies comprehensible translation of that
connectedness.

If Abraham were to disclose his singular

experience in the universal he could only say "I'm murdering
my son."

If the merman were to disclose his experience he

could only say "I'm seducing her."

The difference between

the two is that Abraham was originally in the universal and
the merman outside of it.

But both are faced with the

dilemma of when it is justifiable to consummate a
relationship that requires asserting oneself against the
universal
In the third sketch,

The young Tobias wishes to marry Sarah, the
daughter of Raguel and Edna. But his girl has a
tragic background. She has been given to seven
man, all of whom perished in the bridal chamber.
(p

.
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The evil demon who loves Sarah has killed all seven of her

previous bridegrooms on the wedding night
of her own,

.

Due to no fault

Sarah has been "defrauded of the highest
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bliss.
(p

.

.

.

103)

.

unlimited.,

unbounded, uninhibited devotedness"

She has been unable to give herself to a lover and

unable to express herself in connectedness with another in
the universal by getting married (p.106).

Silentio says that although many would say Tobias was
the hero of this story for having the courage to brave the

danger of the evil demon, he thinks Sarah is the hero:
what love for God it takes to be willing to let
oneself be healed when from the very beginning one
in all innocence has been botched.
.What ethical
maturity to take upon oneself the responsibility of
permitting the beloved to do something so
hazardous! What humility before another person!
What faith in God that she would not in the very
next moment hate the man to whom she owed
everything! (p.104)
.

.

Despite the fact that a situation beyond her control has

placed her outside the universal, making it impossible for
her to consummate a relationship, she is still willing to let

herself be "saved"

— to

receive the love of another in all

humility trusting that that love would bring her back within
the bounds of the universal

While Silentio grants this to be a heroic act in

a

woman, he seems to feel that it would be even more

problematic for

a man:

Imagine Sarah to be a man, and the demonic is
The proud, noble nature can
immediately present
bear everything, but one thing it cannot bear--it
In it there is a humiliation
cannot bear sympathy.
that can be inflicted on a person only by a higher
power, for he can never become the object of it by
himself, (p.104)
.

The man who chooses the demonic closes himself up within

himself

Instead of -translating himself into the universal,
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mediating himself into the idea of society
remains silent, hidden, undisclosed.

(p.

106 ), he

He is lost in the

demonic paradox in which he takes an absolute relation
to the
demonic.

People such as Sarah are in the paradox by virtue

of being set outside the universal by nature or
a historical

situation
they are by no means more imperfect than other
people, except that they are either lost in the
demonic paradox or saved in the divine paradox
(p. 106
)

Due to being outside the universal and the difficulties for

translation this poses, they feel the impulse to assert their
singularity by taking a relation to the absolute.

They could

refuse translation, remaining undisclosed to any other

including God, thus losing themselves in the demonic.

They

could also make an infinite movement that maintains their

singularity in spiritual inwardness at the same time that it
submits them to the demands of the universal, and then

through the movement of faith be saved in an absolute
relation to the divine.

In the latter case,

it would be due

to a belief in connectedness with another that defies

rational understanding that they would be brought back within
the universal.

In Sarah's case,

it

is her humble willingness

to receive love from a man despite the knowledge that she is

outside of the universal, that allows her to believe she
could be saved.

Although,

in imagining Sarah as a man,

Silentio seems to be saying that this kind of receptivity to
a

human other is also possible for

a man,

he qualifies this
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with the notion of the demonic.

If Sarah had been a man,

it

is much more likely that he would become demonic and
refuse

to disclose himself.
In Abraham s case,

it

receive love Sarah shows to

is the same humble willingness to
a

man that Abraham shows to God

that allows him to believe God will keep his promise despite
his violation of the universal in murdering his son.

As in

the last sketch, both Abraham and Sarah defy rational

understanding by putting connectedness above the universal.
Again, the difference between the two is that Abraham was

originally in the universal while Sarah was outside of
This time, however,

it.

it is not due to sin but due to

circumstances beyond her control that Sarah is outside the
universal.

Thus,

there is an even closer parallel in the

dilemma faced by both of asserting connectedness above the

universal
In the fourth sketch,

Faust,

Silentio introduces his version of

"the doubter (par excellence)

sympathetic nature"

(p.108)

.

,

but he has a

The security and joy men live

in are not grounded in unreflected bliss rather than the

power of the spirit.

Thus, Faust,

as a doubter,

is able:

to rouse men up horrified, to make the world totter
under their feet, to split men apart, to make the
shriek of alarm sound everywhere (p.109)
But due to his sympathetic nature:
he remains silent... he tries as much as possible to
walk in step with other men, but what goes on
inside himself he consumes and thus brings himself
as a sacrifice to the universal (p.109)
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Because doubt has destroyed Faust's actuality for him,
and because he would rather remain silent in order to

sacrifice himself to the universal than throw everything into
disorder, he does not tell Margaret of the love he feels for

her

Margaret is innocent

.

.

To express his love in the

universal he would have to disclose himself.

This he cannot

do without wreaking havoc with the universal, due to his

doubt.

If he remains silent about his doubt,

ethics condemns

him for evading the task of translating his hiddenness into
the universal.

He can only get authorization for his silence

by becoming the single individual who as the single

individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute.
To do this he must make his doubt into guilt

Here we have a man who is tempted to defy the universal

neither due to sin or to circumstances

.

Faust is in the

throes of an infinite passion that pushes him beyond it.

The

question here is whether or not he can justify expressing his
doubt and thus pushing others beyond the universal as well.
Since the ethical demands disclosure,
speak.

it would seem he must

But if he can make his doubt into guilt and make the

infinite movement that would both maintain his singularity in

spiritual inwardness and submit him to the universal, he

could get authorization for his silence.
Faust's relationship with Margaret is less at issue in
this sketch than the others we've looked at.

But here again,

the question is of connectedness versus the maintainence of
the universal.

Consummation of

a

relationship with another
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would mean disclosure of his doubt.

Such disclosure would

not only put him outside of the universal, but would
put the

other outside of it as well.

Making an infinite movement

would authorize his silence by putting him into an absolute
relation with the absolute, but it would also make

consummation of a relationship with another human being
impossible.

Here again we approach Abraham's dilemma.

Abraham maintained connectedness with God, but at the expense
of his ability to communicate with the human beings closest

to him about what he was doing.

Abraham's God-relationship

justified the suspension of the ethical, but by virtue of the
absurd, by his faith in God, Abraham believed he would be

brought back within the universal.
the ram for Isaac, God did.
the divine can give,

With the substitution of

Without such assurance that only

Silentio seems to imply, it is better to

be silent
In all the sketches

I

have looked at, the lovers have

agonized over how to justify action that puts oneself or
another outside of the universal, the ethical standards that
one can rationally understand as being applicable to all.

Silentio grants the possibility of such justification in only
one case--the context of a God-relationship where one will be

brought back within the universal by virtue of the absurd.
That is,

in humbly receiving love from an often

incomprehensible God, one opens oneself up to possibilities
for being brought back within the universal beyond rational

understanding
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In the following section

I

will briefly comment on the

category of 'woman' that emerges in these sketches.

This

will orient us for a discussion of the male and female

positions of the text laid out in the next section.

IWQmgn
as such,

Silent io makes no general comments about 'woman

:

but by looking at the position of the five women of

the sketches we will be able to establish the parameters for
the conception of 'woman' at work in Fear and Trembling

.

In the sketch of the young lad and the princess woman is

seen as a focusing point.

The lad’s love for the princess

becomes the "substance of his life"

(p.42).

knight of infinite resignation or

knight of faith (as

opposed to

a

slave of the finite)

a
,

If the lad is a

he will "have the power to

concentrate the whole substance of his life and the meaning
of actuality into one single desire"

(p.42)

Thus,

it is

desire for a woman that gives the lad the focus necessary for

making a movement of the infinite that will promote his
spiritual growth.

In the following sketch,

the bride awaits

her groom in maidenly modesty and humility as he agonizes

over whether or not to tell her about the calamity prophesied
by the augurs.

The merman elicits what's hidden in Agnes,

thus enticing her to entrust her whole destiny to him in

absolute confidence (p.94).

Sarah has the humble love for

God that allows her to love the man willing to let her give

herself to him despite the danger presented by the evil
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demon.

Faust views Margaret in "all her adorable innocence"

(p.109)

.

In all the sketches the woman is the focal
point for the

man's agony in deciding whether or not the relationship

should be consummated.

The woman,

in her love for the man,

surrenders herself to his decision.
least more innocent than the man.

She is innocent, or at
He evokes feelings in her,

and she responds without reflection.

She is prepared to

receive the man's love without any agonizing over whether or
not consummation of the relationship is outside the bounds of

the universal.

And she will accept the man's judgment about

such matters without question
her.

— despite

the pain it may cause

The man has full responsibility for making an ethical

judgment about the appropriateness of consummation.

He will

weigh her pain in making his decision, but finally it is up
to him to decide.

Thus,

the 'woman' that emerges from these

five sketches is a woman prepared to give herself absolutely
to the man she loves.

She is also incapable of judging

ethical boundaries and depends on the man to guide her
This may not be

behavior in accordance with the universal.
Silentio's final position on 'woman as such,

'

but we will see

that the degree of responsibility each of the men in the

sketches we've looked at takes in coming to

a

decision about

the relationship, and his unwillingness to share any of that

burden with the woman involved, indicates an inability to
take up a feminine position with any but

a

divine other
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Pqs it iQns

weighty one.

:

For Silentio, the duty marriage presents is

If one is married,

a

one is bound to disclose

oneself to one's wife, and one is also bound to honor the

institution of marriage and the social relations that go with
it as those relations are laid out in the universal.

'Woman'

presumably has an easier time with honoring the commitments
of marriage since she is willing to sacrifice everything in

love for her husband
of her commitment,

— she

lets him determine the parameters

and she trusts that he will set those

parameters according to the universal.

It

is the man's duty

to uphold the universal so that his wife can unfold and

expand within an appropriate space, one in keeping with the
universal.

Thus,

if he is going to go beyond the universal,

he has to do it on his own.

It wouldn't be

fair of him to

subvert her when she was trusting him to evoke responses from
her that were in keeping with social parameters.

Although Silentio recognizes

a

"higher" calling than the

universal, each and every subversion of the social categories
that make it up must find its agonizing justification in the

deep soul-searching of a God-relationship.

In such a God-

relationship, all one's actions are scrutinized to determine

whether one is willfully trying to put the single individual
before the universal.

It

is only if,

after submitting

oneself to the universal, one discovers that one is faced
with an incommunicable ordeal (where the ethical poses the

temptation to subvert one's absolute duty to God) rather than
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spiritual trial (where singularity poses the temptation
to

subvert the ethical), that such a subversion is justified.
To maintain connectedness with God Abraham needed
to

suspend the ethical.

Just as the men in the sketches

discussed earlier were faced with the dilemma of confronting
women they loved with suspension of the ethical, so did God
confront Abraham with suspension of the ethical.

The women

would have subverted the universal in their love of the men
just as Abraham did in his trusting acceptance of God.

The

problem for the men was in whether or not they could ask such
a

thing of their women.

And whether or not they could

receive new parameters themselves by playing the feminine

position with respect to God.
Sarah,

In the sketches of Agnes and

Silentio intimates the possibility that a woman could

save a man,

just as God saved Abraham.

If man could receive

woman the way that Abraham received God, he could, perhaps,
have overcome the dilemma presented to him by the universal.
This intimation is subordinated to the discussion of

relation to the divine, however.
meant as complete analogies.

a

And these stories are not

They only hint at the

difficulty that Abraham faced in accepting new parameters
from God that involved suspension of the ethical.

Thus,

what

Abraham could do with respect to God, the merman, or Sarah
"imagined as a man"

(cf.

p.104), perhaps would have liked to

have done with respect to their women, but couldn't.
is,

they wanted to be able to take up

respect to their women.

a

That

female position with

They wanted to put aside their role
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as maintainer of the ethical,

and subvert the ethical by

allowing the women to play the role of subject to their
other.

Through trusting acceptance of the other, they could

believe that even though the relationship didn't make sense

according to the universal, their desire for connectedness
would be granted by virtue of the absurd.

And she, not being

bound by the universal in the same way as he, would, due to
her love for him, grant him his desire in connectedness

despite the restrictions of the universal encoded in rational

understanding
Silentio's dilemma is that his conception of masculine
identity dictates that 'man' can only play the role of other
to God.

He can't play woman's other since as a man his role

is to play subject,

to make others his other according to the

Law of the Father which he has inherited.
can subvert that Law is God

—a

The only one who

greater father who can reteach

him the Law according to his dictates.

Only to one "higher"

than himself can 'man' subject himself as
only one higher than himself is God.

a

'man',

and the

Silent io can't support

the idea that another human being could provide him with

parameters that would subvert his current conceptual and
ethical categories and provide him with new, more fitting,

categories for the specificity of his experience, because as
a

man his role is keeper of the law.

Silentio expresses his male allegiance to the Symbolic
and his sense of duty towards it,
the ethical.

in his characterization of

One does not subvert the Symbolic wihout cause.

219

And the only cause that can sanction the subversion of the

Symbolic is God the Father above, the creator of the Law.
Thus,

he allows for a way of subverting the Symbolic,

a way

finding categories more in keeping with the specificity of
life, without incurring "disrespect" for the Symbolic,
we will see exemplified in Nietzsche.

that

He grants an

irrational element to life in the form of the commands of
divine father.
God,

But,

in his allegiance to the subjectivity of

he is not willfully creating new values,

playing the other to God's subjectivity.
dutiful son.

a

rather he is

he is playing the

He is obeying God even though in all humility

he doesn't comprehend God's wishes.

He doesn't expect to be

able to understand according to his rational and limited

human understanding.
a

Instead he responds with the same faith

woman shows her man when she takes on the form he gives

her,

conforming to his desire rather than insisting that he

take on the form of her desire.

In that way she is stretched

beyond her own understanding and creates new meaning in her
attempts to understand his desire.
On this reading, the paradox Silentio discusses is the

receptivity of man to another, the taking on of the role of
other by man.

The dilemma of all five sketches is that the

universal in the normal sense of the word cannot be
maintained.

New meaning has to be found.

The relationship

can only be consummated if a new context for it can be

formulated.

In all these sketches there is something that

makes the relationship unacceptable according to the
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standards of the Symbolic.

In all these sketches Silentio

only has contempt for the suggestion that such an anomaly

should render the beloved unlovable.

Instead one is

presented with the paradox of the unsuitability of the lover
according to the parameters of the Symbolic, and the question
of how a solution is to be found to allow the concrete

specificity of the love expression despite the constraints of
the Symbolic that forbid it.

For the relationship to occur

the Symbolic must be subverted.

The question is, when is

such a subversion justified and how must it be carried out?
In all cases

— including

Abraham's

— it

is due to love of

another whose desire is not in keeping with that of the
Symbolic that one is tempted to subversion.
really justified in subverting the Symbolic.

Only Abraham is
The problem of

the others is that they are trying to play God to a woman,

they want to subvert an other to leave the parameters of the

Symbolic behind.

This is not justifiable.

In a human to

human relationship one or the other must play the subject.

And whoever does so must do so in keeping with the Symbolic.
Just as a man would have to forsake his role as maintainer of
the Symbolic to let a woman save him,

so would a man have to

forsake that role to let himself conform to God's desire in
faith.

I

would suggest that it is here that Silentio

believes the analogy between the sketches and Abraham's faith
ends

.

In playing the female role with respect to a human

beloved,

Silentio believes that 'man' would be undermining
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himself as a male.

This is the only way, however, that he

can subvert the Symbolic.

He presents us with the intriguing

suggestion that the only justifiable way to create new values
is

in the context of a relationship where one takes on

another's desire.

But in delineating this way out of

complete conformity to the Symbolic, he has to posit this
feminine position with respect to another as

a

relationship

with one higher than himself, a Father higher than the Law,
one who creates that Law

— God

himself

— before

he will allow

the possibility of man taking on such a role.
Due to his conception of gender categories and his need
to maintain a masculine identity, Silentio has to make the

dissimilarities between the situations of the sketches and
Abraham's situation more striking than they actually are.

Silentio delineates

a

way of subverting the Symbolic within

the context of a love-relationship that would keep the chaos
of complete disruption of all universal categories at bay,

but he limits his insights in keeping with his need to

maintain masculine identity by limiting the possibilities of
such subversion to a God-relationship.

This limitation

destroys the possibility for such subversion within the
context of human relationships that respect the concrete

specificity of connectedness over the categories laid out by
the Symbolic.

It also closes off the

possibility of

translating new aspects of human experience disclosed in
connectedness with human others into the Symbolic.

As long

as one believes one can have one's desire by virtue of the
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absurd only with respect to
the Symbolic is safe.

a

divine other, the status quo of

What is incomprehensible will remain

untranslatable and hence nonsubversive.

It

is only when such

faith is taken with respect to human others that the

possibility emerges for generating new meaning in
connectedness. [25]

4

.

3

Nietzsche; BEYOND GOOD AND

F.VTT,

For Nietzsche, the concepts we use to communicate our

experience and the values by which we live are human
creations imposed upon

ourselves ballast.

a

[26]

chaotic flux in order to give
We can correlate Nietzsche's values

and concepts to Lacan's Symbolic order.

Life in all its

concrete fecundity is a Dionysian chaos that is completely

beyond the generalizing scope of language.

[27]

Here nothing

is like anything else and there is no way of distinguishing

one "thing" from another.

[28]

is only via a system of

It

values and concepts encoded in language that some stability
can be imposed upon this chaos and that one can take on both
an identity and a position vis a vis other things and other

human beings.

Unlike Lacan, Nietzsche emphasizes

a

creative

moment in which the will to power subverts old moralities in

order to create new ones.

[29]

Thus,

structured by language in the way

a

rather than being

Lacanian subject is,

Nietzsche's "free spirit" subverts conventional language in
keeping with his will to power.
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Thus,

we can correlate Nietzsche's notion of the will to

power that would defy the Symbolic order to a feminine selfstrategy that doesn't prioritize the Symbolic.
feminine self —strategy
however,

I

While the

characterized in the last chapter,

sought fusion-experiences

through the fusion of desire

— contact

— Nietzsche's

with an other

notion of the will

to power makes no reference to desire for contact with an

other.

It does make contact with the subtleties of

experience that would defy conventional categories.

In

listening with the "third ear" the "free spirit" attends to
aspects of experience that

a

less noble soul ignores in his

reduction of experience to that which can be communicated to
others.

[30]

The free spirit attempts to capture this

experience in language despite the risk of being

misunderstood by, or incomprehensible to, others.

he thus

puts language at the service of subtle nuances of bodily

sensations and feelings rather than ignoring aspects of his

experience that don't fit into a preconceived world-view:
Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a
given stimulus by reproducing once more an image
that it has produced many times before, instead of
registering what is different and new in an
The latter would require more
impression.
strength, more "morality" (From Beyond Good and
[31]
Evil #192 Nietzsche 1968b, 295)
.

Nietzsche emphasizes

a

creative aspect of human

existence that Lacan tends to overlook, but he cannot finally
account for the creation of new meaning he claims is
possible.

The will to power, being an irrational force,
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cannot of itself impose order.

[32]

if the concepts and

values encoded in language stabilize our identities
and our
world, then the destruction of the old moralities
can only

lead to nihilism.

[33]

And yet, the old moralities were,

according to Nietzsche, human creations.

How could we now go

about creating a new, more life-affirming, morality?

I

will

suggest in what follows that Nietzsche took up a female

position in Beyond—GbQd and Evil in that he refused to give
the Symbolic order the reverence granted it by a more

masculine self-strategy.

But

I

will also suggest that it was

the inability to assert the alternative strategy of seeking

fusion-experience with others that led to his nihilistic
conclusions.

Nietzsche,

like Silentio,

feels the need to

respond to something in experience that pushes one beyond

conventional language.

Part of what characterizes a female

sel f -strategy is the need to respond to nuances in concrete

experience that defy generalization.

Significance is given

to these nuances in the shared pleasure that comes from

satisfying another's desire.

Nietzsche had as much

difficulty as Silentio in taking up a female position with
respect to an embodied other.

Unlike Silentio, however, he

had no recourse to a divine Other.

His attentiveness to

aspects of his experience that eluded categorization thus
lacks the parameters set by an other's desire.

[34]

Although he could talk of attending to nuances of
experience not accounted for in the categories of language,
he could not account for how such nuances could be given
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meaning.

I

will suggest that such new meaning that brings

new aspects of experience into the self one posits as well as
into one's view of the world, can only come about through the

responsiveness of an other.

For new meaning to emerge, one

needs the mirroring response of an other that brings that

meaning into the relational structure of the self.
a self can only exist

in relationship to others,

position with respect to other selves.

That is,

in a

This means that the

self has meaning only with respect to others, and thus that

only those aspects of experience that have some relationship
to others can be incorporated into the subject's sense of
self.

Those aspects of experience that remain unrecognized

and unattended to by others will not be brought into the

subject's sense of self since it will not relate to the

positioning of that subject with respect to others.

Once

such aspects have taken on meaning for others, however, they

also take on meaning for the subject.

Thus,

meaning cannot

be generated in a vacuum since it is the by-product of a

positioning process that determines the subject's place with
respect to the world.

The puzzle

:

In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche wants to

push us past the old morality that would oppose good to evil.
In Nietzsche's revaluation what is normally considered "evil"
is the "free spirit's"

"good."

The Christian ethic of "all

equal before God" and democratic egalitarianism are both

aspects of a slave morality that would reduce everyone to the
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level of the common man and so prevent the evolution of the

human race.

To counter this disease, Nietzsche wants us to

go beyond the old dichotomy that would label anyone who

inspires fear as "evil"

(#260)

.

We need to encourage a new

type to appear, a higher, nobler man who will create

a new,

more life-enhancing, morality:
The noble type of man experiences itself as
determining values;
it is value-creating
In
the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of
power that seeks to overf low,
the consciousness
of wealth that would give and bestow (#260)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

To prepare the way for this higher man, Nietzsche

("ourselves

who are their heralds and precursors, we free spirits" #44)

,

wants to reveal any and all moralities as human creations at
the service of the will to power.

Far from being a code of

unchanging ideals that hold "true" for all time, moralities
are sets of concepts and values created by human beings to

promote life.

[35]

To understand human beings we need to "descend into the

depths"

(#23)

and understand psychology as the doctrine of

the development of the will to power.

The body is "but a

social structure composed of many souls"' willing is

a

question of the rank of commanding and obeying within this
structure; and morals is "the doctrine of the relations of

supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life'
(#19)

.

comes to be

One's morality bears witness to who one is by

determining "what order of rank the innermost drives of his
nature stand in relation to one another"

(#6)

The strong
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spirit will be that spirit who due to his morality is more
able to discharge his strength (#13)

splintering his strength in

a

Rather than

.

conflict of competing drives

his values will discipline those drives to come together in
an upsurge of strength.

Thus,

instead of the old dichotomy of good and evil,

Nietzsche introduces the new dichotomy of "strong" and
"weak."

Along with this new dichotomy go the dichotomies of

noble/contemptible, higher/ inf erior and healthy/sick.

Nietzsche hopes to prepare the way for

a

new kind of human

being, one who can break the constraints of a morality that
has grown too restricting and therefore life-denying.

Such a

higher man would create the new morality necessary for

developing as yet undreamed of aspects of human potential.
[36]

In the place of the old concepts of good and evil

Nietzsche hopes to create if not the new morality, at least

transitional concepts and values that will facilitate the
evolution of man he envisions.
The puzzle

I

want to explore here is why Nietzsche

introduces these new dichotomies as if they work better than
the old dichotomy of good and evil

.

In what follows

I

will

argue that the dichotomy of strong and weak is undermined by
the text.

We could say that this is no surprise since

Nietzsche is trying to get us beyond all dichotomies.
Instead of explaining away discrepancies in his text by

positing an author behind the text who "intentionally"

undermined himself, however, I'd like to return to the text
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itself.

In light of my project,

an 'I' that confidently

proclaims a clearcut distinction between the strong and the
weak is also attempting to position itself as a subject with

respect to those categories.

That those categories shift in

conflicting ways speaks to

a

speaking

Exploring this conflict in light

'I'

of the text.

conflict in positioning of the

of the theory of self thus far developed could thus give us

insight into difficulties encountered in attempting to move

beyond such dichotomies.
By distinguishing between the strong and the weak, the

noble man and the herd animal, Nietzsche attempts to

distinguish those who represent the higher hope of humanity
from those who should be sacrificed to that higher hope.

The

question is, do these new dichotomies that Nietzsche
introduces do the work he wants them to do?
that they don't.

I

will argue

In making these distinctions Nietzsche

seems to shade his concept of the will top power in different
ways.

At times the strong manifest a will to power that is a

procreative life force that affirms and reveres all life:
the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and
world-affirming human being who has not only come
to terms with whatever was and is, but who wants to
have what was and is repeated into all eternity,
shouting insatiably da capo (#56)
At other times the strong manifest a will to power that is an

appropriating life force that is intrinsically and inevitably

domineering and exploitative:
"Exploitation" does not belong to a corrupt or
imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the
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SSSence of what lives, as a basic organic function;
it is a consequence of the will to power, which
is
after all the will to life (#259)

Which interpretation of the "strong" and the will to power we
take will have repercussions for our interpretation of

Nietzsche
man

s

higher man.

Can there only be one such higher

the one who manages to overpower everyone else and is

therefore doomed to solitude?

Or can we envision a community

of higher spirits who can live in peaceful co-existence?

Nietzsche would seem to want the latter.

[37]

he talks of

the reverence in which a noble soul will hold his equals

— "it

honors Itself in them and in the rights it cedes them"
(#265)

— and

ends Beyond Good and evil with an Aftersong that

appeals for new friends that he, as
man,

can so revere.

a

precursor of the higher

But the search for others that are

equally "high," "free," or "noble" as himself is fraught with
peril.

The distinctions he so boldly makes in some places

are undermined in others.

In contrast to a clear-cut

distinction between the strong spirits that will naturally
come to command the inferior human beings whose place is to
obey, Nietzsche distinguishes a noble soul that needs

cleanliness and solitude from the herd that would corrupt
him.

In an odd reversal it becomes the herd who is strong.

The herd have the same words for the same species of inner

experiences; "those more select, subtle, strange, and

difficult to understand, easily remain along, succumb to
accidents, being isolated, and rarely propagate"
This points to a conflict in Nietzsche's thought.

(#268).

The noble
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soul is playing a dangerous game.

he is a lover of the great

hunt who would probe the human soul and its limits,

its

unexhausted possibilities (#45) and yet, "it might be

a

basic

characteristic of existence that those who would know it

completely would perish" (#39)
teeter on

a

Thus,

strength comes to

fine line between the spirit who can command due

to the self-discipline of drives that results in an up-surge
of will-to-power

,

and the spirit who dares to break down his

internal ranking of drives to probe the "truth" that he is:
in which case the strength of a spirit should be
measured according to how much of the "truth" one
could still barely endure— or to put it more
clearly, to what degree one would require it to be
thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted,
falsified. (#39)
If one were to probe all the "heights,

depths and

distances" of the range of inner human experiences (#45) one
risks the danger of perishing

— losing

one's ability to act,

one's meaning, one's identity in an overwhelming multiplicity
of experience he can no longer control with his fictions.

Although we need

a

new morality more in keeping with the

demands of the will to power, in leaving the old moralities

behind we run the risk of oblivion.
the noble soul is strong

— strong

Thus,

at the same time

in his attentiveness to the

pulse of life which pushes him to discard old values

— he

is

also weak--weak in his inability to leap up in new strength

before destroying his old foundations for action.

This

weakness makes it impossible for him to command, and turns
his health into a sickness that dooms him to solitude.

The
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noble soul who loves the great hunt and would pass through
the "whole range of human values and value feelings"

(#211),

who would look down from the advantage of this perspective

and create new values, is forced into silence.

To speak in

the words suited for common experiences, the experiences

shared by the many, would destroy what was rare, strange and
subtle in him.

The very pulse of life that moves him beyond

those words also proves to be his weakness.

In isolation to

avoid corruption of his delicate rareness, the noble soul
shrinks from contact and awaits the new friends who will

strengthen his new and higher perspective in the community of
shared experiences
The question is, how is this community to be formed?
Again, we come back to Nietzsche's notions of "strong" and

"weak."

If the strong spirit is the spirit who creates new

values, the spirit who commands, who imposes his values on
others, then won't the "true" higher man be the higher man

who manges to impose the values he creates upon the rest?

if

such is the case, then each noble soul must sit in solitude,

struggling to create his new values alone, and finally brave
the corrupting influences of the common man in the attempt to

impose his creations on the world.
I

don't think Nietzsche had this vision.

was aware of the conflict at work here.

And

I

think he

Towards the end of

Part Nine the subsections strike a more personal mode.
#278 the wanderer calls out for "Another mask!

mask!" and in #280 he says,

In

A second

"He is going back like anybody
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who wants to attempt a big jump."
I

in the following sections

will explore Nietzsche's concept of 'woman' in Bevond Hood

££<3 Evj-1 and give an analysis of the female and male

"positions" of Nietzsche's text on the basis of our earlier

discussion of those terms.
Nietzsche goes

a

It will be my

contention that

long way toward breaking down old

sub j ect /ob j ect dichotomies but that his introduction of new

dichotomies is an attempt to save the oppositional selfstrategy of masculine identity.

An examination of his

concept of 'woman' will demonstrate how his reading of gender

categories relates to this attempt.

I

will then explore

other alternatives he might have taken given he could have
freed himself from gender categories entirely and adopted

a

new self-strategy.

'

Woman

:

Towards the end of Part Seven, Nietzsche

devotes eight subsections to "a few truths about "woman as
such"" with the stipulation that one keep in mind "how very

much these are after all only--nu£ truths" (#231)

.

Throughout

his words, Nietzsche goes further in deconstructing the

category of 'woman' than either Kierkegaard or Sartre.

[38]

In the Preface of Beyond Good and Evil he asks "Supposing

truth is a woman

— what

then?" with the implication that the

attack he proceeds to make on those who assume there is an

absolute Truth waiting to be unveiled and possessed goes for
those who would win 'woman' as well.

[39]

He is thus far

from unaware that the role that man would have woman play is
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based on illusion.

If there is an absolute Truth behind the

confusing array of appearances waiting to be revealed, then
man has a focus point, a goal by which to orient his search
for knowledge.
man,

if there is the essential

behind the veils she hides herself

'woman,' the not-

in,

waiting to be

possessed, then man has the ultimate answer to all that he
feels himself to lack.

will make him whole

— the

Truth will heal his ignorance, woman

problem was to find them both.

Once

found they could be possessed and man would finally want no
more.

On this view, at least man knew what he was looking

for and could even measure his progress on the way to his

goals.

But what if both Truth and 'woman' were illusions,

illusions that he himself had invented?

Then he is set

adrift upon the sea of appearances with nothing to guide him-no goal, no direction, no meaning.

[40]

To compensate for the loss of the illusion of Truth as a

realm of eternal ideals men could strive to reflect ever more
perfectly, Nietzsche introduced the will to power and

emphasized man's ability to play the creator himself.

[41]

We need

The old ideals had always been illusions anyway.

fictions to orient ourselves and our actions, to organize our

drives into a unified upsurge of life.

[42]

The trick is to

compensate for the loss of an anchor in Truth with

a

new

awareness of our will to power and our ability to create the
fictions that would best enhance that will to power.
then of 'woman'?

Holy Grail,

What

Is she free to abdicate from her role as

free as well to play the creator, to create the
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illusions that will best serve her own will to power?
and no.

Yes

On the one hand, Nietzsche gives woman credit for

having always seen through the illusion of 'woman' and put it
to their advantage:
is the lie,

beauty"

(#232)

"what is truth to a woman?...

— her

great

her highest concern is mere appearance and
On the other, to take the next step and

discard the illusions given her by man for illusions more to
her liking will lead to her degeneration:
As she... takes possession of new rights, aspires to
become "master" and writes the "progress" of woman
upon her standards and banners, the opposite
development is taking place with terrible clarity:

woman is retrogressing

.

(#239)

Because Nietzsche has equal disdain for the scientific
man who remains bound by conventional "truths" rather than

letting himself go and flowing with the great currents of
free spirit

(#206),

one could argue that he only wants to

make sure woman doesn't do herself the same disservice.
a

a

But

careful reading of Beyond Good and Evil points to more than

that.

Not only does Nietzsche not want woman to make the

same mockery of herself man already has, he wants woman to

continue to play her role of being man's illusion:
Let us men confess it: we honor and love precisely
this art and this instinct in woman we who have a
hard time and for our relief like to associate with
beings under whose hands, eyes, and tender follies
our seriousness, our gravity and profundity almost
(#232)
appear to us like folly.

—

And he exhorts man to make sure she continues to play this
role

:
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A man. .who has depth, in his spirit as well as in
his desires .. .must conceive of woman as a
possession, as property that can be locked, as
something predestined for service and achieving her
perfection in that.
(#238)
.

In #194 he distinguishes three types of men according
to what

they take as really possessing

a woman.

The third type

incorporates the first two's signs for "having":
of the woman's body; and

2)

1)

the use

the knowledge that "the woman

does not only give herself to him but also gives up for his
sake what she has or would like to have"; with

:

3)

the

knowledge that "when she gives up everything for him,

(she)

does not possibly do this for a phantom of him," because:
He wants to be known deep down, abysmally deep
down, before he is capable of being loved at all;
he dares to let himself be fathomed.

Thus,

woman's desire for self-reliance is one of the worst

a

developments of the general uglification of Europe (#232)
because it is in the best interests of man's will to power
that she renounce her own will and desire.

illusion that there

is. a

Necessarily-Feminine"

It

may be an

"something Eternally-and-

(#239),

a

"something more refined and

vulnerable, wilder, stranger, sweeter, and more

soulful

...

0#237a)

,

something one has to lock up lest it fly away"

but if this illusion is necessary for the

development of the higher man, then it is an illusion we
should keep.

Again we are returned to Nietzsche's notions of "strong"
and "weak."

If the higher man is to be a creator of values

then to distinguish himself from those inferior to him he
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must not only create those values, but impose them on those
he has subjected to his will.

On this reading of the will to

power as domination only the one who imposes his morality
will have the opportunity to manifest an upsurge of strength.

Those around him--such as women and slaves

— must

be

sacrificed to his superior ability to create and impose on
others the values that will expedite his own will to power:
to a being such as "we are" other beings must be
subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice

themselves.
It

(#265)

is only when such a being has settled whether or not

another being is of equal rank that:
it moves among these equals with their equal
privileges, showing the same sureness of modesty
and delicate reverence that characterize its
relations with itself (#265).

The same problem of determining one's rank with respect to

woman arises as did earlier with respect to the "weak."

If

woman is to be possessed, her desire subsumed by man’s, her
illusions put in man's service, then presumably she is
"weak."

She is not part of Nietzsche's "we free spirits."

Her reasons for shame

(such as superficiality and petty

presumptuousness) should continue to be kept "repressed and
kept under control by fear of man"

(#232)

.

Clearly it is not

to her that we look in our watch for the higher man.

Thus,

to allow her to attempt the creation of values could only

lead to retrogression.
worries,

Woman can and should chase away

fathom man's depths, and play into his faith that

within her lies concealed

a

"basically different ideal" that
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must be maintained and protected (#239)

.

All these roles are

based on illusions that will give him some relief from his
struggles and even help him on his way.

But only he is

capable of the great hunt that will lead the human race to
its higher glory.

[43]

With this discussion of 'woman,' we obtain some

additional clues to the problem of distinguishing the
"strong" from the "weak."
of will to power,

According to Nietzsche's doctrine

all who can should, and must,

struggle to

manifest as much of their will to power as possible
life.

— such

is

The only constraints on that struggle are the need to

maintain orienting fictions and the mastery of others
stronger than oneself.

Thus,

far from surrendering her

desire for the sake of man, woman should be struggling for as

much self-reliance and self-mastery as it is in her power to
achieve.

then so be it--

If man can keep her in his service,

but to ask her to sacrifice her own will to power voluntarily
is not in keeping with Nietzsche's conception of will to

power.

That is,

it is one thing to suggest that the noble

souls will come to command due to a superabundance of energy,
but it is another thing to suggest that a group of human

beings (i.e., women)

should prefer to help man find the

fictions best suited to his will to power rather than attend
to the pulse-beat of her own.

Presumably,

it is the desire

to render such service that Nietzsche is thinking of when he

worries about her unlearning her fear of man

.

She unlearns

her fear of man: but the woman who "unlearns fear" surrenders
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her most womanly instincts"

(#238);

"what is the meaning of

all this if not a crumbling of feminine instincts, a

defeminization?"

(#239)

This brings us to another point.

If Nietzsche's

"strong" spirit turns out to be not so strong, and if

sacrifices need to be made by the "weak" if the "strong" are
to become stronger,

just what is the relationship between the

strong and the weak?

Why does Nietzsche want woman to

continue to play her womanly role?

Why wouldn't it be better

for the whole human race to struggle for self-reliance and

self-mastery,

letting the best man win

— the

higher man being

he who was the culminating achievement of the struggle of a

multitude of wills to dominate?

Or is something else needed

for the "strong" to become strong,
at in the previous section,

something already hinted

something that would undermine

the distinction between strong and weak entirely?
In the next section

the two positions

I

I

will relate Nietzsche's text to

laid out in the last chapter.

I

will

argue that Nietzsche's notion of the will to power represents
an attempt to speak from the female position.

In his

attention to the pulse of life that defies categories, to the
continual becoming that can't be contained, he attempts to
take into account aspects of experience denied by the extreme
of the male position.

[44]

This attempt brings him up

against the limits of masculine identity.

If woman is to

exercise her feminine instincts in his service, then he must
be man enough to subject her to his service,

to command.

And
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yet how can he command when faced with the danger of the

great hunt--his own dissolution?
My contention will be that despite his breakdown of the

category of 'woman' Nietzsche still cannot allow himself to
exercise what he refers to as "feminine instincts."
for him,

What,

falls under the category of "feminine instincts"

indicates his version of gender categories.
puts in that category is what he is not

That what he

— what's

forbidden to

him as a man--indicates an oppositional self-strategy at
work.

By laying out the elements of the text speaking from

the two positions, and examining the conflict already alluded
to in the last section and this within this framework,

I

hope

to go beyond Nietzsche's new dichotomy of strong and weak.

Questions motivating my analysis are, what constitutes
"feminine" or "weak" instincts for Nietzsche, m instincts he
won't allow himself; and how would these instincts enable him
to surrender his solitude for a community of free spirits?

The positions

notion of
a

a

:

In Part One,

Nietzsche undermines the

fixed human essence by looking at human beings as

process that makes use of concepts and values to enhance

the development of will to power

possibilities open to
her identity,

a

.

Out of the vast range of

human being, who that human being is,

is an effect of her morality--that which ranks

her instincts so that the order of command is clear, conflict

between instincts is reduced, and action is facilitated.

undermining Truth, dogmatism and Platonism he intends to

By
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challenge the belief that there are eternal, transcendent,
road-maps in the sky by which to guide our identities and our
actions.

For Nietzsche, not only are there no such road-

maps, but our real guide is the surging process of life

itself, the will to power in whose service we create our

concepts and moralities rather than vice versa.

[45]

Nietzsche's concept of will to power can be seen as

a

way of representing the source of individual life in chaotic
flux.

As such,

it can be seen as his version of the origin

not a gift from God the Father above who beckons us onward,

but the underground turbulence of life in all its bewildering

multiplicity.

Phenomena are not the pale reflection of an

eternally unchanging realm, but the result of a chaotic,
irrational upsurge of life forever struggling to surge ever

higher and more forcefully, taking the most expedient, rather
than most "rational," forms for getting there.

Thus,

there

is no such thing as a "soul," a "motive," a "law," a "right"

or a "wrong"

— there

is only the will to power that creates

the concepts and values that will feed its continual need to

grow and expand.
The recognition that all rankings, all boundaries, all

categories, are created undermines and subverts the authority
of the Symbolic order of social meaning in favor of the

concrete specificity of life.

The recognition of the guiding

force of the will to power is the "feminine" recognition that
life is growth and becoming and that the Symbolic order

should be subordinate to becoming

— life-enhancing

rather than

241

life denying.

Nietzsche speaks from the female position in

his attentiveness to the pulse of life that defies all

categorizations and that says no more than "I want to live."
It

is that pulse of concrete living things that the feminine

responds to

— the

"indiscriminate" response she makes to

enhance the chances of any living thing simply because it
makes that appeal.

[46]

In valuing the will to power over

morality itself, in saying that the latter should serve the
former, Nietzsche is taking the female position of putting
the concrete specificity of actual living things before the

preservation of eternal ideals.

he is advocating the

destruction of an outmoded Symbolic order that impedes rather
than fosters the growth of the human beings subject to it.
In doing so,

he is listening with a "third" ear,

an ear that

can tune into the subtleties of experience that elude the

symbolic--exper iences that would take humanity higher if
given the nourishment they deserve.

it is this kind of

sensitivity a woman gives to her loved ones, attending to the
inarticulate longing of each, giving them

a

hearing, and

through her mirroring, giving new aspects of experience, of
life,

the response it needs to give itself form.
But this attempt to incorporate aspects of the female

position into his work put Nietzsche into

a

quandary.

The

oppositional strategy of masculine identity relies on the
repetition of fixed relationships for continuity.

the

Symbolic order is a static order of fixed positions by which
one can place one's self and others.

To maintain self-
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it y one must have a certain group of people

(i.e.,

women and subordinates) flexible enough to conform to the

other of one's self /other pattern.

To navigate the broader

realm of social relations one builds up layers of

identifications that replay one's self /other pattern through
inversion and analogy according to the Law of the Father.
Thus, defying the Symbolic Nietzsche is defying the very

order that sustains his identity.

Nietzsche is referring to

just this dilemma in speaking of the dangers of the hunt.

How can he defy the mechanical repetition of fixed patterns
and sterile concepts for the subtle richness of experiences
that elude it without perishing in the attempt?

His response

is to brave the danger of chaotic flux "like a man."

Single-

handedly he must boldly go forth, leaving the charted realm
of the Symbolic order behind, and create a new order all on

his own.

he will be "strong," he will be "noble," he will

play the "creator" all on his own, making his own map of

positions as he goes.
Thus, Nietzsche's new dichotomies and his order of rank

can be seen as aspects of the male position.

They are

attempts to maintain identity through the imposition of one’s
own creations, the imposition of a new self/other pattern
that one can repeat in the same way one could repeat the old
one.

That this strategy cannot work is attested to by the

contradictory nature of these dichotomies.

In a world of

flux and becoming how can any fixed self/other pattern hold?
If one is to navigate this new realm of life experience that
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follows no rules and adheres to no order, one needs a new
strategy.

We all know of such a strategy--we ve all
'

experienced a time where each and every moment was new and
there were no patterns to repeat

create an identity from

a

— and

realm of chaotic flux that served

to order the whole of our existence.

course, to infancy.

yet we managed to

I'm referring, of

To create a new identity,

one more

responsive to the subtler aspects of life that elude the
Symbolic order as we know

it,

that earlier experience.

In his fresh responsiveness to

elusive aspects of experience

one might take some hints from

I

think Nietzsche has, but in

his need to maintain the male illusion of self-sufficiency he
has overlooked another self-strategy and the vital role

played by connectedness in that strategy.

To brave chaotic

flux "like a man" requires overlooking that self-strategy

because it requires exercising those "feminine instincts"

Nietzsche is so loath for women to give up.
The extreme of the male position would have us ignore

chaotic flux in order to crank out mechanical patterns based
on the repetition of pre-fixed categories.

The extreme of

the female position involves surrendering to that flux to the

point of losing all sense of self, of things, of continuity
or order at all.

Nietzsche, by trying to incorporate more of

the female position into the male one is struggling to bring

order to flux

— to

maintain ap identity and meaning while

being faithful to every last nuance of concrete life.

Finally an impossible task, and he knows it.

But at the very
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least he wants us to do a better job of it than we're doing,
he wants us to leave behind some of our old guideposts to

find a morality in keeping with a new range of subtleties,

aspects of human experience that once attended to could allow
new forms of life to flourish.

The "man" with the masterful

and domineering will to power imposes order upon flux.

He is

the great hunter who leaves the Symbolic behind to play

creator in an uncharted realm.

it is the woman with her

"feminine instincts" who has no wish to impose her will.
Instead,

she surrenders the desire for order and mastery and

gives herself up to the life around her

— not

a

surrender of

her will to power, but a surrender to the responses life

evokes from her, responses that defy all order and all

categorization.

A woman who finds her perfection in service

to a man is a woman who has forsaken the repetition of a

self/other pattern to let
forth.

a

man evoke whatever response comes

it is thus that a man can feel himself fathomed to

his depths, his every move, his every thought,

reflected in

her responsiveness to him as if she were his mirror.
It

is this same responsiveness that is a crucial feature

of the mother/infant dyad from which the infant's original

self is precipitated.

Here,

the reciprocal responsiveness of

the two form a whole in which meaning is generated in the

interest of life.

The infant,

rather than repeating a

self/other pattern of its own, conforms to the other of the

mother's self /other pattern.

If the mother is reasonably

nurturing, the self/other pattern she imposes will not be
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that of the extreme male position, but one that is responsive
to the infant's cues and bodily needs.

Thus,

although she

structures her experiences via the Symbolic order, she will
ignore or subvert that order in the interest of enhancing the
life of the infant.

A man who finds a woman to possess will

obtain some of the benefits of the inf ant /mother
relationship.

her responsiveness will mirror him the way his

mother did, allowing him a similar feeling of connectedness,
of being known

("fathomed")

.

But if he cannot leave aside

the need for repetition of a fixed self/other pattern,

if he

cannot brave the terrors of flux within the safety of

another's embrace, he will never be able to leave the

restrictions of the Symbolic order behind.
What Nietzsche has overlooked in his call for the higher
man is that the only way the human race can evolve is

together.
or "noble."

No one man can do it alone--no matter how "strong"

There's a simple reason for this.

Human beings

form and maintain their identity in connectedness.

The only

way for them to change that identity is in connectedness.

Thus far men have been able to veil that fact by denying

their dependency as infants as well as their continuing

dependency on the others in their lives willing to give them
the attentive responsiveness they need.

If we all desired

only to make others conform to our fixed self /other patterns
we would starve for human contact and lose the richness of
life.

If we all desired only to conform to another's

self /other pattern we would lose all stability.

In trying to
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find a meeting ground for flux and order, Nietzsche,

I

believe, was struggling to create a new identity, a new

subjectivity for himself

one that could both respond to the

nuances of life as well as make sense of it.

new subjectivity his need to maintain

identity ran him into an impasse.

a

On the way to

masculine

Narrowing the distance

between the poles of male and female threatens not only any
neat categorization of gender but also our tried and true

strategies for maintaining self-identity.

In braving that

task Nietzsche has shown us some of the pitfalls involved

— as

well as given us suggestions for where to go from here.

Although Nietzsche himself did not achieve the evolution to
the higher human beings he envisioned, he has indeed helped
to pave the way for their coming.

4.4 Sartre; BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
In Being and Nothingness

(Sartre 1956)

Sartre also

emphasizes a creative moment that determines

a

Symbolic order

rather than saying we're structured by the Symbolic.
moves away from

Symbolic as is.

a

He thus

male position that would revere the

Instead he emphasizes the free acts that

give rise to Symbolic orders

— categories

that order

experience in light of an individual project.

[47]

Sartre

also talks about the way one's free acts are given social

meaning by the other who externalizes one's acts.

here he is

also approaching a female position by recognizing that others

play a role in the creation of meaning (versus

a

male
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position that would deny the part played by the other)

He

.

sees this as a completely negative moment, however.
I

will suggest that although Sartre takes a female

position insofar as he refuses to defer to

a

socially

sanctioned Symbolic order, he has not managed to substitute

a

desire for fusion-experiences for the masculine self-strategy
of revering the Symbolic order.

Instead he tries to

substitute individual Symbolic orders.

Like Nietzsche, he

expects each individual to create a law unto himself

—

Symbolic order of his own that may or may not conflict with
the socially sanctioned Symbolic order.

however,

Unlike Nietzsche,

Sartre doesn't advocate receptivity to new feelings

and bodily sensations that may subvert one's categories.

Instead he assumes that subversion of socially sanctioned

categories must be done through the assertion of categories

structured by one's fundamental choice of being.

[48]

Thus

will suggest that Sartre proposes that the law of categories

represented by the Symbolic order should come from each
individual

The puzzle

:

Sartre ends Part Four of Being and

Nothingness with the following passage:
Each human reality is at the same time a direct
project to metamorphose its own For-itself into an
In-itself-For-itself and a project of the
appropriation of the world as a totality of beingin-itself, in the form of a fundamental
.Thus the passion of man is the reverse
quality.
of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in
But the idea of God is
order that God may be born.
.

.

I
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contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain.
is a useless passion (p.784).
Sartre

s

Man

pessimistic conclusion that humanity's fundamental

project is contradictory and therefore unachievable stems
from his view that consciousness cannot be its own
foundation.
of the

Humans want to transform the negating activity

f or-itself

(consciousness) that distinguishes them

from inert matter into
itself is nothingness

a

self-causing substance.

— it

Mere for-

gives the in-itself (brute

existence) meaning by revealing it in the light of an end
that has not yet been achieved.

[49]

Thus,

it introduces

possibility into the fullness of being that is sufficient
unto itself.

But in so doing, human reality also posits

itself as a lack--as a being that is not yet what it is.

[50]

Its fundamental project is to retain the freedom of making

choices between its possibilities, and yet to attain the

self-sufficiency of a complete being that no longer lacks.
Hence, Sartre's alternate description of this project as the

project of being God.
The puzzle

I

[51]

propose to investigate here is the

question: why is the Sartre of Being and Nothingness so drawn
to a project that he claims to be doomed to failure?
a

Through

careful reading of Part Four of Being and Nothingness we

will find that Sartre overlooks a fairly obvious way in which

human consciousness can be its own foundation.

In the

will sketch out his views on for-

remainder of this section

I

itself, being-f or-others

and the project of becoming in-

,

itself-f or-itself in order to highlight the dilemma as Sartre

249

sees it.

In the following section

I

will relate his

discussion of appropriation and the quality of 'slimy' to the
category of 'woman' that emerges from his text.
section

I

In the final

will argue that it is his rigid adherence to gender

categories that blocks him from resolving the dilemma he
depicts, despite the suggestions implicit in his text for
just such a resolution.

Sartre posits a split between for-itself and in-itself.

Human consciousness is consciousness &f something.

something is transphenomenal being.

[52]

This

That is,

consciousness reveals phenomena in light of the possibilities
it projects before it.

light of a concrete,

Thus, phenomena are revealed only in

individual project.

But the being of

such phenomena is beyond all individual projects.
itself

This in-

:

is an immanence which can not realize itself, an
affirmation which can not affirm itself, an
activity which can not act, because it is glued to
itself (p 27
.

It

is

)

.

beyond all negation or affirmation, passivity or

activity, transition or becoming:
It knows no otherness; it
other-than-another-beinq
as
itself
never posits
It is
It can support no connection with the other.
being
in
itself
itself indefinitely and it exhausts

It

is full positivity.

.

(p.29)

For-itself, on the other hand, is an escape from the initself that gives the latter meaning:
I escape the in-itself by
my possibilities that this
toward
nihilating myself
value
as cause or motive.
on
in-itself can take

It

is only because
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Causes and. motives have meaning only inside a
projected ensemble which is precisely an ensemble
of non-existent s
And this ensemble is ultimately
myself as transcendence (p.564).
.

Human reality perpetually puts its being into question.

It

thereby opens a hole in the heart of being by considering
itself in the light of non-being.

That is, by nihilating

what it is by projecting itself towards possibilities that it
isn't,

it gives meaning to itself and its situation.

My

place, my past, the things around me, are all interpreted in

light of the end toward which

I

project my possibilities.

Each human project has its own empirical shape, but all share
the fundamental project of becoming in-itself-for-itself

this fundamental project can take different forms according
to the type of relation to being a for-itself .adopts
is,

That

.

the for-itself projects an ensemble of non-existent s in

light of its initial choice of a particular kind of relation
to being.

Choices of concrete objects of desire are

integrated as secondary structures into this totality.
Although the initial choice can be changed, such a change
can't be achieved through mere reflection.

willing a change would be in bad faith.

In fact,

[53]

It

merely

is action

taken in the spontaneous upsurge of the for-itself that most

accurately reflects one's project in its totality.
Each for-itself finds itself in a world that includes
others.

These others also have the freedom to nihilate what

is in light of their possibilities.

in the distance:

[54]

When

I

see an Other
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suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen
the world from me.
Everything is in place;
everything still exists for me; but everything is
traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the
direction of a new object (p.343).

When there is no Other in my vicinity the world stretches out

around me according to

my.

project, things are understood as

obstacles or as helpful in light of the possibilities

I

am

reaching for.

I

see

I

am the center of my world.

Other on the horizon
not the only one.
that,
2

I

But when

become aware that my perspective is

The Other has his own perspective, one

for example, places the bench that's 30 feet from

feet from him

.

mg.

as

Furthermore, the for-itself is responsible

for revealing the Other's conduct in the world as techniques
(p.668)

.

[55]

As

I

watch the Other sit on the bench

I

turn

what he lives as a free project into a technique that exists

outside of him.

The world:

is revealed to me... by collective and already
constituted techniques which aim at making me
apprehend the world in a form whose meaning has
been defined outside of me (p.657).

By manifesting certain techniques,

I

manifest my membership

in various collectivities such as the human race,

or a professional or family group.

a nation,

But in choosing my acts

always go beyond the internal technical organization that

expresses my memberships, toward myself
of my individual project.

Thus,

— the

transcendent me

although the for-itself

gives the Other an exterior that make objective rules of

human conduct, this conduct is always grounded in the free
acts of individuals with individual projects.

I
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As a for-itself living with other for-itselves,

I

am

aware of other freedoms that create perspectives different

from my own, and that can exteriorize my behavior in light
of

their own projects.

Giving an outside to another's behavior

gives that behavior meaning that can form techniques

I

choose to take on or reject in living my own project.
a new

can
Thus,

dimension of being arises--being-for-others
by means of the upsurge of the Other there appear
certain determinations which I am without having
chosen them.
.All this I am for the Other with no
hope of apprehending this meaning which I have
outside and, still more important, with no hope of
changing it.
Speech alone will inform me of what I
am (p 671
.

.

r

.

)

.

The situation that

reveal in the free choice of my project

I

is alienated from me and comes

for the Other"

(p.673)

other for-itselves,

I

"to exist as a form in itself

Because

exist as a for-itself for

I

can be freely apprehended by them in

light of ends that are not my own.

Because the Other

apprehends me as an Other-as-ob ject

,

reducing my free conduct

into an objective form, he limits my freedom.

tells me who

attitudes

I

I

am and although there are an infinity of

can assume with respect to what

cannot not assume some attitude.
(e.g.,

The Other

I

am told,

I

The things others say

ugly, brilliant, a coward, a Jew)

refer to me since

I

I

am

cannot actually

am a free nothingness which projects

itself toward its possibilities.

But

I

can choose to

interiorize such "unrealizables" by incorporating them in the
structure of my free projects (p.678)

These unrealizables
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can't be realized because as a being that lacks and is always

projecting itself toward what it isn't,

am never a

I

completed being that can see myself from the outside.
Instead,

am always waiting for a "repose which would be

I

an d no longer a waiting for being... that is, evidently,

plenitude of the type "in-itself-for-itself "" (p.688).

a

Death,

far from enabling me to attain this repose,

is

the triumph of the Other's point of view over my own:

Death reapprehends all this subjective which while
it "lived" defended itself against exteriorization,
and death deprives it of all subjective meaning in
order to hand it over to any object ve meaning
which the Other is pleased to give to it (p.696)
i

As long as
I

I

am alive

I

can escape what

I

am for the Other.

can demonstrate that whatever the Other discovers about me

can be surpassed by projecting myself toward other ends.
Thus,

I

can prove that "my dimension of being-for-myself is

incommensurable with my dimension of being-for-others"
(p.695).
I

But once death has cancelled out my possibilities,

exist only thought the Other.

I

can no longer nihilate my

outside with the absolute, subjective positing of a freedom
that interprets itself and its world in the light of its own,

freely chosen, project.
The ultimate goal for the for-itself is not death, but

being as for-itself (p.723)
which is what it is

.

That is,

it wants to be a being

(rather than always be projecting itself

toward what it lacks)

,

but it also wants to be this as
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consciousness.
is

The fundamental value guiding this project

:

the ideal of a consciousness which would be the
foundation of its own being-in-it self by the pure
consciousness it would have of itself (p.724).
Thus, the

f or-itself

wants to be an in-itself that founds its

existence by constituting that existence in the free choice
of itself.

complete,

Like the in-itself such a for-itself would be

lacking nothing, a full positivity.

But unlike the

in-itself, such a for-itself would choose to be exactly what
it

is and constitute its very existence in the making of that

choice.

Like God,

such an in-itself-f or-itself would be

a

self-causing being, completely free and always choosing, yet
already realized and always complete.
For Sartre, the project of becoming in-itself-for-itself
is doomed from the start.

Since "(C)hoice and consciousness

are one and the same thing"

(p.595)

and since in-itself is an

immanence which can not realize itself, the two realms of

being are radically opposed.

Consciousness can't found

itself because it must choose itself by projecting itself

toward non-existent s

.

Once it failed to pose such

transcendent ideals it would lapse into the inert immanence
of an in-itself that cannot choose.

the in-itself is to negate it.

The only way to escape

The only way to escape the

Others that would give it an objective form not of its

choosing is to negate that form by continuing to engage in
project of its own choice.

a

And yet, if for-itself can give

others an outside meaning, revealing an Other in the same way
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reveals in-itself, then a natural solution to the project

of in-itself-f or-itself emerges.

Although an individual for-

it self may not be able to found its own consciousness,

perhaps an interlocking network of human consciousnesses
could.

Obviously Sartre did not see this as
In the next section

[56]

I

a

possibility.

will explore how his conception

of gender may have precluded such a possibility,

final section

I

and in the

will explore it further in light of the male

and female positions revealed in his text.

LWQma n
as such,

"

*
:

Like Kierkegaard,

Sartre doesn't discuss "woman

but he mentions women and the feminine in enough

places for us to reconstruct what 'woman' means to him, at
least within the confines of this text.

The sections most

pertinent to our present topic are found in chapter two of
part four.

In this chapter Sartre introduces his conception

of "existential psychoanalysis."

Unlike traditional

psychoanalysis, Sartre does not propose understanding human

behavior by tracing its origins to sexuality or the will to
power.

Instead, he proposes understanding human behavior in

light of the original way in which each individual has chosen
his being.

Since the fundamental human project is to become

in-itself-f or-itself

,

desire of what

I

lack can be understood

in the light of this project of being that which no longer

lacks.

An empirical study of concrete desires will indicate

various approaches to this project.
examples"

(p.736)

A "thousand empirical

show that desire comes in three categories-

256

to do, to have, to be.

"To do" reduces to "to have"

which reduces to "the desire to be related to
object in

certain relation of being "

a

a

(p.751).

(p.742)

certain
Thus,

[57]

a

discussion of appropriation reveals various ways of

approaching the ideal of in-itself-for-itself
Sartre discusses various kinds of appropriation.
forms of appropriation,

In all

for-itself attempts to become its own

foundation by appropriating an object that is indifferent to

consciousness (thus an in-itself) at the same time that

it

represents for-itself by belonging to it (thus an in-itselffor-itself)

A thing that is mine is m£, because possession

.

of a particular object means

"

to have for myself

;

that is, to

be the unique end of the existence of the object"

Because possession means
the objects

I

have exclusive rights on utilizing

possess in light of my own project,

I

(p.752)

I

found my

possessions in their being by creating their meaning.

Since

this creation is an emanation of the transcendent me of my

chosen possibilities, the object is me.
possession,

in-itself"

Thus "(I)n

am my own foundation in so far as

I

I

exist in an

(p.755).

In the appropriation of objects of knowledge:

What is seen is possessed; to see is to
.The unknown object is given as
deflower
immaculate, as virgin, comparable to a whiteness
It has not yet "delivered up" its secret; man has
not yet "snatched" its secret away from it.
.

I

.

.

transform the known into me by appropriating it in the form

of a thought that receives its existence from me.

And yet
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because it is also an objective fact that will never lose
its
form,

at the same time that it is "assimilated,

into myself, and.
unt rans f ormable

,

.

.entirely

me."

transformed

it is also "impenetrable,

entirely smooth, with the indifferent nudity

of a body which is beloved and caressed in vain"

(p.740)

In the appropriating activity of the scientist,

the

artist and the sportsman, the object of appropriation
(knowledge, artistic medium or physical environment) appears

"simultaneously to be

a

kind of subjective emanation of

ourselves and yet to remain in an indifferently external
relation with us."

In such activity we attempt to found the

existence of an in-itself that is me because it is mine:
The "mine" appeared to us then as a relation of
being intermediate between the absolute interiority
of the me and the absolute exteriority of the notme
There is within the same syncretism a self
becoming not-self and a not-self becoming self
.

(p.751)

Furthermore,

Each possessed object which raises itself on the
foundation of the world manifests the entire world,
just as a beloved woman manifests the sky, the
shore, the sea, which surrounded her when she
appeared.
To appropriate this object is then to
appropriate the world symbolically (p.760).
In the drive to become that which doesn't lack,

wants to appropriate not only
world.

As long as

I

a

particular object, but the

am choosing myself by negating what

in order to project myself toward what

in-itself.

But if

I

for-itself

I

am not,

I

That is,

reveal all that is in light of the free choice of a

am

cannot be

can appropriate the whole world,

found my own existence in the in-itself.

I

I

I

can

can
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transcendent me that turns out to be exactly what the initself is

.

But appropriation is merely symbolic.

The objects

make mine are only symbolic representations of me.
how many objects

I

appropriate,

I

I

No matter

am still only nothingness

a free for— itself that must be what it

is not.

Appropriation

of others in sexual relationships is as doomed to failure as

the appropriation of knowledge of things:
the lover's dream is to identify the beloved object
with himself and still preserve for it its own
individuality; let the Other become me without
ceasing to be the Other (p.740)

This "impossible synthesis of assimilation and an assimilated

which maintains its integrity"

(p.739)

can never come to

As long as for-itself can choose itself only by

pass.

negating itself in light of what it isn't, for the Other to
become me,

(s)he would have to become the nothingness of a

for-itself
The attempt to attain in-it self-for-it self through

appropriation takes an interesting twist in Sartre's
discussion of the "slimy."

[58]

In the third and final

section of chapter two, Sartre proposes
things

psychoanalysis of

Things have qualities that reveal being in

(p.765).

certain ways

a

If we bring out the ontological meaning of

qualities, we can understand how particular qualities

symbolize being.

We can then better understand an

individual's original choice of being by noting the

particular attitudes he takes with respect to particular
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qualities
work,

.

To give us an idea of how such an ontology might

Sartre explores the meaning of the "slimy."

Here,

appropriation fails, and the "mine" that related absolute
interiority with absolute exteriority turns into "a

possibility that the In-itself might absorb the For-itself"
(p.776).

That is, the project to attain in-itself-f or-itself

is reversed into the attack of an in-itself on the for-itself

that would "draw the For-itself into its contingency,
its indifferent exteriority,

existence"

into

into its foundationless

(p.776).

Just as Sartre's discussion of appropriation was laced

with references to women as objects to be possessed, his

discussion of the slimy is laced with references to the
feminine that would engulf one.

Both discussions refer to

a

realm of being between the absolute freedom of the for-itself
and the absolute immanence of the in-itself.

Making

something "mine" was a symbolic attempt to bridge the two
realms that led to failure.

The "slimy" symbolizes

a

being

"in which the for-itself is swallowed up by the in-itself"

(p.783).

This ambiguous substance is "between two state"

(p.774).

Ironically, while attempts to bridge the two realms

in an appropriation that would lead to in-it self-for-it self

are doomed to failure, attempts made by the in-itself to

swallow up the for-itself seem more likely to succeed.

While

references to women and the feminine in the discussion of

appropriation refer us to the ideal, if doomed, project of

becoming in-itself-for-itself

,

references to women and the

260

feminine in the discussion of the slimy refer us to dangerous

aspects of an ambiguous being between two states.

In the

former 'woman' was in the appropriate relationship to foritself,

in the latter

'woman' threatens to derail the for-

itself's project entirely.

In possession the for-itself

remains the assimilating and creative power:
is the For-itself which absorbs the In-itself.
In other words, possession asserts the primacy of
the For-itself in the synthetic being In-itselfFor-itself.
yet here is the slimy reversing the
terms; the For-itself is suddenly comprnmi seri
Tt
is a soft, yielding action, a moist and feminine
sucking .... I am no longer the Master in arresting
It

.

.

.

.

the process of appropriation (p.776).

"(S)lime is the revenge of the In-itself.

Thus,

sweet,

feminine revenge"

A sickly-

(p.777)

The slimy offers a horrible image because we are haunted

by the image of a consciousness become slimy.

Such a

consciousness would be held back from the freedom of
itself projecting itself toward its possibilities.

a

for-

It would:

be slyly held back by the invisible suction of the
past and... would have to assist in its own slow
dissolution in this past which it was fleeing,
would have to aid in the invasion of its project by
a thousand parasites until finally it completely
lost itself (p.778).

This type of being doesn't exist anymore than the in-itself-

for-itself, but just as the latter is an ideal toward which

project myself, the former is an "Antivalue" from which
flee.

This antivalue represents the kind of being

want to become,

avoided"

"a

(p.779).

I

I

don't

threatening mode of being which must be

I
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Through these discussions we can begin to make sense of
Sartre's refusal to explore the possibility that human

consciousnesses could found one another.
a

it is one thing for

for-itself to attempt to appropriate the in-itself.

It is

entirely another for it to allow itself to be appropriated.
The moment for-itself allows itself to be held back by

"moist and feminine sucking,

"

to allow its free project to be

invaded by a "thousand parasites," it is compromised.
only acceptable way for

a

a

The

for-itself to approach the project

of becoming in-itself -for-itself is by retaining mastery

throughout.

Such a reading of the project naturally dooms it

from the start.

A for-itself that is forever fleeing in-

itself by insisting on its freedom to negate everything that
is,

will never be able to repose in the objective form

granted it by another.

And yet, in his description of the

Antivalue, Sartre himself suggests the form that such repose

could take.

In the next section

I

will set the ultimate

value of the in-itself-for-itself against the anti-value of
the slimy by relating them to the male and female positions
of our interpretive framework.

I

will argue that

incorporation of the anti-value of the slimy with the value
of the in-itself-for-itself could resolve the dilemma

presented by man's "useless passion."

The positions

:

Sartre's concept of the

transphenomenality of being moves him away from the extreme
one.
of the male position and brings him closer to a female
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The in itself exceeds all categories since there are as many

ways of illuminating it as there are for-itselves to

illuminate it.
define it.

Reality exceeds the social categories used to

The specificity of my life goes beyond those

categories.

The human conduct of particular for-itselves is

given objective forms by others who perceive that behavior
fr.om

the outside.

Such exteriorization of what were free

acts gives rise to a Symbolic structure of techniques and

characteristics with social significance.

But all that can

be said about another's conduct is an exteriorization of that

conduct.

It distorts

it by giving it an outside meaning that

cancels out the free upsurge of an individual project.

In

taking various attitutdes to the Symbolic, the various
techniques and meaning structures available to one, each

person surpasses the Symbolic in choosing his or her own

particular relation to being.

The original choice of one's

relation to being sets the parameters for all one's other
choices.
the word.

It is not a rational choice in the normal sense of

There are no possible grounds for making such

a

choice since it is the choice itself that constitutes one's
That is,

end and thus one's situation in light of that end.
it

is this choice that reveals the in-itself and gives it

meaning
Sartre's emphasis on one's absolute freedom of choice

challenges the Symbolic's authority to tell me who

I

am.

I

do not create a self by taking up a position granted me by

the Law of the Father

—

I

create a self by projecting myself
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toward my own possibilities.

I

reveal and interpret the

positions laid out in the Symbolic in light of an end of my
own choosing.

is because I'm making the choice

It

make

I

that the positions of the Symbolic appear to me as they
do.

Sartre rejects any transcendental source of values.

My

values do not come from God, the Father, Platonic ideals, or
others.
me,

I

Even though meaning structures may exist outside of

surpass them in living out my own choice of being.

transcendent me

The

project in light of the fundamental

I

relation to being

I

meaning structures.

have chosen informs my attitudes to these
Thus,

in choosing or rejecting the

positions the structures that embody social relations offer,
I

pass beyond them.
My freedom can only be experienced from the inside.

Any

attempt to characterize it from the outside can only cancel
it out by freezing my choice of being into a technique with

an objective form.
in which

I

It can not capture the moment of choice

hurl myself toward a future of my own making, or

the possibility that my relation to being could be

transformed at any moment, given my next act, my next choice.
Thus, my interior life defies all description in the

Symbolic.

The moment that one's life is exteriorized from

the viewpoint of the other, my possibilities are

extinguished.

The only thing one cannot choose is whether or

not one is free.

evade my freedom

I

I

am condemned to freedom.
am in bad faith.

must accept that the choices

I

When

I

try to

To avoid bad faith,

make are finally beyond

I
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rationality and beyond the comprehension of others.

must

I

accept a freedom so absolute that it has no foundation, no
court of appeal for the fundamental choice of being it
makes.

[59]

Sartre moves away from the male position of someone

enthralled by transcendental ideals that come from above, to
a female

position with respect to one's own freedom.

In both

Nietzsche and Kierkegaard there is the feminine element of
letting go and allowing themselves to be formed

— Nietzsche

in

his receptivity to the subtlety of experience, to new

feelings and sensations that would subvert categories, and

Kierkegaard in his receptivity to an incomprehensible God.
Sartre emphasizes nothingness, the nothingness that

distinguishes the for-itself from the in-itself and thereby
saves it from being meaningless matter.

[60]

Sartre thus

narrowly confines his move toward the female position.

All

three grant a lack of rational foundation for ultimate
values, but while Nietzsche confronts a seething array of

conflicting forces and Kierkegaard confronts the
incomprehensible will of God, Sartre confronts nothingness.
We do not simply take up a position in the Symbolic, we

choose one.

And in choosing such

position we authorize it

a

in light of our fundamental project.

guide us in choosing our project.

We have nothing to

We reject the security of

being inheritors of the Law of the Father, only to assert
that it is our freedom that creates that Law.

Thus,

Sartre
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rejects the authority of the Symbolic in order to assert the
y of each

individual to create a Law unto himself.

There is a price to be paid for making this move.
fact,

In

far from feeling supremely confident with this new

position of power, Sartre is terribly burdened with the

responsibility that goes along with it.

[61]

Now, being a

person means not only upholding the Law of the Father, it
means creating it.

He must continue to stake out an

identity, but with the understanding that the Symbolic given

him as aid and support is a fraud.

It cannot tell him who he

is or how to be because no matter what position he takes up

in it,

his choice surpasses it.

Sartre has reoriented the

project of subjectivity by saying that each one of us must
posit our own ideals, posit our own transcendence

complete responsibility for it.

But,

it

— and

take

is still non-

existent ideals that pull us away from the in-itself, that

allow us to escape the in-itself by negating it.

On Sartre's

view,

each one of us must become the Father of the Law on our

own.

Having granted a transphenomenality to being that ever

threatens to overflow the categories of thought, and having
done away with the possibility of

from above

(God)

,

a

transcendental grounding

or an instinctual upsurge for grounding

from within (such as the will to power)

staring straight in the face of

a

,

Sartre is left

world that threatens to

absorb him entirely with only the negating power of

nothingness to protect him.

[62]
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The slimy is ambiguous,

soft, between two realms.

It

threatens to appropriate the for- itself, to turn the for—
itself into the in-itself.

It

is a feminine sucking that

lures the for-itself into forgetting tis freedom and its

responsibility for creating

a

Law unto itself.

itself allows the slimy to trap it,
its ideal of in-itself-for-itself

drawn to the anti-ideal of

a

,

If the for-

it will fail to attain

and instead it will be

being in which the

foundationless in-itself has priority over the for-itself
(p.778).

Both ideals involve an intermediate being between

two realms of being.

And yet Sartre sets them at opposite

poles--one is an ideal to be attained, the other an ideal to
flee.

The question is, how different are the two ideals?

Feminine slime is soft and leechlike.

It wants to be an

individual, and yet allows itself to be dissolved into its
past.

It

invites the for-itself to appropriate it, but then

compromises the for-itself'

s

appropriating activity.

anti-value of the slimy draws the for-itself into
being where the for-itself'

s

a

the

realm of

freedom is put into doubt.

It

is no longer creatively appropriating an object in light of

its own project,

it

is being appropriated.

Its freedom is

contaminated and the radical split between in-itself and foritself is compromised.

The value of the in-itself-for-itself

draws the for-itself into
itself

's

a

realm of being where the for-

freedom remains intact and the radical split between

in-itself and for-itself is maintained.

[63]
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Sartre undermines the authority of the Symbolic and

moves toward a female position.

tending toward dissolution

'Woman'

— beckons

he must refuse the invitation.

— soft

and leechlike,

him to receive her, but

She may accept the ambiguous

status of being between two realms, of being both

appropriator and appropriated, but he cannot.
a

He can take up

position of receptivity that goes beyond all rational

categories only with respect to his own freedom.

The pull to

forsake his male role is apparent, but he resists the

temptation by setting up the slimy as an anti-value.
Instead, he heads resolutely toward an ideal that will allow

him to keep his oppositional self-strategy intact.
like sucking is feminine.

Leech-

Letting one's project be invaded

by a thousand parasites is feminine.

In rejecting such

feminine strategies Sartre closes out the possibility of

a

new approach to the ideal of in-it self-for-itself
If

I

could accept such feminine strategies,

I

may not be

able to achieve the status of the in-itself in my continual

projection of myself towards

a

transcendent me.

But

freely choose to be founded by other consciousnesses.

receptive attentiveness to another's desire

I

I

could
In

could allow

myself to be appropriated, to be the in-itself that fulfilled
that other's current lack.

I

could appropriate an other by

giving him or her meaning in light of my own project.
same time

I

At the

could allow myself to be appropriated by him or

her by taking on the meaning (s)he gives me in light of his
or her project

If both for-itselves involved remained true
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to their original choice of being, but allowed the concrete

form secondary choices take to be shaped by the other, they

could form a reciprocal relationship.

Both would be in-

itselves for the other, but both would also exercise their
free choice as for-it selves

.

Two individuals could find the

meeting point between two free projects that could grant both
repose,

if both were receptive to conforming to the desire. of

the other within the parameters set by their own projects.

Each would then be an "emanation" of the other, at the same
time that they remained in an "indifferently external

relation" with the other due to having a project of their own
that remains unaffected by the other's project.

Together

they would be in-itself-for-itself--all consciousness, yet
complete and self-causing.

could not last for long.

Obviously,

such a state of repose

But if one took Sartre's project of

becoming in-itself-for-itself as

a

project for humanity as a

community rather than for humanity as individuals, we resolve
Sartre's dilemma.

A community of consciousnesses each with a

unique perspective, each revealing various aspects of other
for-itselves and fulfilling various lacks, could conceivably
achieve a state of self-causing repose.

It may not be a

"realistic" project, but it is not the hopeless deadend of a
"useless passion."

4

.

5

Conclusion
In the next chapter

I

will delineate two poles that

represent the extremes of male and female positioning and the
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se ^ ^“Strategies correlated with these two poles.

To do so

I

will make use of the discussion of alternate self-strategies
of chapter three, as well as of insights gleaned from my

readings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre.

Here

I

will

draw some tentative conclusions from the readings of
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre given in this chapter.
K i$ rkggflflr(j

We saw that for Silentio,

:

subverting

Symbolic categories involves deferring to the desire of an
other.

That means using a feminine self-strategy that values

satisfying the desire of an other over maintaining Symbolic
categories.

A masculine self-strategy would sacrifice

connectedness for maintaining a self that was positioned in
the Symbolic.

Once we relate the universal to the Symbolic and the

position of Abraham to

a

female position that values

deferring to the desire of the other

— being

desires— over maintaining the Symbolic,

what that other

we can go on to say

that such a priority can lead one to be "taken out of the

universal," and fill out what that means.

Thus,

we can see

how the female position can jeopardize one's standing in the

Symbolic order and therefore jeopardize one's identity.

Letting another's desire inform one can take one beyond the

universal without destroying one's identity if one receives
the desire of the other with faith that one will be returned
to the universal.

Nietzsche

:

While Kierkegaard doesn't address the

question of how one goes about changing Symbolic categories,
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Nietzsche does.

Correlating Nietzsche's values and concepts

to the Symbolic, we can take the female position as one that

chooses to prioritize something other than those values and
concepts.

Symbolic categories are created not through

attentiveness to the desire of an other, but through
receptiveness to subtle messages of the body.

This relates

to the desire for body connectedness and responsiveness

discussed in chapter two as well as our discussion of
Irigaray's "sensation-ideas" in chapter three.
Sartre

:

Our reading of Sartre revealed a

characterization of a masculine self-strategy that is afraid
of losing its legitimacy.

If he can't maintain a masculine

self-strategy with respect to woman, he will become what she
wants and so lose the ability to position himself.

Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Sartre doesn't take up
position to either God or body-sensations.
impose categories upon the world.

Unlike
a

female

he needs to

He thus can't see the

feminine self-strategy as a viable alternative, which means
that any break-down in the masculine self-strategy will lead
to a failure of identity.

NOTES

[1]

Again, I am deliberately leaving the applicability
of my characterization of "masculine" and "feminine"
strategies open.
I believe that Freudian and Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory is the best theory we have to explain
how selves are formed and maintained.
This does not mean,
however, that it is "correct" in any universal sense of the
word.
Just as feminists have taken issue with other
feminists for purporting to have the story about women's
experience (see chapter one, section 1.5), feminists have
taken issue with psychoanalysis for purporting to have the
story about how human beings become socialized persons
Just
as purporting to have the story about 'woman' cancels out
important differences among women, so does purporting to have
fch.e story about self-constitution cancel out important
differences in self-constituting activity.
I believe that Freudian and Lacanian theory is an
important and effective tool in trying to understand the
constitution and maintenance of selves in patriarchal,
capitalist societies with some form of the nuclear family
(i.e., family positions that include a father, a mother, and
children)
but I do not want to close out the possibility
that it may work better for some cultures than others, some
time periods than other time periods, and that in some times
and places it may not work at all.
I do not have space in
this work to investigate that possibility further, but I do
not think that possibility detracts from the appeal of
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis was developed in Western
patriarchal, capitalist culture from the 19th century onward,
and despite any reservations I might have about proclaiming
anything approaching universal applicability before further
investigation, I feel it has received adequate confirmation
of its applicability in and by the culture that developed it
to warrant endorsing it.
Also see my footnote ([1]) on a similar point in chapter
.

.

three
[2] A "deconst ructive " reading is a reading that is in
tradition, especially as exemplified
post-structuralist
the
term here because it speaks to a new
this
I
use
by Derrida.
more in keeping with the
strategy
interpretive
kind of
Lacanian view of the self as radically contingent and
"decentered" that I have been developing here. For more on
deconstruction and its influence on the interpretation of
texts, see Derrida (1978), Dews (1987), Felman (1982), Harari
(1979), Leitch (1983), Moi (1985), Silverman and Inde (1985),
Sturrock (1979) and Taylor (1987)

on the
[3] Mark Taylor, in commenting on a paper I gave
Kierkegaard section of this chapter, said that the Lacanian
notion of 'woman' is inseparably bound to the Real and that
which eludes binary oppositions. To understand the Lacanian
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notion of woman we would thus need to think through the
Lacanian notion of the Real
Woman as the Real is the
Goddess, the figure for what can't be figured, that which is
the condition of the possibility of sexual difference as
such, an other of a more radical sort than the other of a
male/female opposition an other that is always already
excluded from the Symbolic order and yet always speaking
through that order. Taylor's comments on 'woman' lead him to
posit Kierkegaard's God as a Goddess; Kierkegaard's divine
Other is the maternal Other rather than the transcendent
father
As I mentioned in chapter two, footnote six, I have not
had the space in this work to do Lacan's notion of the Real
justice.
Although I find Taylor's comments suggestive-especially in light of the ambiguity of positioning with
respect to female and divine others that I will be exploring
in Fear and Trembling
I feel that they enhance rather than
challenge the interpretation of Fear and Trembling I give in
this chapter.
To suggest, as Taylor suggested, that Lacan
and Kierkegaard are more interested in the moment of the Real
that is irreducibly other, a moment that can't be
domesticated in self /other relations, and to assert that the
Real is irreducibly other (as Taylor did)
speaks to the male
positioning of all three. Woman as the Real, as Goddess, as
irreducibly other the maternal Other that is not oneself-this is precisely the kind of opposition I am challenging in
positing both the possibility of connectedness between
embodied others as well as the possibility of generating new
meaning in the playspace of such connectedness.
1

1

.

—

—

,

—

is misleading to say decisions in Kierkegaard's
sense are made in the aesthetic sphere since the aesthete
[4]

It

prefers to reflect on possibilities, but Kierkegaard also
thinks that at this stage there is no actual self to take
See Taylor (1975, 128-130)
position up.

a

.

Discussions of the differences among the three
interrelationships, and the positions taken up
their
spheres,
pseudonyms, that I have found
Kierkegaardian
various
by
include: Dunning (1985),
section
this
writing
in
useful
and Taylor (1975).
Malantschuk
(1971)
Mackey (1971),
[5]

writing
[6] Thompson (1967) suggests that Kierkegaard in
self-therapy
of
form
in
a
engaged
was
works
pseudonymous
his
designed to provide him relief from the misery of his life.
Others (e.g., Croxal 1956 and Taylor 1975) have emphasized
Kierkegaard's characterization of these works as a form of
"indirect communication" designed to enable the reader to
come to a subjective understanding of possibilities for
Although Thompson's reading strikes me as a bit
existence.
the
crass (reducing Kierkegaard to a patient on the couch)
selfof
process
idea that Kierkegaard was engaged in his own
that
time
same
the
transformation in the act of writing, at
,

273

he was encouraging his readers to engage in that process, is
in keeping with my claim that the production of meaning is

also a self-constituting process.

[7] Dunning claims Silentio's point of view is an
ethical interpretation of how the religious stage differs
from the ethical (1985, 124)

[8] For discussions/characterizations of the two
Kierkegaardian concepts, the 'universal' and the 'ethical'
that I have found useful, see Robert Perkins' "For Sanity's
Sake: Kant, Kierkegaard, and Father Abraham," Merold
Westphal's "Abraham and Hegel," Paul Holmer's "About Being
and Person: Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling " and C. Stephen
Evans' "Is the Concept of an Absolute Duty toward God Morally
Unintelligible?" all in Perkins (1981)
.

[9] This reading of the ethical realm as involving duty
as well as communication is borne out in Fear and Trembling
by Silentio's emphasis on revealing oneself: "his [the single
individual's] ethical task is to work himself out of his

hiddenness and to become disclosed in the universal"
(Kierkegaard 1983, 82).
See also David Wren's "Abraham's
Silence and the Logic of Faith" and Mark Taylor's "Sounds of
Silence," both in Perkins (1981)
.

[10] See Lemaire (1977) for a discussion of Lacan's
'Symbolic' as a term referring to both a hierarchy of social
positions as well as symbolic/linguistic codes. Some have
argued against any such "facile" correlation. Since I am
arguing here that a social position is the function of taking
up a position as a grammatical subject within
symbolic/linguistic codes, however, I feel the correlation is

warranted
The story of Abraham and Isaac is given in Genesis
22:1-18.
Biblical comments on it include Hebrews 11:17-19
and James 2:21-23.
[11]

For a historical discussion of some interpretations
of the Abraham/Isaac story preceding Kierkegaard's see Louis
Jacobs' "The Problem of the Akedah in Jewish Thought" and
David Pailin’s "Abraham and Isaac: A Hermeneutical Problem
Before Kierkegaard," both in Perkins (1981).
[12]

The positioning of the beloved as the other in the
I am
following discussion is not entirely unproblematic.
of
analogy/disanalogy
primarily interested in the
lover/beloved relationships with the Abraham/God
It is due to loving someone the lover cannot
relationship.
have according to the strictures of the universal that he
feels the impulse to defy the universal, just as it is
Abraham's love for and desire to maintain connectedness with
[13]
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that lead Abraham to defy the universal.
As we will
however, in the discussion of the sketch about the
lad/princess relationship, the lad as the knight of faith can
get the princess "by virtue of the absurd," just as Abraham
can get his son back "by virtue of the absurd." Here the
lover/beloved relationship is more in keeping with the
Abraham/Isaac relationship than the Abraham/God relationship.
That the only sketch Silentio gives which suggests any
possibility for consummation of a male/female relationship
involves the ambiguity of situating the beloved in the Isaacposition rather than the God-position undermines that
possibility. Just as Abraham can't communicate his
connectedness with God to Isaac, the lad can't communicate
his connectedness with God to the princess.
This leaves full
translation of their union into the universal an

God,
see,

impossibility
[14] On the terms of the theory of self I'm developing
here we could put this situation as follows: Given who he is
and who the princess is, connection between the two is
forbidden.
The self /other patterning the lad uses to
maintain self-continuity doesn't allow him to have the
princess as an object that can satisfy his desire. For the
connectedness of satisfied desire, either the lad or the
princess would have to shift positions. Such a shift of
position would involve a rupture in identity that would defy
rational self-understanding. And yet, he loves the princess
as an embodied other in a way that defies all such
positioning

[15] Again, on my terms, we might put this thus: He
constitutes himself as a self that desires this other, the
princess
Instead of cancelling out his felt response to the
princess by denying his love, he chooses to remember her,
despite the disruption this causes his self/other patterning.
.

On my terms: His self /other patterning vis a vis
remains the same, but he retains the self
others
embodied
with the princess by maintaining a
in
contact
created
self
distinct from the outer self that
inner
spiritual
of social positionality.
universal
the
navigates
[16]

[17] Mark Taylor argues in "Sounds of Silence" (in
Perkins 1983) that while silence is a necessity in the
immediate moment of the aesthetic sphere and in the religious
sphere, the ethical person must speak: "The absence of
individual selfhood and the inability to use language
necessitate the silence of aesthetic immediacy .... The direct,
unmediated radically privatized individualized relation of
the believer to God cannot be conveyed in the universal
categories of thought and language" (p.186); "the ethicist
argues that a person is duty bound to speak, to come out of
concealment and to reveal publicly the ground of his deeds.
Silence is a moral transgression in which one refuses to
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express himself in terms of universality and clings to
particularity" (p.180).
[18] This point is made by Silentio's sketch of the
story of Agamemnon (Kierkegaard 1983, 87)
Agamemnon is a
"tragic hero" rather than a knight of faith because his
actions are readily intelligible to us.
It was tragic he had
to sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia.
Killing her is not in
keeping with the ethical commitment to love one's daughter.
But since he did it due to the "higher" ethical consideration
of saving a whole city, we can accept his act as an act of
sacrifice
.

[19] For a discussion of the merman's four alternatives
in terms of silence see Taylor’s "Sounds of Silence," in
Perkins (1981)
[20] In my terms, such translation comes down to taking
up a position as a subject that is intelligible to oneself
and others

[21] Again, in my terms, the interests of an absolute
relation to the absolute would be the desire for the pleasure
of connectedness with an other that defies the possibilities
for positioning available to one in the Symbolic.
[22] As an aesthete the merman is engaged in poeticizing
the woman to be the other that will satisfy his lust.
Her
innocence disarms him into wanting to make a commitment to
her.
This takes him into the ethical sphere.
[23] C. Stephen Evans (1983) argues that the ethical
person committed to maintaining commitments and living up to
an ethical ideal is doomed to failure and thus doomed to feel
guilt for being unable to become what she's taken
responsibility for becoming. Such guilt pushes the ethical
person into the religious sphere due to the realization that
the only way toward salvation from sin (one's inevitable
failure to be all one could be) is through the grace of God
i.e., through recognition of one's dependence on an Other.

He's at
[24] As an aesthete, the merman has no self.
His positioning is that of
the mercy of fleeting desires.
For
one who attempts to avoid all positioning entirely.
discussions of this kind of positioning of the aesthete in
terms of a failure to achieve selfhood, see Taylor (1974)
[25] Dunning (1985) demonstrates that self-development
from one sphere of existence to the next can be traced in the
pseudonymous works as a complicated dialectical development
of inner and outer natures and of self and other that
(ideally) ends up in the sphere of existence Kierkegaard
calls religiousness B. On his view, one's inner and outer
natures are furthest apart in the aesthetic and religious
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spheres of life, and are closest together in the ethical
sphere.
Commentators on Kierkegaard have criticized him for
stressing the inwardness of religiousness B (the ultimate
goal of selfhood) in a way that renders any prospect for
community problematic. For example, Mackey comments: "the
existence of other men presents him [the religious man] not
with a public in which he is firmly set as a part sustained
by an organic whole, but only with further possibilit ies-beckoning, tempting, or threatening that he must take into
the gamut of his inner life.... His own inwardness is the only
reality .. .with which he is properly occupied" (1971, 190).

—

[26] This comes out most clearly in the Birth of Tragedy
(Nietzsche 1968b) where Nietzsche draws a distinction between
the Dionysian and the Apollonian.
In this work he seems to
suggest that the Dionysian is the primal state of existence-a state of pure undifferentiated flux ("...the
objectification of a Dionysian state ... represents ... the
shattering of the individual and his fusion with primal
being" (65); "...the primordial contradiction and primordial
pain in the heart of the primal unity .. .beyond and prior to
It is therefore real in a way that the
all phenomena" (55)
Apollonian attempts to organize that flux are not:
"For
Apollo wants to grant repose to individual beings precisely
by drawing boundaries between them and by again and again
calling these to mind as the most sacred laws of the world,
with his demands for self-knowledge and measure" (72)
"...the Apollinian tears man from his orgiastic selfannihilation and blinds him to the universality of the
Dionysian process, deluding him to the belief that he is
seeing a single image of the world" (128)
)

;

.

[27] With the renewed interest in Nietzsche there have
been updated readings that argue that Nietzsche went beyond
That is, although
an Apollonian/Dionysian dichotomy.
Nietzsche, in his earliest work, The Birth of Tragedy seems
to argue that "reality" is ultimately chaotic and anything we
say about it no more than a dream or illusion, his later
works go beyond even this appearance/reality split to assert
Thus, people like
that there is nothing beyond appearances.
Nietzsche's
that
argue
Megill
(1985)
and
Nehemas (1985)
of truth.
theory
aesthetic
an
down
to
comes
i
vism
per spect
Nietzsche associates Dionysian chaos with the
"...by the mystical triumphant cry of Dionysus
"feminine":
individuation is broken, and the way lies open
of
spell
the
to the Mothers of Being, to the innermost heart of things
Also see Kelly
From The Birth of Tragedy (1968b, 99-100)
Oliver's discussions of the "feminine" in Nietzsche (1984,
In keeping with my reading of the female position as
1988)
other in
a position that attends to bodily sensations of the
s
Nietzsche
order to satisfy the other's desire, I am taking
the
beyond
concept of Dionysian chaos as life-experience
generalizing scope of language. Thus, my notion of Dionysian
,

.

.
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chaos is not something beyond appearances, a reality out of
our reach.
Rather, it is intrinsic to human experience.
Also see Jean Granier's "Nietzsche's Conception of Chaos" and
"Perspectivism and Interpretation," both in Allison (1985).
[28] See the section of "On Truth and Lie in an ExtraMoral Sense" published in Nietzsche (1968a) and Hinman's
article on Nietzsche's view of metaphor. Hinman argues that
Nietzsche felt all concepts were metaphorical since no two
experiences are the same. Thus, Nietzsche breaks down the
distinction between literal and metaphorical language:
"the
categories and concepts in terms of which we order experience
have no more epistemic justification than other metaphors,
except for the fact that we have forgotten their metaphorical
origins and let them harden into normative measures of
reality itself" (Hinman 1982, 189)
Also see Kofman (1972)
.

[29] "With a creative hand they reach for the future,
and all that is and has been becomes a means for them, an
instrument, a hammer.
Their "knowing" is creaf na their
creating is a legislation, their will to truth is
will to
power " From Bevond Good and Evil #211 (Nietzsche 1968b,
Also see #260 of Beyond Good and Evil and "On the
326)
Thousand and One Goals" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
i

.

—

.

.

.

#246.
Schutte comments:
[30] See Beyond Good and Evil
"one might say that the self engaged in authentic
understanding of itself needs to have a fine ear for the
tunes that the body and the unconscious are playing in it and
for it" (1984, 46)
In a talk Kofman gave at a Nietzsche
conference (U. Mass., Amherst, spring, 1986) she referred to
Nietzsche's "third ear" as the intuitive ear of woman that
situates itself beyond metaphysical oppositions of truth and
See Lorraine et
error, good and bad, clarity and obscurity.
Also see Derrida's discussion of Nietzsche's
al (1986)
"ear" in Otobiographies (1984)
.

All quotes from Nietzsche in the text are from
I will cite section
Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche 1968b)
numbers from this work rather than page numbers from now on.
[31]

.

[32]

to power,

For a discussion of the irrationality of the will
"The Will to Power" in Allison
see Alphonso Lingis
'

(1985)

For discussion of Nietzsche's nihilism see Deleuze
(1983) and Maurice Blanchot's "The Limits of Experience:
Nihilism" and Eric Blondel's "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor,"
both in Allison (1985).
[33]

We could say that although Nietzsche doesn't
explicitly address the desire of an other in the text, the
speaking 'I' of his text subverts conventional language in
[34]

278

order to attentively respond to the desire of his own Other.
That is, repetition of the same self/other pattern is
thwarted in order to attend to and attempt to reflect the
barely audible, barely intelligible signals of an Other not
yet incorporated into such patterning.
This Other, being all
aspects of his experience not yet incorporated into his selfsystem, is a bit more amorphous than Kierkegaard's God who at
least desires specific things of his creations.
[35] "Whatever makes them rule and triumph and shine, to
the awe and envy of their neighbors, that is to them the
high, the first, the measure, the meaning of all things."
From "On the Thousand and One Gaols" in Thus Spok^
Zarathustra (Nietzsche 1966, 58)
[36] "Your love of life shall be love of your highest
hope; and your highest hope shall be the highest thought of
life.
Your highest thought, however, you should receive as a
command from me
and it is: man is something that shall be
overcome." From "On War and Warriors" in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra (Nietzsche 1966, 48)

—

[37] Schutte argues that there are two uses of the willto-power notion in Nietzsche: "In one case, power is used in
the sense of domination, whereas in the other it is used in
the sense of recurring energy" (1984, 76)
She relates the
former to Nietzsche's notion of the higher man of Bevond Good
and Evil who overcomes morality and the latter to the overman
of Thus Spoke Zarathustra who engages in the self-overcoming
of morality: "Self-overcoming involves the overcoming of the
Apollonian principle of individuation and drive to permanence
in favor of the greater reality of the Dionysian flow of
existence in which the boundaries between subject and object,
time and eternity disappear" (1984, 86)
Schutte feels that
Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism wasn't radical enough to get
him beyond the dualisms of strong versus weak, master versus
slave (p. 190)
She further claims that this failure
manifests itself in his depiction of love between the sexes
(the sex drive seen as an instinct of domination
p. 177)
community
need
for
human
distrust
the
and in his tendency to

—

(p.

180)

For discussions of Nietzsche's "deconstruction" of
see Derrida (1979), Krell (1986) and Oliver (1984,

[38]

'woman'
1988)
.

[39]

See Derrida's Spurs

(1979)

and Oliver’s rendition

of Derrida's position (1984)

Of course, man, in his attempts to assume selfsufficiency, must evade this feeling of lack through mastery.
It is woman, or Truth, that is dependent on him and his
By
It is he who possesses them.
mastery and not vice versa.
[40]
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mastering the both of them he will finally be the whole man
that he is supposed to be.
Despite Nietzsche's
deconstruction" here of the notions of 'truth' and 'woman'
we will see that he is still drawn to the notions of mastery
and possession.
[41] "The "world," "essence" are themselves texts
written by a particular type of will. The idea of an
original music of the world is replaced by an original text
of which human texts function only as metaphors: all text
becomes correlated with an interpretation that constitutes a
determined sense, provisional, symptomatic of the domination
of the world and other types of life by a certain type of
life" (Kofman 1972, 121
my translation)
Also see
Kaufmann (1968) and Nehemas (1985)

—

.

[42] "In effect all construction is the expression of an
internal architecture, that is, a certain hierarchizat ion of
instincts, the subordination of a multiplicity of instincts
to the strongest instinct that thus serves as a provisional
center of perspective" (Kofman 1972, 90
my translation)

—

[43] In Spurs (1979), Derrida refers to three kinds of
women in Nietzsche: "Woman, inasmuch as truth, is scepticism
and veiling dissimulation" (p 57); "Feminism is nothing but
the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a
man .... Feminism too seeks to castrate .... Gone the style" (p.
65; and "In the instance of the third proposition ... woman is
recognized and affirmed as an affirmative power, a
dissimulatress an artist, a dionysiac
She affirms
herself, in and of herself, in man" (p. 97), and comments:
"He [Nietzsche] was, he dreaded this castrated woman.
He
was, he dreaded this castrating woman.
he was, he loved this
affirming woman" (p. 101)
Krell (1986) picked up on this
Derridean view of Nietzsche as the deconstructor of 'woman'
who moved beyond gender categories by taking up feminine
positions in his text. On this reading, Nietzsche's
misogynist comments refer to social constructions of 'woman'
rather than women themselves. This view is more
sophisticated than Kaufmann 's view (Kaufmann 1968) that we
can simply bracket Nietzsche's misogynist comments as
I am in agreement with
aberrations of Nietzsche's time.
"Nietzsche
does not, as both
when
she
says:
however,
Oliver,
Derrida and Krell suggest, want to become woman" (1988, 28);
Nietzsche's desire,
"rather, he desires to possess woman.
not the desire of a
It
is
then, is not a feminine desire.
(the desire to
desire
masculine
Rather, it is a
woman.
25).
impregnation)"
(1988,
possess through
.

.

,

.

.

.

.

The true, undissembled voice of Dionysian art
Amid the ceaseless flux of phenomena
cries: ""Be as I am!
primordial mother, eternally
creative
am the eternally
finding satisfaction in
eternally
existence,
impelling to
[44]

I
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this change of phenomena!"" From Birth of Tragedy section 16
(Nietzsche 1968b, 104).
Oliver comments: "Nietzsche
repeatedly uses metaphors of biological reproduction 'womb
of being', 'mother eternally pregnant', 'procreative life'
to describe the Dionysian force.
Nietzsche's Dionysian type
is continually be reproducing.
The biological metaphors
which Nietzsche uses to describe the will to power are
metaphors of reproduction, procreation, motherhood" (1988,
Also see Eric Blondel's "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor"
26)
(in Allison 1985) for a discussion of Nietzsche's "central"
image of the " vita feminia ."
r

—

—

.

.

[45]

See Kaufmann (1968)

[46] Deleuze refers to life-enhancing and life-denying
forces of life as becoming-active and becoming-reactive
forces: "Becoming-active is affirming and affirmative, just
as becoming-reactive is negating and nihilistic" (1983, 68)
Schutte, however, feels that Deleuze 's distinction "remains
conceptually tied to the old notion of the struggle for power
between the forces of good and evil" (1984, 90)
She
distinguishes two versions of Nietzsche's will to power: "The
Ubermensche who symbolizes "the ability of human beings to be
at one with the process of life and death without building up
walls and mental barriers against it.
It is a Dionysian
symbol reminding one of the dynamic continuity of life" (p.
.

124)

.

[47] "(T)here is a situation for consciousness to the
extent it views existent things in their totality and in
their relation ... to itself, arranging them as a world around
itself" (Jeanson 1980, 123)
Also see Warnock (1965, ch 5)
.

.

.

[48] For discussions of how one's fundamental choice of
being affects one's relationship to the world and others, see
Catalano (1980, 196-202), Hayim (1980, 50-58) and Jeanson

180-187)

(1980,

.

"(T)he For-itself is not a person, nor a substance,
nor a thing; it is merely revelation of the In-itself" (Desan
(1980, Part
I have been influenced by Catalano
1954, 10)
1-4) in my
ch
Jeanson
10-56)
and
(1980,
Two), Desan (1954,
"For-itself."
rendering of the
[49]

.

"Consciousness, in general, is a desire for
"things"; it is at all times aware of an object, with the
realization that it can never coincide with that thing which
it desires or with that which it is conscious of.... it is a
Also see
mere desire or lack. ." (Hayim 1980, 12-15)
and Warnock
126-136)
Grene
(1980,
103-106),
Catalano (1980,
[50]

.

(1965,

42-43)

.

.
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[51] "What it [the For-itself] lacks is being, which
would make it a totality, a self, i.e., itself an In—
itself.
.The For— itself is a failure.
A Being— for— it self
can never be a Being-in-it self without losing, ipso facto,
its most characteristic feature of consciousness [i.e.
freedom or nothingness]
If such a being could be
hypostat ized, realizing this utopian identification of Foritself and In-itself it would be God" (Desan 1954, 32-33)
Also see Jeanson (1980, 140)
.

.

.

,

(T) he phenomenon of being is being as revealed to
[52]
consciousness, encountered by it, while the being of
phenomenon [transphenomenal being] is apprehended by it as
the objectivity that inevitably overflows and grounds any
knowledge that consciousness has of it" (Jeanson 1980, 112)
Also see Catalano (1980, Introduction) and Grene (1980, 114-

119)

.

[53] For discussions of Sartre’s notion of bad faith,
see Catalano (1980, 78-91), Hayim (1980, 24-26), Jeanson
(1980, 127-135) and Warnock (1965, 50-62)

"Ontologically, the Other appears as an alien
as the upsurge of another subjectivity with its own
consciousness as well as with its own desire for a human
world" (Hayim 1980, 32)
Other commentators that have also
influenced my reading of Sartre's "other" are: Catalano
(1980, Part Three), Desan (1954, 65-95), Grene (1980, ch
5),
Jeanson (1980, ch. 5) and Warnock (1965, ch. 3)
[54]

freedom,

.

.

[55]

Also see Desan (1954,

116).

[56] It's important to remember that I am restricting my
Although
discussion to the Sartre of Being and Nothingness
it would be interesting to compare this Sartre to the later
Sartre of say, the Critique of Dialectical Reason especially
on this point, I will not do that here.
.

,

[57] For discussions of this trio (to do, to have, to
Catalano (1980, Part Four), Desan (1954, 121-131)
see
be),
and Hayim (1980, 61-63)
.

[58] See Margery Collins and Christine Pierce's article
on the sexist nature of this discussion (Collins and Pierce
Also see Warnock's comments on the 'viscous' (her
1979)
translation of slimy) (1965, 99-107).
.

[59] As Desan puts it: "His extreme notion of freedom
needs a For-itself which is void, completely void. he thinks
that the slightest granule of being would provide something
for deterministic influence to take hold of and that the
freedom of his pure and translucid consciousness would
thereby be destroyed (1954, 158)
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[60] "...because it is not a fixed attribute with a
certain nature, consciousness as the for-itself is also
characterized by Sartre as nothingness
Tn contrast to the
for-itself,
.the in-itself possesses no lack or
desire .... every act of consciousness is an instance of
negation, that is, of breaking away from the in-itself"
(Hayim 1980, 14-15)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

[61] "The Sartrean individual is utterly alone, wholly
responsible, making himself as the negation of a barren field
of being, in itself wholly devoid of meaning" (Grene 1983,
Also see Hayim (1980, 17)
92)
.

.

[62] "It is ... inevitable that the nihilating power of
consciousness, unable to indefinitely sustain everything and
remain[63]
present to everything, will allow phenomena to be
reabsorbed one by one into the in-itself from which
consciousness had made them emerge for itself " (Jeanson 1980,

151)

.

Many commentators have criticized Sartre's
conception of human freedom and his insistence on the radical
split between the for-itself and the in-itself (see, for
example, Desan 1954 and Grene 1983)
Judith Butler comments
on the repercussions of this dualist thinking in the context
of de Beauvoir's reading of 'woman' as 'other': "Women are
"Other" according to Beauvoir insofar as they are defined by
a masculine perspective which seeks to safeguard its own
disembodied status through identifying women generally with
the bodily sphere" (1986, 8); "...From this belief that the
body is Other, it is not a far leap to the conclusion that
others are their bodies, while the masculine "I" is a noncorporeal soul .... Beauvoir s dialectic of self and Other
argues the limits of a Cartesian version of disembodied
freedom, and implicitly criticizes the model of autonomy
upheld by these masculine gender norms" (p.9)
.

'

CHAPTER

5

CONCLUSION
5

.

1

Introduction
This dissertation is a response to the puzzle of gender—

-what function do gender categories serve, and why is it such
^

tricky business to challenge their legitimacy?

writing this dissertation was twofold.

First,

I

My goal in

wanted to

develop a theoretical framework for addressing the puzzle of
gender.

Second,

I

wanted to affirm philosophy as an activity

of human self-understanding that continues to provide

satisfying answers to current social dilemmas.
individual needs

a

Just as each

self-identity that integrates the fullest

range of her experience, thus allowing flexibility without

sacrificing passionate commitment, responsibility, or
effective agency, so do we, as

a

world community, need a

self-identity that integrates the fullest range of human
experience without trivializing or cancelling out the
experiences of those who live on the "margin."
I

[1]

believe that the struggle of each and every individual

or larger collective for recognition is crucial to the

development of

a

new worldview.

To avoid totalitarianism, no

one should give in until they're satisfied that the aspects
of their experience that would be liquidated by hegemony are

incorporated into the dominant discourse.

[2]

If we are

struggling for a new world-view--one that will nurture us as
a

whole species,

a

world community, rather than blight us

with the disease of social categories that distort or cancel
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out the rich detail of human experience

their voice to be shut out.

— no

one must allow

All must demand to be heard.

Philosophy has the task of providing individual and
collective struggles for recognition with

framework

a

flexible enough to incorporate new viewpoints without

bringing the whole edifice down,

a

world-view that will

respect multiplicity and allow new categories to multiply

without threatening to destroy any possibility of categories
at all

—a

framework that values and respects all life and

experience, rather than just the small range manifested by a

particular group of people.
This new vision is already coming to life as people

grapple with the contradictions facing us.

The contradiction

have attempted to address here is that of gender

I

— why

do we

persist in clinging to categories that attempt to box the

multi-faceted nature of human existence into two, mutually
exclusive, categories?

Obviously any conception of man vs.

woman cannot possibly hold.

Even if one restricts oneself to

human anatomy alone, hermaphrodites as well as other sexual
"anomalies" attest to the inadequacy of
[

3

a

two gender system.

]

In chapters two and three

I

developed

a

theoretical

framework from which to approach philosophical texts, using

Lacanian psychoanalysis and feminist critiques of

psychoanalysis.

Lacanian theory brought out the contingent

nature of a self that is not

a given,

but a construct that

needs continual reconstitution via self/other relationships
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if it si to be maintained.

A look at object relations theory

and feminist critiques of psychoanalysis brought out aspects
of this self that Lacanian analysis
bi- as

overlooked.

— due

to its own male

With the help of these psychoanalytic

theories and the background of a philosophical tradition that
places the self in a social context,

I

developed

a

theoretical framework that delineated two different selfstrategies for creating and maintaining self-identity.

exploring three versions of masculine self-strategies

By
I

have

underlined the ideal nature of "masculine” and "feminine".
Even as self-strategies the two poles of the male and female

positions are no more than abstractions from the myriad ways

self-strategies actually play themselves out in the

interconnecting field of human relations.
look at philosophers

I

By choosing to

felt were pushing against the

boundaries of "masculine" self-strategies,

I

underlined the

possibility of collapsing male and female self-strategies
into one, more flexible, strategy that could reap the

advantages of both.

I

[4]

have argued that the philosophers

I

looked at could

not make this move to incorporate the two strategies due to

the conceptual barrier of their gender categories.

I

have

also suggested that there is a critical point for each and

every individual--a point of no return— when they are faced

with the dilemma of the collapse of gender categories, and
that this dilemma is not

a

trivial one.

Until we take this
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dilemma seriously we will not be able to go beyond gender

categories

,

and we will not be able to resolve the current

power struggles that face us.

Truly reciprocal relationships

require the abandonment of a rigid, mutually exclusive, two—

gender system.

Although such reciprocal relationships may

require something approaching "androgyny,

term here for two reasons.

"

I

do not use that

despite my belief that we

One,

need to move toward a "new" kind of subjectivity, one which
incorporates the two self-strategies without the conceptual

barrier of rigid gender categories,
connotation that there should be
human subjects.

It

a

I

want to avoid the

uniform self-strategy for

is not difference between men and women

that should be eradicated--but restrictions on differences in

self-strategies due to gender categories.
should evolve out of the context of

a

Self-strategies

particular individual's

life experience in response to that individual's particular

problems in creating and maintaining subjectivity.
in my readings of Kierkegaard,

As we saw

Nietzsche and Sartre, they

could not resolve certain problems due to their own reading
of gender categories

.

I

am interested in what kind of

solutions we might find for such problems if we could get
past the gender categories that restrict us.
Two,

"androgyny" is too easily read as effeminate

masculinity.

That is, because the masculine self-st rategy is

the accepted "norm" for personhood in dominant Western

culture, any attempt to envision a new kind of human subject

tends to take this norm as its basis and throw in

a few
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feminine

aspects for good niessure

Before we csn

.

articulate what the incorporation of two self "Strategies in

a

way that breaks the conceptual barrier of gender categories
m ^-9ht entail, we need to be able to articulate and valorize

the "repressed" self-strategy--the feminine.
In the third section of this chapter

Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre

(or,

I

[5]

will compare

to be more precise,

Silentio, Nietzsche and Sartre)

as representatives of

variations of a male position.

In the fourth,

I

will explore

suggestions for a new kind of self-strategy

I

see emerging

from their texts.

I

will discuss

And in the fifth section

further possibilities for the theoretical framework developed

here in light of philosophy as an enterprise and a feminist

project

5

.

2

Interpretive Framework
The interpretive framework

restricted one.

I

I

am developing here is a

have generated it using Lacanian

psychoanalysis, critiques of Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the
idealist tradition of Western continental 19th and 20th

century philosophers.

cross-culturally is

a

Whether this framework could apply
question that

I

leave open.

I

am here

interested in seeing how these traditions can be brought to
bear on the question of gender in the context of

philosophical texts that are

a

part of this tradition.

My interpretive framework stands as follows: We can

characterize two poles that represent "pure" femaleness and
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"pure" maleness.

That is, we can characterize two modes of

being that are so radically distinct from one another that
they are opposed and mutually exclusive in the strictest
sense of those words.
one of these poles.

No one could actually personify either

Briefly, we can characterize the two

poles as follows:
The female PQlg: The purely and eternally feminine is chaotic
flux.

It

is life in its concrete specificity

— so

concrete

that it escapes any and all attempts to characterize it via

general categories.

The eternally feminine mode of being

takes each and every aspect of life as completely unique and

unrepeatable

— so

much so that the attempt to characterize

this mode of being in words immediately falsifies it.

It

is

beyond language, beyond all attempts to label, describe or
even point it out.

Even to say that "each and every aspect

of life is unique" is false,

since without names or any kind

of generalizations to help us distinguish one aspect of life

from another, all aspects flow into one another and there is

only an overwhelming chaos within which no distinctions can
be made and in which no selves or perspectives can

distinguish themselves.
because

a

This pole can only be a limit

self at this position is a contradiction in terms.

There can be no purely feminine self since such

a

self would

be completely unable to distinguish itself from the life

around it.

It would be

dissolved into

a

chaotic flux of life

that pulsated along with no beginning, middle or end.

289

The male pQle

:

The purely and eternally male is changeless,

eternal, harmonic order.

It

is a complete,

self-sufficient,

completely rational, changeless map of the universe in which

everything and everyone has its unique place plotted out for
3-11

time.

It contains all categories

every nuance of life.
is,

It

necessary for capturing

is the real rendered orderly.

it is the real with everything in its proper place,

That
the

proper order toward which the universe is striving, the only
order where absolutely everything and everyone has the place
that is in harmony with all other places.

The harmony of the

whole where all of life is finally brought into harmony, all

things follow their appropriate course and nothing is in
conflict.

It

is life made perfect,

rendered completely

intelligible and rational, where all connections are clear
and intelligible, and everything is connected to everything
else.

It

is completely characterizable via the perfect

language that reflects all the categories it has.

Everything

has its boundaries and definable ways of relating to

everything else.

Nothing is muddled, confused or blurred.

All is complete clarity and distinctness.

This pole can only

be a limit because a self at this position is also a

contradiction in terms.

There can be no purely masculine

self since such a self would be motionless.
it would not need to change.

It

Being perfect,

would remain in a state of

suspension in the only place in which it truly belongs.

All

would be known, desire would be sated, and all would remain
fixed in their positions with no need or desire to move, no
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lack to push them to reach for what they don't have.
no change,

Thus,

no movement, no life.

Having set up these two poles, we discovered that we

could characterize two self-strategies, each related to one
of which took one of these poles as its guiding ideal:
T he female self-strategy

connectedness.

:

This self-strategy is based in

The feminine self who makes predominant use

of the female self-strategy is a self who maintains self-

continuity by maintaining connectedness with others.

She

must always be connected to an other who informs her, gives
her her meaning and her function, by demanding her to play
the role of other.

That is,

she takes on the shape that will

satisfy the desire of a self.

She reflects back to this self

the image that self desires to see.

self /other pattern set by another.

She conforms to the
She conforms to this

self /other pattern by responding to that self's desire with
no self parameters of her own to hold her back.

She becomes

whatever self will fit the form provided by the "other" of
the other's self /other pattern.

She gives first priority to

connectedness, to the fusion experienced by fitting so

closely to the desire of an other that she feels that other's
desire as her how and so desires what the other desires--that
she be the "other" that will affirm the other's self.

She

cares very little about the pattern of social positions laid
out by the Symbolic.

Instead, her attention is completely on

the specificity of those others in her life whose "other" she

plays.

She cares very little about the "rational" code for
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ing

and.

transposing

a

particular self-identity

through the positions of the Symbolic.

She attends instead

to the concrete specificity of the particular individuals in

front of her in order to take on whatever shape they give
f

this is within the socially acceptable parameters of

the Symbolic,

fine.

If not,

subvert those parameters.

she is perfectly content to

Her priority is satisfying the

concrete desire of a particular other for an "other" that
will satisfy that other's self /other pattern.
The male self-strategy

opposition.

:

This self-strategy is based on

The male self who maintains himself with

a

male

self-strategy must always oppose himself to those around him.
He takes the self of a self/other pattern created in early

childhood, and he attempts to translate and transpose this
self through the social positions of the Symbolic by finding

others to play the "other" of his self/other pattern that
will repeatedly confirm and so maintain
of his original self.

a

recognizable form

Unless the other is willing to conform

to his self/other pattern, he must establish a connection

guide to

with the other by using his self/other pattern as

a

staking out the Symbolic positions between them.

He can thus

build up the layers of his identity to fit various situations
and social contexts by using the logic of the same— rules of

analogy and similarity--to translate his identity with the
help of the Symbolic categories available to him.

Through

the various meaning structures at his disposal, he can find
the self/other pattern suitable for a situation he has never
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before encountered by ordering that situation via socially

acceptable categories and finding his appropriate position
vis a vis those categories.

By finding others in the

situation that take the same positions vis

a vis

him that his

self /other pattern specifies, he can maintain self-identity,

even though specific people and events have changed.

His

priority is the laying out of a clear self/other pattern via
clear categories that can be related to one another in an

orderly and "rational" fashion.
place within the Symbolic.

Everything has

a category,

a

This place could be found by

tracing out through rules of similarity and analogy,

a

logical deduction of categories, the implications of one's

original self /other relationship.

Any messiness must be

cleared up and properly categorized in order to allow the

transposition of self/other patterning through the network of
already established categories.

Ordering of experience

through already established categories makes transposition
and translation easier by clearly labeling, clearly defining,
the boundaries of things.

Then all one has to do is maneuver

through those positions via the transposition of one's
self /other pattern.
We have delineated these two self-strategies as extremes
A self that

approaching the limits set by the two poles.
only used the female self-strategy would be

a

self that was

so pliable she would take on absolutely any form some other
in her vicinity desire of her.

She would be so dependent on

others to determine her form for her that she would take on
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whatever shape was given her with no questions asked.

A self

that only used the male self-strategy would be a self that
so

rigidly adhered to his own fixed conception of himself that
he could never change, but would have to continually repeat

the same self /other pattern with no variation.

He would thus

need an other who was very pliant, changing to fit his need
in whatever new situation presented itself,
a

or he would need

very stable external situation with rigid Symbolic

categories.

As we have seen it is more likely that the

particular position between the poles taken up by an
individual would combine the two self-strategies in some form
or other.

As we have also seen,

there would be a critical

point for each individual, representing their own conception
of gender categories,

that would be the point of "no return"

for these individuals when it came to incorporating any more
of the opposite-sex self-strategy than they already had.

Testing a particular text for this critical point has given
use useful insights into the conceptual barriers preventing
an author from making use of his own suggestions for getting

himself out of dilemmas he himself confronts

.

By analyzing a

text's category of 'woman', we have been able to suggest new
ways of getting beyond certain impasses of the text the

author couldn't due to his conception of gender categories.
Such an analysis suggests an internal critique of the gender

categories of the text.

Reworking gender categories can

resolve problems presented by the text.

The "deconstruction"

of gender categories a gender-sensitive reading of
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philosophical texts can provide could, in turn, have
ramifications in the broader realm of social relations

between men and women

5

.

3

Variations in a Male Position
The positions taken up between the two poles, with

a

critical point different for each individual, mean that each

individual divides humanity into the two groups of "male" and
"female" a bit differently.

It also means that

individuals may divide the two groups up with

a

many of those
greater or

lesser overlap of the male and female characteristics that

both sexes can share without putting their gender into
question.

But as long as there are gender categories there

will always be a point where a person of one sex cannot

manifest characteristics of the other sex.
will call

"critical point" where if

That is, there is

what

I

say,

were to go any further toward the female pole,

a

no longer be a man.

I,

as a man,
I

would

The same is true for a woman, coming

from the female pole, and going towards the male pole.
I

would further argue that this critical point has to do

with the need for two strategies that are complementary.

A

purely "feminine" self would get lost in the broader realm of
social positions.

Since her priority is connectedness with

an embodied other,

she acts in responsiveness to another

rather than on the basis of social acceptability.
extent that she takes on

a

To the

masculine self-strategy she can

position herself in a socially acceptable way.

To be
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guaranteed
a

a

position in the broader social realm, she is to

greater or lesser extent dependent upon

position her.

a

masculine self to

In her responsiveness to this self she takes

on the role of other that will guarantee her a position
in

the social realm.
A purely "masculine" self would lose the richness of his

embodied experience.

Since his priority is positioning

himself vis a vis Symbolic categories, he orders his

experience via categories in accordance with the self/other

pattern that will maintain his identity.

Like any theory

that refuses to respond to data it hasn't yet been able to
explain,

such a self-strategy would soon lead to

falsification of one's experiences by reducing them to
inadequate categories.

To incorporate new aspects of

experience into one's self /other pattern, however, one needs
a

responsive other.

It

is only through the responsive

mirroring of an other that anticipates one's desire that as
yet meaningless bodily sensations can be incorporated into

one's self /other pattern.

Each individual has their own sense of when a strategy

would no longer be complementary and so threaten their own
selves with extinction.

Depending on one's upbringing and

cultural background, this critical point would come at

various places between the two poles.

Thus,

the critical

point for each person would represent that point at which

they can no longer conceive of the kind of response necessary
for maintaining their self-identity, the point where their
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own strategies would fail because there
would be no strategy
out there to complement it
As we have seen this critical point can
take different

forms.

Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre all have
different

conceptions of gender categories

— that

is,

the critical

point, or conceptual barrier, past which they
cannot push

incorporation of two self-strategies further, differs for
the
three of them.

I

for each of them,

will now characterize the critical point

relating that critical point to what we

learned about their particular category of 'woman.'

Kierkegaard

:

Kierkegaard could conceive of

female self-strategy with respect to a man.

a

woman taking a
That is, he

could conceive of a woman being receptive enough to

a

man to

allow an experience beyond her conceptual categories to
occur.

The princess waited for the knight of infinite

resignation or the knight of faith (depending on how it

turned out) to make up his mind about how to deal with the

unsuitability of their match.

The bride waited in all

modesty for the groom that never came.
entrust her destiny to the merman.

herself be saved by Tobias

.

Agnes was ready to

Sarah was ready to let

All the women characterized by

Silentio in Fear and Trembling were either innocently
recept ive--wait ing for someone to take them by the hand--or

actively entrusting themselves to the judgment of another.
Thus,

all these women were willing to receive another, to

entrust themselves to the judgment of another even though to
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them that other's reasoning may have seemed irrational
according to their own sense of the Symbolic

.

Because they

were women, willing to take the female position with respect
to another, they put connectedness with another first.
is,

That

they were willing to override their own sense of the

Symbolic in order to satisfy the desire of the other.
The man who won this woman's trust, on the other hand,

had the weighty responsibility of respecting that trust by

keeping the woman within the bounds of the Symbolic.
Silentio's conception of 'woman' was of someone who utilized
a

female self-strategy of surrendering herself to the form

given her by the "other" of another's self /other pattern, and
who took no responsibility for maintaining Symbolic order.
This,

in turn,

necessitated that the man take all

responsibility for maintaining Symbolic order.
to impossible,

concerned,

It was next

and inconceivable as far as Silentio was

for a man to let go of his self /other pattern

enough to let himself be informed by the female's "other".
Since the responsibility of maintaining the Symbolic order
was his and his alone, and since overflowing his own

self/other pattern to receive another could subvert Symbolic
categories, he could not "indulge" in a female self-strategy.

And yet, Silentio felt the restriction of Symbolic
categories.

He granted a kind of experience beyond all

categories, beyond the universal, within the context of

God-relationship

a
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Silentio could more easily justify taking up the female

position with respect to God.

That is, of conforming to

God's desire by playing the role of "other" in God's
se f /other pattern.
-^-

he could not,

however,

taking up this role with respect to women.

conceive of
For someone in a

God-relationship, someone who attended to the will of God,
who had a faith in God that went beyond all Symbolic

categories, there were feelings and acts that went beyond the
Symbolic, beyond what could be communicated in language,

beyond the rational.

Thus,

man could take up a position of

innocent receptivity with respect to God, without forsaking
his role as upkeeper of the Symbolic order.

Social relations were protected from an exploration of

inwardness that included opening oneself up to the desire of
the other and letting it inform one.

Silentio allowed the

possibility of individual transformation, but stopped short
of social transformation.
of faith remained the same,
same,

The external demeanor of a knight

social categories remained the

the traditional male/female complements of self-

strategies remained the same.

It was only in inwardness that

one could explore the possibility of breaking down

traditional ways of dividing the task of self and other that

maintain subjectivity.

But the new kind of subjectivity

Silentio posited in the inwardness of the knight of faith
could not be translated into the outwardness of social
relations.
.

The receptivity with respect to God that defied

all categories was a realm of inward experience that man
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would not introduce into the Symbolic.

He would keep it to

himself, knowing that his actions could not be expressed
via

any available categories.

Man could take up a female

position with respect to God, just as woman could, but
Silentio could not conceive of man taking this position with
respect to woman or other men.
Silentio'

s

critical point, then, did not come in

positing a man in the female position.

It came in

determining the "other" with respect to whom this position
could be posited.

Silentio could not conceive of

a man who

would risk subversion of Symbolic categories, because it was
the male sex that must preserve those categories.

Since

women weren't responsible for maintaining the Symbolic order,
if men gave up that responsibility,

then the Symbolic would

be threatened with dissolution and chaos would ensue.

To

counter this possibility, man had to make sure that he did
not forsake his role.

Silentio maintained the possibility of

getting beyond restricting Symbolic categories by positing
the possibility of a different kind of self-strategy carried
out in an inwardness that would not effect one's external

relations with the world.

Thus,

he could conceive of the

incorporation of the two self-strategies into one as long as
the Symbolic order itself could be kept safe from tampering.

Nietzsche

:

Nietzsche went further than either of the others

in questioning the boundary between the two self-strategies.

His free spirit could make use of both.

But he still felt
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that different self-strategies had to be divided between

different groups of people.

he recognized the importance

those with "feminine instincts" had for the "strong," but he
to see that if the "strong" were to incorporate two

self -strategies into one, other individuals of the human

community would have to make corresponding changes.

Nietzsche

s

critical point comes in his failure to recognize

the interdependency of self-strategies

The free spirit

.

should be able to impose his self/other patterning on others,
and yet challenge Symbolic categories by overflowing any and
all categories that do not respect the specificity of his own

experience.

Thus, Nietzsche's free spirit would impose a

patterning that requires the support of the Symbolic, at the
same time that he should respect life's specificity in

that would subvert Symbolic categories

.

a

way

he should create the

categories that speak to his own experience, but he should be
able to create these categories with no help from another.
Thus, Nietzsche overlooks the complementary nature of what

I've called "male" and "female" self-strategies in his

attempt to incorporate them.

Silent io recognizes that an

attempt to subvert categories needs to be contained within
the context of a relationship.

Nietzsche doesn't provide

this context, thus leaving him much more vulnerable to being

overwhelmed by chaotic flux.
Nietzsche's conception of 'woman' is that she should
stick to her feminine role so that man can perform his task
of incorporating the two self-strategies.

But he fails to
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recognize that an incorporation of the two self-strategies

would require a change in the other that played another's
"other".

Since human identity is created and maintained in

interdependent relationships, and since self-strategies must
be complementary, a change in one self-strategy necessitates
a

change in the other.

For Nietzsche's new vision of

subjectivity, of the free spirit, to work, all must change to
support this new kind of subjectivity in the complementary

and interdependent network of human relations.

Nietzsche's

critical point comes in failing to recognize that the change
he envisions cannot be of one individual or an elite group of

individuals

— it

must be a whole community of individuals.

Thus, while Silentio's conception of a new kind of

subjectivity takes into account its relational nature,

Nietzsche's critical point leads him to believe that

a

new

kind of subjectivity can be imposed on others in the same way
that the old, male identity was.

Sartre

:

Sartre recognizes that there's no particular reason

that any particular group of people should take on one or the

other of the two self-strategies

.

But he could not conceive

of incorporating the two strategies.

If there weren't a

group of people to play the other, if the distinction between
self and other was not complete, then identity, and human
agency, would fail completely.

He could not tolerate any

overlapping of the two strategies, although the possibility
of such an overlap comes out in his work.

His critical point
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comes in conceiving that a man could make use of a
female

self-strategy.

He concedes that others may refuse to don the

female self-strategy— but this only makes it harder and
more

unlikely that one will find an "other" to fit one's own
se ^ f /other pattern.

The task of being a man is thus harder

than ever, but it is still the same task.

One can't count on

the Symbolic since it turns out not to be sanctioned the way

that one thought

One cannot count on the Law of the Father

.

to preserve one's identity.

If one is to preserve an

identity, one must continually impose one's self /other

pattern.

With the legitimacy of the Symbolic in doubt, this

task is harder than ever, but at the very least one must make
sure that one doesn't become an "other" for another's
self /other pattern.
Thus,

Sartre's critical point comes in taking on the

female position with respect to any other— be they God or
human.

He shares Nietzsche's feeling that the Symbolic is

arbitrary, but rather than challenge it or subvert it in
light of one's own specificity, or in light of a God-

relationship, he focuses on the need to legitimate Symbolic

categories on one's own.

One must take responsibility— there

is nothing else to appeal to,

nuances of life.

neither God, nor subtler

One must admit that all is arbitrary and

take responsibility for the categories one chooses to affirm
as being arbitrary.

Unlike Silentio, Sartre doesn't feel

that man has a responsibility to maintain the Symbolic as it
is.

He doesn't specify the conditions under which one is
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justified in subverting the Symbolic because he believes
that
one is always recreating the Symbolic.

Like Nietzsche, he

thinks the Symbolic is an arbitrary creation that has
no

claim to legitimacy or authority.

Unlike Nietzsche, he

doesn't think that there's anything beyond it to inform one.
If the Symbolic has no legitimacy,

does.
a

no authority,

then nothing

There is nothing with respect to which one can take up

female position of receptivity, nothing one can entrust

oneself to, in order to let oneself be informed by

a

new

shape that will give rise to new categories.
If the Symbolic has no legitimacy then there is nothing

to inform one and one is entirely on his own, to make sense
of an inert in-itself as best he can.

Unlike Silentio,

Sartre doesn't think there's any other with respect to which
one can take on a female self-strategy.

Unlike Nietzsche,

Sartre doesn't think there's any pulse of life waiting to

inform one.

For any meaning at all to exist, one must create

one's own categories out of the nothingness of one's own
freedom.

Thus,

unlike Silentio, Sartre throws the Symbolic

into doubt, but refuses to take up a female position with

respect to anything else.

He thus can conceive of the

failure of a male self-strategy, but he cannot conceive of an

opposing self-strategy with any efficacy.

All three show some awareness of the possibility of two
st rategies--that is,

they all seem to be aware that the male

strategy is not the only one, that there is another strategy.
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their stance toward, that other strategy varies.

All

three have varying critical points that constitute varying

conceptual boundaries in their ability to incorporate the two

self-strategies of the typically male and the typically
female into a new self-strategy.

While Silentio will allow

the possibility of being informed by God's desire, and

Nietzsche allows the possibility of being informed by
to power beyond rational categories,

a will

Sartre will not allow

himself to be informed by anything at all.
the refusal to be informed by a human other.

All three share
The mark of the

male position that they all share is the refusal to take on
the "other

"

of a human other's self /other pattern.

At the

same time, all three grant this as a mark of the female

position, of 'woman' as she appears in their texts.

Tracing

out these three male positions has thus allowed us to arrive
at a critical point that they all share in common.

next section

I

In the

will explore the possibilities that going

beyond this critical point may lead us to.

5

.

4

Suggestions for

a

New Subjectivity

Up to now we've thought of the two strategies as needing
to be performed by one or the other of the self /other dyad.
We are now ready to move to an incorporation of the two

positions into one.

That is, up to now there has been what

I've called a "critical point"--a point where the individual

could not envision anymore overlap of the two strategies
without endangering the possibility of subjectivity entirely.
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There may have been a greater or lesser overlap of the

masculine and feminine, but finally each according to their
gender had to bear responsibility for one or the other of two
kinds of functions designed to maintain the identities of
both.

If either the one or the other failed to carry out the

function they were responsible for then identity,
subjectivity, would fail.

This would entail obliteration of

the worst sort for both parties.
In a relatively static society with rigid Symbolic

categories, an individual would assume an identity at birth

and keep that identity the rest of his life.

For example, a

serf in feudal times would not have much opportunity for any

change in his identity.

His identity would be staked out in

terms of his relationships to the people around him.

These

relationships, being relatively static, would ensure a

relatively static self.

For the breakdown of static social

relations to occur without a loss of stable subjectivity,
there must be a group of people willing to mirror back the
desire of those who would create new identities.

For

example, a serf who typically thought of himself as

subservient and lacking in decision-making abilities would

need someone to reflect back to him his dawning desire to
fight back rather than submit to demands.

A mother gives the

infant's initial attempts to reach out for something by

putting an object in his hand.

She notes what he's reaching

for and anticipates a desire the infant may not have yet

recognized in himself.

The women, or man, who picks up on
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the serf

s

impatience with his position and reflects back to

him an angry person with the power to act will be able to
affect the serf

s

subjectivity by allowing him to incorporate

new aspects of his experience (e.g., the tension of his body

which now signifies his anger to him)
pattern.

into his self/other

Thus a social position takes on new meaning in the

context of concrete relationships with others.
In our complex society there has been a proliferation of

symbolic structures.

Mass media and cable TV, along with

accelerated methods of transportation, have created

a

clash

of all the symbolic structures various cultures have created.
If we could delineate a "central" network as the symbolic

structures representing Western hegemony, we could target

subsidiary networks from "deviant" walks of life as well as
"marginal" cultures all across the globe, that are being

incorporated into the "central" network and which incorporate
other symbolic structures into themselves as well.

With this

complicated Symbolic, the positions one may take up with
respect to others have become much more diverse.

While a

serf might need a concrete other to reflect back to him new

aspects of himself,

a

boy from a family of farmers might

choose to emulate Michael Keaton of "Family Ties" and get

involved with public TV.

.

Having been presented with this

option by the media, he has a new position available to him
that may be better suited to how he experiences himself in

concrete relationships than, say, trying to keep the family
farm afloat.
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With the proliferation of identity possibilities
supplied by a symbolic framework that has expanded to absorb
more and more of the vast range of human experience, we no
longer need to relegate women to the role of "other."

As

long as there is a group of people prepared to play out an

extreme version of female subjectivity, there is

a

group of

people flexible enough to provide men with whatever "others"
they need.

Such a group of people insures that a continuous

self-identity can be maintained even when new situations are

being confronted that exceed the current Symbolic categories.
As the globe becomes a world community and the Symbolic

allows an increasing diversity of positions, we no longer

need one group of people to supply this kind of cement.

The

Symbolic structures have become complicated enough to allow
each individual to take on the positions that suit his

experience without needing a group of people that will
surrender their own self/other pattern to conform to that of
another's.

Thus, both sexes could now assert themselves as

individuals, transposing themselves through the Symbolic,

without needing others flexible enough to sacrifice their own

positioning in order to nurture new identities.

There are

enough paths laid out so that one can sort through the
various and conflicting Symbolic orders of various cultures
without getting lost, without needing an other to conform to
one.

Thus, a new option is opened up--the possibility that

we could all learn to perform the role of other without

losing the role of self.

We can all play the self because
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there's a complicated enough variety of Symbolic structures

available to us to fit

wide range of experience.

a

This

allows more likelihood that two people with conflicting

experiences can find common ground in the Symbolic.

We can

also play the other, without sacrificing our own self/other
pattern, because there are parameters that can open up

between two selves that allow such mingling.

That is, there

is room in the overlap between the two selves for both to

play "other" to the other's self at the same time that the
other continues to confirm their own self /other pattern.
This creates a kind of play-space similar to what we looked
at in chapter two in our discussion of Winnicott

Both

.

selves need confirmation of their social position and yet can

release new aspects of their experience in keeping with their
other's "other."
For example,

I

may be a white, male lawyer with an

office in New York City.

My self/other pattern with

a

subordinate requires that he give me a certain amount of
deference and so forth.

If

I

could allow myself to play the

other's "other" in a way that prioritized concrete

connectedness rather than Symbolic categories,
myself playfully engaging with the subordinate.

I

might find

Instead of

disqualifying any aspect of our interaction that didn't fit
my self/other pattern,
his body.

I

I

would allow my body to respond to

would then give these responses meaning by

attending to them and articulating them in one form or
another.

For example, picking up on his body stiffening when
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gave an order in a certain way, and modifying my order.

The same would hold true for the subordinate's engagement

with me.
course.

This kind of interaction occurs all the time of
The point here is that two modes of interacting can

be going on at the same time, with either one mode

masculine self-strategy

)

or the other

strategy) predominating.

(the

(the feminine self-

It's interesting to contemplate how

quickly the form of the lawyer/subordinate relationship would
change if both parties made predominate use of a feminine
self -st rat egy

Gender-sensitive readings of philosophical texts can
help us explore and articulate how gender affects our world-

view and our ways of relating with human others.

Articulating the two strategies, valorizing both of them, and
demonstrating how they can come together into one strategy,
will help pave the way toward a new kind of subjectivity in

which both strategies can be used by all individuals.
I

have tried to suggest how such an incorporation of the

two strategies might work.

For reciprocal relations to work,

individuals must be able to use both strategies equally well.
They must be both responsive to the desire of the other, as
well as clear on their own parameters.

They cannot let

themselves be taken over by the desire of the other, and they
cannot let themselves turn into dictators of the form the

other will take.

[6]

Instead, both must utilize both

strategies in an equal give and take.

This give and take is

within the confines of the Symbolic in the sense that it
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makes use of the positions the symbolic makes available.

It

also defies the Symbolic in the sense that it readily

subverts Symbolic categories, for example, those of status
(as we

saw in the example on the previous page) or gender,

in

order to create new categories in keeping with the concrete

specificity of the concrete relationship.

But this new kind

relationship is not merely the imposition, transposition,
of the self-same identity of one onto an other;

it

is the

creation of two new identities in reciprocal responsiveness
to the desire of the other that gives them a new form within

the parameters of their identity as laid out by the Symbolic.
In the three philosophers

I

have looked at here

explored the possibilities for

a

new subjectivity presented

I

have

by each;

Kierkegaard

:

In his relationship to God,

Silentio talks of

receptivity to the incomprehensible desire of an other.

a

If

Silentio could take this position with respect to a human
other without losing his own identity, he could stretch his

identity beyond "rational" standards, without losing his
identity entirely.
to God,

I

Thus,

what he says about a relationship

take as being instructive for a relationship with

another that doesn't take one outside of one's own
parameters.

In addition to the male sense of self that

maintains its identity in a self/other context by imposing
its self and making the other conform to its desire for the

other that will sustain that sense of self, this new self-

maintaining human being will allow the same receptivity to an
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other that defies all "rational" meaning given to life and
one's own experiences as Silentio suggests that Abraham felt
in his acceptance of God's desire despite its apparent

irrationality.

If every individual

— whether

male or female

could allow this "irrational" moment to creep into their own

project of maintaining self-identity, they could allow faith
in the other they were involved with to carry them through

that moment where the other was taking them beyond themselves

and what they had already worked out through the

transpositions of a male self-strategy, to a new moment where
things made sense in an entirely new perspective.

they could take

a

That is,

"leap of faith" by trusting that in taking

on the role of "other" to another's self /other pattern, they

would not entirely forfeit their own position.

Nietzsche

:

Nietzsche suggests that we are not tied to any one

position in the Symbolic, but his taking on of the female
position doesn't have the parameters of Kierkegaard.

Instead

of taking on the female position with respect to a particular

person, Nietzsche attempts to take on the female position

with respect to life.

This is admirable.

But it also makes

the danger of losing all and any identity much more

immediate.

That is, Nietzsche has no answer to the question

of how to protect one's identity given that one has abdicated

from the male strategy in order to take on the female one.
If one were to attend to every nuance of one's embodied

experience, one's self and perspective would unravel.

Without some sort of parameters to guide one's attentiveness,
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the world would quickly lose its coherence.

Attending to the

nuances of one's embodied experience in responsiveness to an

other in order to respond to the other's desire,

is the

feminine self ~ strategy for providing such parameters.
]

Kierkegaard protects himself from the loss of all

identity by speaking of dropping the male strategy only

within the context of

a

God - relat ionship

.

Nietzsche tries to

adopt female relationships with respect to all life

experience, and yet insist that it is one's own personal

responsibility to yet maintain identity.

Thus, he

complicates things for himself by refusing to admit that
identity is a contextual affair in which people have to take
on various roles if one is to continue as a person.

He tries

to say that one individual can take on both strategies and

not have his identity fail rather than admitting that if his

vision is to work, both parties must take on both strategies
so that both can continue as identities working in a

reciprocal relationship.

Instead he insists that woman

continue to play her role--even if it is an arbitrary one
and he insists that even though man should push toward the
female position, that he should be able to protect himself
from a loss of identity, not by insisting on

a

reciprocal

change in any other, but through sheer strength of will.
Sartre

:

Sartre suggests that the Symbolic order is not

sacrosanct, thereby breaking down the legitimacy of a

masculine self-strategy.

Although he doesn't offer

a

feminine self-strategy as an alternative, we can trace the
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struggle toward

becoming God.

new kind of subjectivity in the project of

a

Sartre says that such a project is impossible,

but he is operating on the assumption that each individual
has the project of becoming God.

both in-itself
for-itself

— an

— the

No single individual can be

object subject to the gaze of another

consciousness that gazes

— at

once.

community of individuals could conceivably attain

— and

A
a

state of

in - itself-for-itself if they could achieve reciprocal

relationships.

If the self-strategies of the individuals of

the community perfectly complemented one another, then it is

possible the community could form a harmonious, selfsufficient,

self-causing whole.

The new self-strategy incorporating both female and male

self-strategies

:

This self would be based in both opposition

and connectedness as two moments in the whole of a dynamic

process of self-maintenance

.

A self that made equal use of

both strategies would be a self that would use the positions
laid out by the Symbolic as a vehicle for translating and

transposing its own self/other pattern to new situations and
contexts.

it would also be a self that would be open to

being informed by the desire of an other within the

parameters set by an overlap of its self/other pattern with
the self /other pattern of the other.

That is,

it would

adhere to the form of its self/other pattern, but it would
also be flexible enough to overflow the boundaries of its own

314

self/other pattern in order to conform to the "other" of

a

/other pattern of someone of his or her choosing.
In the reciprocal relationship of a fusion-experience
in

which both selves are able to take on

a

female self-strategy

with respect to one another, each will anticipate the desire
of the other in a mutual attempt to pleasure one another.

Thus, neither will dictate the exact shape the other should

conform to.

Instead, the two selves will create a new

self /other pattern for both, by mutually conforming to the as
yet unarticulated desire of the other.

That is, through

attentive receptivity to the concrete specificity of the
other that defies all categorization, each self will

anticipate the desire of the other and attempt to satisfy
that desire before it is voiced.

In this mutual

attentiveness where each attempts to conform to the other's
"other," the parameters of both selves' self/other patterns
will change.

The desire to satisfy the other will lead each

to overflow the self-boundaries set by their self/other
But this overflow of self-identity

patterns in the Symbolic.

will remain within the parameters of taking on an "other"
that will satisfy another.

The transformed self /other

pattern of each will also be continuous with their original
self/other pattern since that pattern was the context within
which the other attended to the self's desire.
For example, two colleagues may have very decided views
on their relationship vis a vis the other and the book they

want to write together.

If both take on a female self-
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strategy with respect to the other, those views will swiftly
change.

Rather than attempting to fit the other and the

project into one's self /other pattern, the individual will

attend to the pleasure of the other.

Again,

a

playspace is

created in which both try to tune in to and anticipate the
desire of the other.

In this state of reciprocal

attentiveness the project and their relationship to one
another take on

a

form that is different from either

individual's preconception of it.

Thus, the self /other

pattern of both is transformed in the process of creation.

5

.

5

Philosophy and Feminism
The new self-strategy that

I

have just characterized

above came from a reading of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and

Sartre that took the possibility of two types of self-

strategy and their incorporation into one self-strategy
seriously.

This possibility cannot arise until the male

self-strategy is no longer considered the ideal norm for any
and all self-strategies.
of self-strategy,

In order to articulate a new kind

one that utilizes the advantages of both

male and female strategies, we need to become aware that
there are two types of strategies, characterize the types and
the various forms the positions that fall under each type can
take, and articulate ways of incorporating the two more fully

into one.

Thus far such a project has been hindered by the

assumption on the part of both male and female theorists that
the only "good" strategy--the only strategy that is a
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strategy

is the male,

oppositional strategy.

We will not be

able to formulate a new kind of subjectivity until we
can

koth recognize and affirm the female self —strategy as

a

strategy that has, in its own right, solved the problems of

effective human agency.

Both strategies have their

advantages and draw-backs.
can work without the other

As we have seen,
.

neither strategy

But a further exploration of

both strategies as strategies rather than as givens about
human nature or "man" and "woman" needs to be made if we are
to go beyond both to a new mode of being, a new kind of

subjectivity that can create new possibilities for human
existence
I

consider the interpretive framework that

I

have

sketched above to be tentative and contingent in the sense
that further use of it will inevitably change it.

What

I

would like to see is further investigation of the differences
between a male and female self-strategy, and further

speculation about how the two might be combined in such

a way

that we could do away with the need for any gender categories
at all.

There have been many interesting studies in recent

years about human nature and the self.

The Frankfurt School,

post-structuralists such as Foucault and Derrida, have all
made provocative attempts at articulating the dialectical

nature of self/other relationships and self/society contexts
in order to enrich our understanding of human nature.

none of these attempts has taken gender into account in

systematic way.

But
a
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Unless feminist theory is taken seriously, and unless
the existence of two kinds of self —strategies are taken

seriously

each with their own valid perspective to offer

— we

have no possibility of working beyond gender to a new kind of

subjectivity that could allow each and every individual to
make use of both self-strategies and so expand their

perceptions of the world.

Until we can take female

experience as an aspect of life that is informed by

a

perspective every bit as valid as the male perspective, we
will never be able to confront the impasses we currently face

and move beyond them.

Not only must we grant "female"

experience as a different perspective on life, but we must

characterize what constitutes that difference in perspective
and we must incorporate that perspective into the new world-

view that we are all struggling to create.
I

would like by interpretive framework to allow

a

reading of all those who have investigated human self-

understanding in the Western idealist tradition, in
that will bring gender to the fore.

a

manner

Most of the people who

have written on the subject have not directly addressed the

question of gender.

They have written analyses that are

"gender-blind" in the sense that they have completely

excluded or ignored the female perspective by either

marginalizing it or putting it completely off-stage.
Feminist theory has, of course, tried to correct this
limitation.

What

I

have tried to do in this dissertation is

to suggest an interpretive framework that would allow us to
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utilize the insights of these gender-blind analyses of
human
nature and self by reading these very same gender-blind
texts
in such a way that gender is brought to the fore.

For the

purposes of this dissertation, this framework is restricted
to a specific philosophical tradition, although it is

possible it could have
Even

a

wider application.

gender-blind text is informed by gender.

a

theorist speaks from

a

Every

position that is gender-informed,

speaks from a perspective that makes more or less use of

either

a

"masculine" or "feminine" self-strategy.

Reading

these texts with such an interpretive framework in mind

highlights the gender categories at play in
text.

This,

a

particular

demonstrates the importance of these

in turn,

categories as conceptual barriers to envisioning a new mode
of being for humanity

— one

that goes beyond gender

categories, that reaches beyond relations to others built

upon oppositions and domination, and instead strives for

relations built upon connectedness and cooperation.

Feminist theory is not relevant merely for the feminist

project of emancipating women from a role that has become

constricting and oppressive for women.

It

is also the key to

resolving the conflicts we all face, both men and women, in
our self-concept ions

identity.

.

We are moving to a new sense of self-

Both men and women need to make full use of both

self-strategies to give full expression to the new kind of
human being that is currently emerging.

Until men can get

over their gender-blindness, and until women can get over
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assuming that they must either become male to speak, or
must
deny

male" self-strategies in order to affirm themselves
as

women [7], we will not be able to create the new self-image
we need to create a new kind of human community.
^®it.her sex can ignore the advantages of the other's

self-strategy.

Both sexes must learn to incorporate the

advantages of the self-strategy of the other.

We must

overcome our differences in order to affirm what both have to
°ff er to the other.

Human identity always has and always

will be a product of a social and communal enterprise

— no

single individual can form and maintain an identity without
the help and support of the others around her.

For women to

be emancipated, both men and women need to change.

For men

to deal with the crisis in values and meaning that currently

faces them, both men and women need to change.

We need to

recognize and affirm the interdependence of us all, and the
need we all have for both male and female strategies in order
to maintain human identity.

transform

a

Only then will we be able to

practice of maintaining human identity that has

divided two tasks between two sexes into
incorporate those two tasks into

a

a

practice that can

dual task that can be

performed by all in reciprocal relationships based in mutual
trust and respect.
A gender-sensitive reading of philosophical texts can do

several things for us:
1)

It can help us further articulate the interdependent

nature of human identity.

Once we've put the self into
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context

,

positing it as one moment in the whole of a

self/world relation rather than isolating it from the world
in which and by which it constitutes itself,

we can further

elaborate that context by investigating the other kinds of
selves a self needs in order to continue in a particular
form.

Once we start seeing how various kinds of selves

constitute one another in
^ ® Ist

ions

,

a

community of interlocking human

we can better understand what kind of contextual

transformation would be needed to effect particular kinds of
individual changes.

In particular,

we could better

understand the way current gender categories work in

preserving both male and female selves and so envision

a

transformation of gender categories that would respect the
way in which gender categories play off of one another.
2)

It can help us further articulate the interdependent

nature of various perspectives on reality.

The "masculine"

worldview, as represented in the dominant discourse of the

Western tradition, would not be possible without its
"underside"

— the

unarticulated feminine position that

supports the masculine worldview.

If we all actually

subscribed to the masculine view that fullfledged personhood
consists of autonomous thought and action that asserts its

mastery over everyone and everything around

would soon fall apart

.

it,

human society

"Masculine" persons can only maintain

this view as long as there are silent,

feminine others to

submit to playing the roles necessary for maintaining this
illusion.

Without the feminine prioritizing of human
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connectedness, the masculine prioritizing of human
opposition
would have left them so alienated from themselves
and other

people that they would no longer be able to function
as

members of a society.
3)

It can

demonstrate the importance of feminist theory to

both men and women without invalidating the achievements
of
the masculine perspective.

Just as the feminine perspective

has been crucial to the development of the masculine

perspective and self-identity, so is the masculine
perspective crucial to the development of the feminine
perspective and self-identity.

Without the Symbolic

structures put into place by masculine self-strategies, the
feminine perspective could not be articulated.

is thus

It

not a matter of male against female or vice versa, but of two

kinds of perspectives, each of which enabled the other one to

exist

Given my account of human identity as the product of an

interlocking network of self-strategies, and given the role
human identity has to play in the constitution of

particular world-view,

a

a

better understanding of gender is

crucial to human self-understanding as well as an

understanding of how we shape the reality we attempt to
describe.

Philosophers who have any interest in

a

deeper

self-understanding or a deeper understanding of the way our
self-understanding enters into our understanding of the world
we live in,

can therefore not afford to marginalize gender
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issues.

We can no longer afford to assume that
understanding

the experience of a particular group of people
can give us
the whole picture.

Not only are the experiences of the rest

of humanity crucial for an understanding of the
human race as
a

whole

they are crucial to the understanding of the

masculine

perspective as well.

Feminist theory not only

allows women the opportunity to theorize about their

particular perspective on the world and human affairs, it
also allows men the opportunity to better understand what
informs their own perspective.
In addition to what

I

have called the "female"

perspective, we could distinguish other alternate

perspectives that form the background to the dominant
discourse.

The "marginal" perspectives that aren't

incorporated into the current hegemony of the current
dominant discourse takes many different forms.

Gender is one

way of approaching the interdependency of various

perspectives.

Additional categories for characterizing the

different perspectives are those of race or class.

It

seems

to me that gender is one of the key entrypoints into an

exploration of the interdependency of various perspectives
because it is the one perspective that counters the dominant

masculine discourse that each and every one of us experiences
from birth on.

Gender difference is

identity from our earliest childhood.

a key
[8]

part of all human
As we grow up we

learn to marginalize various parts of our identity--we learn
what aspects of our experience finds expression in the
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dominant discourse and what aspects are marginalized

according to various other categories such as race, class,

geographical region, or other "deviancies" (being
handicapped, or whatever)

.

To create a self that is

acceptable in all walks of life, we constitute ourselves

according to the social categories that apply most
universally.

We learn to restrict other aspects of our

identity to the social contexts where it is accepted
P ar ticular geographical region,

people.

— our

or a particular group of

Trying to introduce these identities created in

smaller, more marginal, contexts creates the tension that

introduction of a "marginal" identity into the hegemony of
the dominant discourse of a culture always creates.

Gender is a focal point for

a

particularly interesting

way that certain self-identities have been marginalized.

Female self-strategies constitute roughly one half of the
population, and yet they are still considered "marginal"

according to the dominant discourse.

Feminist theory that

attempts to characterize and valorize female self-strategies
is still considered marginal in academic departments all

across the country.

Female academics have learned to

marginalize their female experience,
have.

just as male academics

To have a voice in the dominant discourse as given

expression by the academic community, one must marginalize
the female aspects of one's experience and speak with a male

voice

324
It

is only if we articulate the female
perspective,

as

well as the male perspective that we will be able to
explore
ways of changing both perspectives by bringing the two
closer
together.

experience.

Both perspectives capture aspects of human
The question is, do we want the two perspectives

divided between two groups of people, or do we want an
entirely new perspective that can be shared by all.
say a "new perspective"

I

When

I

don't mean the perspective of a

God's eye view that finally captures all of human experience.
If such a view is possible,

me to envision.

What

I

it is too far in the future for

do mean,

is a perspective that can

see all perspectives as interdependent and mutually
af f ect ing--and that can valorize all the different

perspectives that go into the whole perspective of a human
community as equally valid.

[9]

A philosophy that takes

gender and gender issues seriously has the task of providing
a

theoretical framework in which various perspectives can be

seen as mutually supporting and mutually enriching.

Thus,

instead of valorizing any one perspective as the "correct"

view of human experience, we will have a perspective for
seeing how various perspectives not only fill out the picture
of reality, but also make other perspectives possible.

The self-strategies

I

have laid out here and

characterized as either "male" or "female" could take many
different forms depending on culture, race, class, and other
factors that may enter into one's particular identity.

[10]

Gender is an important place to start in investigating the
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interconnectedness of all perspectives and how they interact,
because it is

a

crucial feature of everyone

'

s

original

creation of a self in connectedness with and individuation
from a same-sex or opposite— sex other.

We need a perspective

that can hold multiple perspectives together, giving a

theoretical framework in which their interdependence and
their interconnectedness can be explored.

Masculine

identity, being oppositional in nature, opposes itself to a

female other.

It may oppose itself to other groups of human

beings as well, depending on its race, class, etc., but its
most fundamental opposition is to a female other.

[11]

Thus,

gender is a key entry point for commencing an exploration of

philosophical texts as the creation of a perspective that is
dependent upon the background of another perspective.

To

better understand the way human perspectives play off other
human perspectives, gender-sensitive analyses are crucial to
the philosophical enterprise of theorizing the human

condition

NOTES
[1] For discussions of the problem of difference in a
feminist context see, for example, Bulkin, Pratt and Smith
(1984), Hooks (1984) and Spelman (1982).
This problem has
been of on-going concern in the women's movement due to the
difficulty of forming a collective identity as "women."
Women come from different races, ethnic groups, and economic
backgrounds. These differences may often seem more striking
than the shared identity of one's gender. Feminist theory
has taken on the challenge of being sensitive to these
differences at the same time that it still attempts to
provide a comprehensive theory. My remarks in this chapter
are informed by this discussion.

[2] It is on this point that I'm very sympathetic to
post-structuralists like Foucault and Derrida who carry on a
continual practice of deconstruction.
I do,
however, feel
that there is at least possibility of achieving a new worldview more satisfying than the present one even if such a
world-view would be quickly outmoded.
I am thinking of a
world-view here along the lines of a group-identity
constructed by myriad individuals, just as a self is
constructed from myriad fragments of embodied experience.

—

[3]

See Dworkin

(1974)

and Frye

(1983)

[4] Although I chose three male writers since my
particular interest here is the limitations of male
positioning, I certainly think female writers can exemplify
In addition, how gender categories impact
male positioning.
on the self-constituting activity of women and just what
might constitute a "woman" writer (or a writer beyond gender
categories?) are both interesting questions that I would like
to explore in the future
[5] I am influenced here by Janice Raymond's discussion
of problems with the concept of 'androgyny' for feminism in
The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She~Male (1979, ch

VI)

.

[6] For a discussion of problems due to the "egopermeable-boundaries" of the female gender see Flax (1978)
[7] The French trend of l'ecriture feminine explores
See
some of the problems of a purely feminine voice.
Eisenstein and Jardine (1980), Marks (1978), Marks and de
Courtivron (1980) and Moi (1985)
.

[8] I am thus, for the purposes of my project,
emphasizing gender as an identity category. For a discussion
of what identity categories (e.g., race, class, gender) have
priority that challenges this view, see Elizabeth Spelman
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(1985)
her view brings up for my project the interesting
question of how other kinds of identity categories affect
self-strategies.
Such question, however, are beyond the
scope of this work.
.

[9] This is a Hegelian view in the sense that I'm
assuming a sort of "coming together" of perspective along the
lines of absolute spirit.
Any self-respecting post-modern,
P os t-structuralist would turn over in her grave!
I here
admit a yearning for this kind of ultimate closure, at the
same time that I accept deconstructing practices as more
feasible for a day-to-day understanding of human experience.

[10] I have argued that there are many positions in a
spectrum of positions between the poles of "male" and
"female" that an individual could take; thus, for example,
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre are representative of three
variations in male positioning. The possibility that such
positioning could be affected by factors such as race, class
or ethnicity, is a fascinating one, but I don't have the time
to pursue it here.
To bring up this possibility and do it
full justice would complicate my project to the point of
absurdity.
Rather than taking this as an indication that the
kind of
of gender categories I propose here is
exploration
[11]
futile, however, I take this as a further indication of the
possibility of getting beyond gender categories entirely.
See my discussion of this point with respect to the feminist
concern for differences among women in chapter one, section

1.5.

Again, that the opposition of male and female is
the most fundamental opposition is subject to debate both in
Although I am advocating
and outside of feminist circles.
gender as an important category of analysis, it is not
crucial to my project that it be accepted as the most
fundamental identity category.
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